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Abstract 
This dissertation investigates public sector work and the desire for concursos in 
northeastern Brazil. It considers the meaning of civil service to “new” middle class 
Brazilians and seeks to understand how standardized entry tests are used to further 
aspirations of upward mobility. The desire for public sector work has its roots in 
histories of economic instability, paternalism in the private sector, and neoliberal state-
craft. Neoliberalism alters the dynamics of the labor market, making available positions 
in the public sector through the expansion of the penal state. For many participants in 
this project, the desire for public sector work is at once a proactive alignment with the 
neoliberal project of the state and a reaction to shrinking public entitlements and 
instability in the labor market, arising from an environment in which social insecurity 
threatens families perched precariously on the boundaries of middle class. In Brazil, the 
system of concursos overlays on previously established forms of governmentality in the 
labor market and higher education, linking individuals, families, and the state in the 
construction of desire. This desire shapes patterns of consumption in education, travel, 
and home ownership, as well as discourses in the moral economy—where critiques of 
the public sector are most prevalent by participants in this project, despite their own 
participation in concursos and continued expressed desire for public sector work.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
“Get a public sector job and you’ll have it for the rest of your life. Doesn’t 
matter if you lie, cheat, steal, or don’t show up for work. They can’t fire you. The only 
way you can lose your job is if you kill someone. And even then, it’s negotiable…” 
Or so I was told by a Brazilian taxi driver in the summer of 2011. I was in the 
capital city of Recife in the northeastern state of Pernambuco. I had gone to study the 
relationship between higher education and income earnings, but upon my arrival, I was 
swept up by the “febre do concurso”—the fever surrounding entrance exams for public 
sector work. The intensity of concursos in public discourse seemed to me a recent 
development since my previous visit to the area during 2003, and certainly since my 
childhood in northeastern Brazil during the 1980s and 1990s. Working for the 
government had become the dream job, now within grasp of ordinary Brazilians. There 
were countless stories of the perks of public employment: Work one day a month—
payday! Show up to retrieve your paycheck and then disappear until the next cycle of 
disbursement. Maintain a public job in a neighboring state (you do not have to be 
“present” for work if you live out of state!). Hold multiple positions in the public sector 
(work only a handful of hours a week for each job!). 
Talk of concursos dominated popular conversation: upcoming examinations for 
public employment were posted in newspapers and announced on the radio, street 
performers danced on the corners of busy intersections twirling advertisement posters 
for the newest cursinho (a preparatory course for an entrance exam), and billboards for 
test prep centers lined the highways and main bus routes (Figure 1). While riding in a 
taxi one afternoon, my driver summed up the obsession with the public employment 
2 
epidemic sweeping the country. “It is,” he said, cupping his hands and lifting them 
reverently to the sky, “the great pearl of the labor market.”  
 
Figure 1. Billboard advertising cursinho (author 2012) 
I returned to Recife the following year to study this gem and the participants, 
technologies, markets and discourses with which it was supported. I spent the greater 
part of 2012 conducting fieldwork in the city, received multiple participants in my home 
during their own vacations to the United States in 2013, and returned to the city in 2014 
for follow-up fieldwork. I talked to hundreds of Brazilians—on busses, in taxis, at 
gyms, in grocery stores, in neighborhood parks—about these standardized tests. I asked 
people, young and old, if they would like to have a public job. One hundred percent 
answered affirmatively. If they had children, I asked if they would like their children to 
have public jobs. Again, the responses were overwhelmingly affirmative. But when I 
asked people to explain why they desired public employment, their replies were less 
certain. Nearly every person cited stability (estabilidade) as the source of desire for 
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public sector work, but few could articulate what stability meant in their own lives or 
readily explain how it would change their current situations. 
What is the significance of public employment to the families who participate in 
Brazil’s entrance exams? A staggering number of resources were devoted to the passing 
of concursos, which were increasingly selective and expensive endeavors. Moreover, 
concursos often competed with other items in the household economy, including higher 
education, home ownership, and consumptive practices. Nevertheless, on examination 
days, thousands of test takers filed into designated testing facilities around the city to 
compete for employment positions.  
The odds of selection were not in their favor. Participants interviewed in this 
project often found themselves one among tens of thousands. I accompanied one such 
young woman to an exam for employment as a customer service attendant for the local 
municipality. She was one of 21,209 examinees competing for 405 openings (vagas)—a 
selection rate of less than 1.9 percent. Another young woman tested for a position as a 
teller at one of the national banks. There were no openings advertised for the job and, 
therefore, no guarantee of employment. Instead, examinees were placed on a “reserve” 
list, to be considered as positions became available. In the previous concurso for the 
same job title in 2010, approximately 200 applicants were called to fill teller positions 
from among 11,696 examinees (a selection rate of about 1.7 percent) before the time 
limit on the reserve pool “expired” and a new concurso was scheduled for 2012.  
During the time of my fieldwork, low selection rates between one percent and 
five percent were not uncommon in entrance exams, especially for mid-level (nível 
médio) positions. By the time of the writing of this dissertation, the selection rates were 
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even more overwhelming: in one single concurso in the state of Minas Gerais, 134,270 
examinees tested for 32 openings in the labor court (Colitt 2015). Why families 
continued to pursue concursos, allocating significant portions of their household 
economy to the construction and reproduction of desire for public employment, is 
central to this dissertation. 
Explaining Desire 
Where does the desire for public sector work come from? There have been two 
explanations traditionally referenced when investigating the preference for public 
employment in Latin America. The first has to do with wage premiums. Grounded in 
quantitative data, proponents of this view highlight the appeal of public employment 
benefits including, “participation in a different pension fund regime (without an upper 
limit), a raise in salary every three or five years, paid leave, near-absolute job security, 
lack of incentive structures that interfere with productivity, and even a wage premium 
over the corresponding private sector” (Mattos and França 2011:45). Brazil has the 
highest wage premium in all of Latin America (Love and Baer 2009). The average 
public employment wage premium has been estimated at 28 percent based on earnings 
data for positions at the municipal, state, and federal levels (Pessoa and Martins 2006). 
That is to say, the average wage in the public sector is nearly a third more than a 
comparable position at a private firm. When wage premiums are broken down at the 
local, regional, and national levels, the premiums can range as high as 250 percent for 
high ranking administrative positions (Macedo 1985) and 230 percent for federal 
positions in the southern part of Brazil (Foguel et al. 2000). 
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These are striking figures and certainly suggest a potential motivation Brazilians 
may hold for pursuing public sector work. In actuality, however, positions affording 
large premiums are the exception rather than the rule and often benefit the political elite 
rather than those in the middle ranks of the public sector hierarchy. For example, 
teachers working in public schools generally experience a negative wage premium over 
their private sector counterparts (Vaz and Hoffmann 2007). Most mid-level positions in 
state and municipal governments have a negative premium as well (Panizza and Qiang 
2005). Employees occupying the middle of the hierarchy in public employment 
regularly register low to negative wage premiums over their private sector counterparts. 
Indeed, for most of the participants in this study, the concursos chosen had wage 
premiums that were significantly depressed, if not actually negative, compared to 
positions in the private sector. Moreover, participants in this project knew that these 
positions paid less than comparable positions in the private sector. One young woman 
working as a teacher at a prestigious private secondary school tested for a position as a 
public elementary school teacher. Upon passing the entrance exam and ranking high 
enough to assume the job, she asked to be terminated from her position at the private 
school. In sheer financial terms, her decision could be considered “irrational.” Her two 
children had received free tuition at the private school as a condition of her 
employment—a monthly benefit package totaling more than R$5,700. Her termination 
meant that expenses for private schooling would have to be assumed by the family and 
paid out of pocket. Additionally, her monthly salary was reduced by nearly half, 
dropping from R$2,300 to R$1,200 in moving to the public sector. Thus, wage 
premiums appeared to have little to do with her desire for public sector work. They 
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were, at best, a theoretical rather than actual incentive of public employment. The 
problem with the explanatory framework of wage premiums outlined above is that it 
privileges the maximization of economic capital and obscures the social and cultural 
factors some Brazilians consider when navigating the labor market. 
The second framework offered to explain the preference for public employment 
in Latin America has to do with class identity. A quick survey of the literature on class 
identity in Brazil establishes the relationship between class and occupation (Chilcote 
1990, Goldstein 2003, Owensby 1999, Ribeiro 1995). This is not to say factors such as 
phenotype, income, and consumptive practices do not matter to class belonging—there 
is plenty of evidence that they do (Burdick 2013, Caldeira 2000, Edmonds 2010, Dent 
2012, King-Calnek 2006, O’Dougherty 2012, and Alves and Evanson 2011)—rather, it 
is to say that occupation is central to class identity in spite of these factors. Some would 
argue this is a classic Marxist argument: ownership of production shapes occupation, 
which in turn shapes class identity and motivates social actors. Indeed, Marxist 
frameworks have enjoyed (and continue to enjoy) broad appeal in Brazil among 
academics and activists alike. But occupation has been a longstanding component of 
class identity in Brazil (and in Latin America more broadly) since the colonial era. 
While the effects of the colonial legacy remain the focus of many research projects, 
most social scientists agree that there are temporal and spatial consequences of 
colonialism that remain to this day (Shohat 2006). Wacquant frames state-craft as 
“structurally conditioned but historically contingent” (2012:74) and thus shaped by the 
colonial legacy. 
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Colonialism first linked elite classes with the public sector through colonial 
governments, allowing elite families to consolidate land holdings, control access to 
resources, and command indigenous slave labor in the frontier territories through their 
positions in the public sector. In the 1800s, elite classes used public employment to 
foster the maneuvering and exploitation of political and economic institutions and 
protect the intergenerational transmission of wealth among citizens (Metcalf 2005). In 
contemporary contexts, elites continue to use the public sector to drive class identity in 
Latin America. Occupation in the public sector grants public employees access to public 
resources, cash flow, and informal economies  (Aron-Schaar 2002, Nutini and Isaac 
2009).  
Since Brazil has not experienced the kind of social revolution that occurred in 
other parts of Latin America, many conceptions of class identity remain tied to the 
colonial legacy in general and the public sector in particular. For the greater part of the 
twentieth century, the link between occupation and class identity remained strong in 
Brazil despite changes in class configurations. Social mobility during the 1960s and 
1970s was largely acquired through occupational status (Conniff and McCann 1989). 
Approximately 72 percent of upper-lower class Brazilians—those on the verge of 
entering the middle class—secured entrance into the middle class by the 1980s through 
larger processes in the labor market that reconfigured class membership and social 
organization after the military dictatorship (Pastore 1982). In other words, in addition to 
benefitting the elite, the initial expansion of the public sector during these decades 
established a small, albeit precarious, middle class. In the 1990s, when employment in 
the formal economy became increasingly important to middle class identity, pursuing 
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public sector work was one of the only strategies tempering the effects of 
hyperinflation, economic uncertainty, and currency devaluations (O’Dougherty 2002). 
The cultural significance of occupation and the significance of particular types of 
employment (informal versus formal, public versus private) only fueled the desire for 
public employment.  
Proponents of the second explanatory framework maintain that employment in 
the public sector signifies upward mobility and is therefore most often pursued by the 
middle and upper classes who have the resources available to compete for public 
employment (Panizza 2002). When evaluating the preference for public sector work, 
then, the prevailing argument is that Brazilians desire public jobs due to their class 
identity—that is, they pursue public employment because of its historical association 
with elite classes and the contemporary associations between class identity and 
occupation. A middle class graduate in engineering, for example, would pursue a high-
level concurso in the field of engineering. Any wage premiums in the public sector 
would further motivate the individual to prefer public sector work. A lower class 
individual, on the other hand, would opt for a mid-level or entry-level concurso 
requiring less specialization, such as a customer service attendant in a municipal 
building. Any wage premiums for the position in the private sector would motivate the 
individual to pursue work in the private sector, since the desire for public sector work is 
cultivated by class identity. In other words, choices of occupation would be driven by 
class identity, as individuals would be conditioned to desire particular professions 
because of class-based aspirations, experiences, and expectations. 
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At the outset of my fieldwork, I adopted the aforementioned framework, 
viewing the desire for public sector work as a product of class identity. I quickly 
discovered, however, that many Brazilians were more concerned with attaining public 
employment at any cost than they were with attaining a particular occupation or 
earnings level. Twelve of the fourteen participants in my student cohort pursued 
concursos for which they were “overqualified”—in terms of education, income, and 
class. Many Brazilians were willing to accept employment in occupations traditionally 
associated with classes lower than their own, and this was not for a lack of jobs in the 
private sector. In the private sector, however, students were much more discerning 
about the occupation and less willing to accept employment in areas outside their field 
of study. Take, for example, the following excerpt from an interview with Rafaela, a 
young chemistry major: 
L:  Have you already thought about taking a concurso in an area other 
than your field of study? Tell me about this. 
Rafaela:  Yes. I wanted to take one in banking. I like banking. 
L: Like, Caixa Econômica?  
Rafaela:  That is right. Or Banco do Brasil. 
L: That one was just a few months ago, wasn’t it? And did you take the 
concurso?  
Rafaela:  I took it, but I did not pass. 
L: You did not pass. Did you study? Do you take a cursinho? 
Rafaela: No, because at the time, I was, it was during my capstone to 
complete my, my degree. 
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L: Because this was a mid-level job, wasn’t it? 
Rafaela: It was mid-level. 
L:  But do you plan to take more mid-level concursos outside your field? 
Rafaela: Yes. 
L:  Like what? Give me an example. 
Rafaela: When the next banking one opens, it appears that Banco do Brasil is 
going to open one now. An administrative technician. I will see. It is 
like this: I will have to see if there are openings, no openings, lots of 
openings, few openings, things like that. To see if it is worth it. 
L: So these two concursos? And do you have examples of other 
concursos that you have heard about? 
Rafaela: Advanced or mid-level? 
L:  Could be either, that you would take just to get a public job. 
Rafaela: There are mid-level concursos with the courts, but they are very 
difficult. Municipal courts, regional courts, criminal courts, also 
agricultural courts.  
L: So, if you passed, any one of these would be good? 
Rafaela:  If I passed, it would be good!   
L: And give me an example of the private jobs that maybe you are 
thinking about doing even though they are not in the field of 
chemistry. 
Rafaela: There are none. 
L: There are none? 
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Rafaela:  Well, there are banking jobs in the private sector. But I think it is 
fairly complicated. So there are none. If the job is in the private 
sector, it needs to be in the field of chemistry.  
Rafaela considered, and indeed tested for, multiple mid-level positions in the 
public sector outside her field of study. She named a handful of job titles for which she 
would accept employment that had nothing to do with her area of expertise. She was 
overqualified educationally for the public positions, and the employment for which she 
applied had negative wage premiums compared to the private sector. Moreover, the 
occupations for which she tested (bank teller, customer service attendant) were mid-
level positions requiring little specialization and associated with lower class earnings. 
However, when asked to consider comparable mid-level positions outside her field in 
the private sector, her answer was immediate: “There are none.” She maintained that 
employment in the private sector would have to meet certain standards; namely, offer 
specialized work in the area of chemistry and “good” pay. Her responses were not 
unique. I spoke with a number of students who expressed similar strategies about job 
selection. It became apparent that public sector work of any kind was desirable to these 
individuals—having less to do with earnings or occupation than with securing public 
employment at any cost.  
Theoretical Framework 
This dissertation investigates the desire for public sector work and offers a 
framework that does not root desire in income maximization or class-based sentiment 
acquired through class culture, but rather presents it as part of a learned subject 
position—cultivated in citizens by “governing” (Foucault 1991) aspirations though 
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subjectivation and state-crafting projects rooted in education and work. Since concursos 
are inherently competitive in nature, the desire for public sector work motivates social 
actors to participate in “fields” of competitive relations (Bourdieu 1994a) that maintain 
social differentiation and constrain access to resources. Thus, the public sector offers a 
location at which the moral economy, consumptive practices, and competing 
investments in the household economy (investments in education and disciplinary 
technologies such as standardized testing) intersect. I argue that public employment is a 
central pursuit to Brazilians who view themselves as the “new middle class”—a term 
recently popularized in public discourse—and a critical component to the development 
of an emerging class consciousness. In this sense, the desire for public sector work is 
part of larger “learned position” (Steedman 1987:13) through which subjectivity is 
constructed as Brazilians grapple with the meanings of a label (“new middle class”) 
regularly applied to their households. Rather than framing class consciousness as being 
learned upon entry to the labor market, I take the labor market as an object of desire in 
class consciousness, featured in “imaginings” of success (Ortner 2003), which are 
themselves discursively constructed and grounded in a particular history of social 
movements and economic markets. Ultimately, I want to demonstrate how the desire for 
public sector work is constructed, reproduced, and governed as Brazilians form 
“temporary attachments” to subject positions which are themselves discursively 
constructed (Hall and Du Gay 1996). These positions are greatly shaped by social and 
historical contexts, including accumulated histories of identity production, and they 
exist in constant tension with the state (Holland et al. 1998). 
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In this dissertation, I consider the desire for public sector work as it is advanced 
by the state and reproduced by individual participants in ways that are both complicit 
and oppositional to state-crafting projects. I understand the state to consist of the 
institutional frameworks performing the actual bureaucratic functions of governing, as 
well as the larger apparatus of power regulating subjectivity and economy through 
accumulated histories of citizenship, economic exchange, and ideology. I identify state-
crafting projects in Brazil, cautiously, as neoliberalism—“cautiously” due to the 
frequency with which the term is presently applied to the Brazilian case among scholars 
from many fields in academia to describe the effects on the market, morality, and 
subjectivity (Caldeira and Holston 2015, Hunter 2010, Kingstone and Power 2008, 
Love and Baer 2009, Reid 2014, Zibechi 2014)—but also because the term is 
descriptive of structural changes underway in Brazil since the 1990s. Drawing from 
Wacquant (2012), I define neoliberalism as a political project associated with 
commodification, individuality, and the reformation of the state through the expansion 
of the penal wing and the reduction of the welfare wing. Neoliberalism, in Wacquant’s 
view, “actively [fabricates] the subjectivities, social relations and collective 
representations suited to making the fiction of markets real and consequential” 
(2012:68). This form of state-crafting entails an increase in flexible labor markets, 
economic insecurity, and social insecurity, all of which contribute to, and help explain, 
the desire for public sector work. Additionally, I recognize the neoliberal project as 
internally contradictory (Dent 2012)—a “deeply consolidated and crisis driven form of 
market rule…marked by compromise, calculation, and contradiction” (Peck 2010:106). 
In this environment, the desire for public sector work is at once a proactive alignment 
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with the neoliberal project of the state and a reaction to shrinking public entitlements 
and instability in the labor market. That is, employment by the penal state offer a refuge 
from the anxieties of the market. 
 Methodology 
Why study the northeast? Anthropologists have largely located themselves in the 
southeastern part of Brazil investigating a wide range of topics including race, class, 
diaspora, religious identity, nationalism, public health, and violence. But how any of 
these issues are experienced in the northeast has been largely ignored. Regional 
differences are sure to exist: the northeast is marked by the colonial legacy and builds 
its industry of tourism on this reputation. It is also a region that has experienced severe 
discrimination and marginalization, both politically and economically, from the more 
“modern” cosmopolitan south. It would be foolish to paint an ethnographic portrait of 
subjectivity in the United States with data limited to New York City. Such a project 
would not only ignore variation in other parts of the country, such as the southern 
United States, but it would also be misleading in its characterization of lived 
experience. By the same token, the ethnographic literature in Brazil lacks the regional 
representation portraying variation of subjectivities, often at the expense of those in 
marginalized areas. Thus, one reason to locate this study in the northeast has to do with 
my desire to address this gap in the literature. 
The second reason has to do with economic development. Historically, the 
northeast has been associated with “a dense rural population, the severest poverty, and 
intermittent droughts…[as well as a] history of out-migration” (O’Dougherty 
2002:173). It contains “the largest single concentration of poverty in Latin America” 
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(Reid 2014:166). However, in recent years, and indeed, since the presidency of 
northeasterner (nordestino) Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva, the northeast has transformed 
from the most economically depressed, poverty stricken region in Brazil to one of the 
most thriving regions in terms of economic growth. This economic development 
presents a unique opportunity to observe the evolution of work and desire as it is 
experienced on the ground, during periods of massive structural change. Large inflows 
of capital and development initiatives stimulating privatization in the past decade have 
created a multiplicity of jobs in the private sector (Beluzzo et al. 2005). During my 
conversations with northeasterners, many made a point to comment on the irony that 
those from the state of São Paulo (Paulistas), once thought of as the modern 
breadwinners of Brazil, were now migrating in droves to the northeast where they, as 
one woman put it, “take our jobs and our money because they cannot find work where 
they live.” This critique was regularly leveled at northeasterners just a few decades 
earlier in the 1980s and 1990s and characterized the discrimination toward the region. 
But the tables have turned and, at the time of my fieldwork, the capital city of Recife 
was thriving. Home prices had tripled in less than two decades and preparations to host 
the FIFA World Cup promised to bring heavy investments in infrastructure, 
transportation, and security. In 2012, the Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV), a leading 
center for political and social research in Brazil, released a publication identifying 
economic development in the northeast as the primary driver of the reduction of 
inequality for the entire nation of Brazil (Neri et al. 2012). 
Finally, this ethnographic project affords the opportunity to investigate 
subjectivities largely neglected in the anthropological literature: middle class Brazilians. 
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The expansion of concursos put public sector work within grasp of the “common” 
Brazilian, or so it seemed, shifting the labor paradigm from “who you know” to “what 
you know.” The significance of this transformation of the geopolitical landscape cannot 
be overstated. The city of Recife is well suited to study the effects of concursos on 
subjectivity at the local level, as many of these changes are recent (within the past 
decade) and still evolving. I am fortunate to have conducted my fieldwork over a span 
of four critical years (2011 to 2014) in which emerging subjectivities among the “new” 
middle class shifted from a spirit of optimism to one of mass protest against the state. 
During the first few years of my fieldwork, the real was trading strong, averaging 
R$1.30 to the USD. By the writing of this dissertation, it had dropped to R$3.80. It is 
my hope that the contribution of ethnographic data in the northeast during this time will 
provide a glimpse into the personal lives of Brazilians undergoing rapid change and the 
ways in which large-scale structural movements such as class mobility, remaking of the 
state, and economic changes are experienced by individuals themselves. 
With respect to participant selection, I wanted participants who not only 
afforded insight into the decision-making processes of social actors but also grounded 
larger, national movements of education and public sector work in “ethnographies of 
the particular” (Abu-Lughod 1993). It was especially important to me to maintain a 
small sample size in order to devote more time to families, following participants in 
depth over a longer-term project. When I initially drafted selection criteria for this 
project, participation was limited to 1) twenty students who were enrolled in local 
institutions of higher education in Recife, Brazil, and 2) their parents. I focused 
recruitment on organizations that functioned as a bottleneck for students preparing for 
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concursos. One, for example, was a test center offering cursinhos for entrance exams to 
public employment. It was widely recognized as one of the best test prep centers in the 
city and charged some of the highest rates for specialized classes. Another was a center 
offering courses for the English and Spanish components of standardized tests at more 
affordable rates. Since many mid-level and upper-level concursos have a language 
component, I theorized that a language prep center would be a reasonable place for 
recruitment of students competing in multiple fields (higher education and public 
employment) as well as families with more limited resources. I only selected 
participants if they were actively engaged in the pursuit of public sector work. 
At the beginning of my fieldwork, I was introduced to participants from 
personal contacts. It was through one of these contacts that I came to teach English at a 
language prep center. My pool of students greatly increased upon teaching and I was 
able to observe informal conversations in the classroom and public discourse about 
aspirations for employment in larger groups. At the end of my fieldwork, I had 19 
participants, with whom I devoted most of my time to participant observation: staying 
in their homes, getting to know their families, accompanying them on errands, going to 
church services, birthday parties, and social events, and observing their household 
economies. While I did not enter the study to explore race or religion, these emerged as 
important topics. My sample was too small to permit systematic exploration of these 
issues, but did include some relevant diversity I discuss throughout the dissertation. My 
focus on tertiary students came from a desire to contribute to larger discussions about 
the lack of skilled labor in the private sector and the apparent lack of returns on 
investments in higher education (both topics discussed below), and I intended to follow 
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the student cohort through an academic calendar year—February to November—
highlighting the changes in their attitudes toward public sector work as they graduated 
and experienced job procurement thereafter. However, the year of 2012 was one in 
which nearly every federal organization went on strike, including university professors 
and employees, and the research design of my project was altered considerably as I had 
to shift my focus away from higher education (Figure 2). I followed the lead of many 
students who found themselves in a “holding pattern” during the strikes: I put my 
efforts into investigating their preparations for standardized testing and their pursuit of 
public sector work. 
 
Figure 2. University television message: "We are on Strike" (author 2012) 
In 2013, I was able to host two families in my home during portions of their 
vacations in the United States, accompany them on their travels, and observe firsthand 
their perceptions of travel and subjectivity abroad. Finally, I had the opportunity to 
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return to Recife for a brief period in the summer of 2014. I conducted follow-up 
interviews with 12 of the 19 original participants. 
Broader Context 
Why study the desire for public employment? This dissertation frames public 
sector work as a site where aspirations about class identity, economic stability, and 
education intersect and can be investigated in more detail. The frenzy surrounding 
concursos is a recent phenomenon and gets at the heart of what “development” really 
means in the Brazilian context. The desirability of public jobs dominates narratives of 
postsecondary students in the northeast and the discourse about “why” they participate 
in higher education. Moreover, the subject of concursos consistently comes up in 
conversations in a number of public spaces, reflecting a growing interest among 
Brazilians in issues of higher education, privatization, and economic development. 
Advertisements in billboards, newspapers, and television spots for concursos permeate 
the propaganda for higher education, and a growing number of peripheral markets are 
emerging in support of the increasing demand for public sector jobs. Included in these 
are for-profit tutoring and test centers offering cursinhos. Studying desire informs larger 
questions about identity: How is it constructed and reproduced among Brazilian 
families? How is it used in particular sites to contest, reconstruct, and reproduce identity 
in Brazil? 
Additionally, this dissertation investigates the desire for public sector work in an 
effort to contribute more broadly to discussions about the lack of skilled labor in the 
private sector and the questionable value of higher education. The lack of skilled labor 
in the private sector is thoroughly researched in more “quantitative” social sciences. 
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There is not as much data from qualitative sources. Despite the expansion of private 
industry in the northeast and record numbers of graduates entering the labor force, there 
remains a national shortage in the supply of skilled labor in the private sector. This is 
due in part to an overwhelming preference for public sector employment, even in 
positions where employees earn less than their private sector counterparts. This 
dissertation contributes more broadly to the question of why recent graduates prefer 
employment in the public sector even in contexts of lower wages, limited professional 
mobility, and intensified recruitment efforts by private businesses. 
The questionable value of higher education has been discussed in multiple 
disciplines. While Brazilian anthropologists have studied extensively institutions of 
higher education, especially with respect to elite cultures and affirmative action 
policies, there is little on the relationship of higher education and public sector 
employment. Higher education is generally associated with upward mobility and 
increased opportunities for employment and income earnings. It is increasingly 
common in many Brazilian contexts, however, that investments in higher education are 
not demonstrating the economic returns expected in the labor market. Global initiatives 
in economic development have traditionally privileged education as a means of 
increasing income on the statistical premise that those with higher levels of earnings in 
developed economies also have greater levels of educational attainment. However, the 
relationship between upward class mobility and higher education is less clear than many 
economists and policy makers would like. So it is in Brazil, where persistent inequality, 
paternalistic models of employment, corruption, and public sector privilege constrains 
the income-raising potential of higher education. 
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The context of higher education in Brazil has changed dramatically over the past 
20 years. Schwartzman (2004) notes that enrollment numbers have more than doubled 
in two decades, resulting in an exponential increase in the numbers of Brazilians with 
educational attainment at the tertiary level. The privatization of higher education over 
the past three decades drastically increased the accessibility of postsecondary 
institutions and contributed to an educational environment in which private institutions 
outnumbered public institutions 10 to 1 (Bertolin and Leite 2008). However, there 
remained a shortage in the supply of skilled labor in the private sector in Brazil. Mattos 
and França (2011) note that the public sector workforce contained approximately 40 
percent more skilled laborers than the private sector, even though the public sector was 
targeted for budget cuts under deficit-reduction programs and the private sector was 
expanded through initiatives in privatization and economic liberalization.  
The shortage of skilled labor in the private sector amidst a labor market full of 
postsecondary graduates presents an unusual dilemma. Models of economic 
development suggest that skilled laborers should be exogenously allocated by market 
forces to sectors with the greatest demand for them (which, in the case of northeastern 
Brazil, would be the private sector). However, as discussed above, college-educated 
laborers end up in the public sector. Since concursos and higher education compete in 
the same social and economic spaces, this dissertation will contribute to questions about 
the value of higher education more broadly. How are resources shifted when families 
consider investments in higher education versus investments in the public sector? How 
is higher education changed if it is perceived of (and used) as a credentialing technology 
to access public employment (that is, it is only achieved for the purpose of getting a 
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public sector job)? What happens to the value of higher education if it is rendered 
unnecessary to obtain public sector work (as in the case of many mid-level concursos 
that do not require college degrees)? 
This dissertation aims to investigate these questions and contribute to larger 
discussions about the anthropology of work, education, and subjectivity. A note on the 
contents and organization of this dissertation: Chapters 2 and 3 sketch historical 
overviews of the labor market and higher education in Brazil. In Chapter 2, I examine 
how longstanding economic instability, shifting models of corporate management, and 
legal frameworks protecting civil servants heighten the desire for employment in the 
formal economy and in the public sector. I explore the notion of near absolute job 
security and meanings of “stability” for participants in this project, focusing in 
particular on the link between public sector work and the capacity to consume and 
accumulate in the fields of education, travel, and home ownership. I investigate these 
concepts at the familial level as collective aspirations reproduced through job selection 
and exchanges in the informal economy, whereby individuals act as extensions of the 
family and families act as collective extensions of the state. Chapter 3 considers higher 
education in Brazil in light of the colonial legacy. I explore how the desire for public 
sector work overlays on previously established foundations of governmentality and 
politics of exclusion in institutions of higher education. In particular, I examine why 
markers associated with class identity and mobility, intergenerational transmissions of 
wealth, and cosmopolitanism are easily transferred from higher education to public 
sector work. Like job selection in the labor market, I take the pursuit of higher 
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education at the familial level and offer ethnographic examples illustrating how higher 
education is at once complementary and in competition with public sector work.  
Chapters 4 and 5 contain the bulk of my theoretical framework and bridge the 
“historical” chapters on the labor market and higher education with “case studies” on 
travel and home ownership. Chapter 4 considers technologies of power dominating 
conduct and objectivizing the subject. I investigate how state-crafting projects and 
changes to the horizontal strata produced an environment of social and economic 
insecurity for many participants in this project, and I consider the role of anxiety in 
shaping subjectivity. I suggest neoliberalism, as articulated by the Brazilian state, 
shapes subjectivity and interactions with the market. This is especially visible in the 
emergence of the union/government/corporation bloc as it alters class consciousness 
and the ability to organize politically, as well as in the advancement of 
commodification, individuality, and the reformation of the state through systems of 
penality.  Chapter 5 considers technologies of self practiced by participants in 
constructing themselves as ethical subjects. I focus on evangélicos as a category of 
practice and draw from Weberian frameworks outlining the protestant calling and 
interpreting the will of God to examine subjectivation through moral discourses. In 
particular, I investigate why some participants find public sector work morally 
objectionable and how they navigate the ambivalence they feel about corruption in the 
state whilst pursuing their own desire for public sector work.  
Chapters 6 and 7 offer case studies in which I explore accumulated histories of 
state-crafting projects and technologies of conduct as they link the desire for public 
sector work to travel and home ownership. At the outset of my fieldwork, I was 
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surprised to find that Brazilians most often cited travel and home ownership when 
expressing their desire for public sector work. In Chapter 6, I consider travel as a 
behavior associated with the kind of person participants envision themselves becoming 
with public sector work. I suggest that flexible citizenship, conspicuous consumption, 
and experiential value drive the desire for public sector work since travel has less to do 
with an actual quantifiable amount of money and more to do with the perception of 
public employment facilitating that travel. Chapter 7 sketches the relationship between 
public sector work and home ownership. I examine why owner occupancy has become 
integral to middle class identity and how the Brazilian state has facilitated this 
transformation in citizens and in the market through the public sector. I consider new 
meanings of home ownership in the domestic sphere (with special attention to the 
decline of domestic workers in middle class homes), in fields of conspicuous 
consumption, and in the production of “leisure” lifestyles.  
Finally, I conclude this dissertation with an overview of my main points and a 
discussion of the shortcomings of my research design. I reflect on the “lessons learned” 
during fieldwork and offer a brief summary of the potential areas in which this research 
project could be expanded in the future.  
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Chapter 2: Labor Market 
The desire for public sector work has roots in the longstanding instability of the 
labor market in Brazil. Instability is an enduring feature of post-colonial economies in 
Latin America, and Brazil is no different in this regard. A complex history of debt 
crises, budget realignments, and privatization shaped the labor market from its early 
days as an export economy built on slave labor, to import subsidized industrialization 
and state protectionism, to the crisis and currency devaluations of the 1980s, to the 
“neoliberal” reforms of the 1990s (Bulmer-Thomas 2003). As of the writing of this 
dissertation, Brazil was on the cusp of yet another recession, with high unemployment 
and political instability. Despite a history of volatility, employment in the private sector 
was relatively stable during the period of industrialization, from the 1930s to the 1980s. 
Laborers in the private sector were often employed in industries protected by the state—
such as manufacturing—and worked in businesses patterned after familial models of 
corporate management: paternalistic, personal, and stable employment for members of 
the family and its extended social network.  
This model of organizational behavior is well documented in Latin America by 
development organizations such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) and the International Finance Corporation (IFC), and it is often 
linked to agrarian models of social organization. It remains the dominant form of 
corporate management today in Latin America and is partly responsible for shaping a 
moral economy in the labor market that is widely recognized as “quintessentially” Latin 
American: a moral economy in which the expropriation of public sector resources for 
private use is broadly accepted and practiced whilst theft in the private sector is strictly 
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forbidden and representative of a personal affront against the family (Elvira and Davila 
2005, Evans 1995, IFC 2014). Differences in attitudes toward the public and private 
sectors are relevant to discussions about concursos because they help explain the 
desirability of the public sector work. This chapter investigates how the desire for 
public sector work in contemporary contexts emerged from a history of political 
volatility and paternalism in the private sector.  
As mentioned earlier, the private sector afforded relative stability during the 
period of industrialization. With the implementation of liberalization policies in the mid 
1980s, state protections on domestic enterprises were gradually removed, and 
domestically produced goods were required be more competitive in the “free market.” 
Within a decade, projects aimed at eliminating import taxes and quotas, privatizing 
national industries such as automobile and mining, and participating in international 
bond markets resulted in more “flexible” labor markets. That is to say, the private sector 
experienced a shift in corporate management models as businesses emphasizing familial 
interests and social status cut employees and benefits to maximize profits and compete 
in a marketplace less protected by the state. By the 1990s, the number of businesses 
operating under a familial model was further reduced with the arrival of foreign 
investment and management. Brazil was the largest recipient of direct foreign 
investment in Latin America, second only to China in the world, illustrating the sheer 
scale of the privatization of state-owned enterprises and the inflow of foreign companies 
(Bulmer-Thomas 2003). Among the top 30 percent of the largest private corporations in 
Brazil, for example, the familial model of corporate governance went from being used 
in two thirds of companies in 1997 to about half in 2007 (IFC 2014, Silveira et al. 
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2007). As private sector businesses became less dominated by inward-looking familial 
concerns and more infused with external interests (whether domestic or foreign), 
anxiety about loyalty to the company, stability, and job security increased. 
By the turn of the twenty first century, more than half of the labor force (62 
percent) was employed in the informal economy due to this shift, as well as 
hyperinflation, recession and unemployment averaging 14 percent (Love and Baer 
2009, Reid 2014). The informal economy has long been an integral segment of Brazil’s 
exchange system, but it is often ignored or understudied in the literature because of 
uncertainty about its definition and difficulty in measuring its qualities and forms. Hart 
(1973) first coined the term “informal economy” in an effort to distinguish between 
productive activities characterized by wage labor (which were reported to the state) and 
self-employment (which were not). Danesh (1991) defined the informal economy as 
unregulated exchange activities, including those that could potentially take place legally 
(“grey” markets) and those occurring in direct opposition to the state (“black” or 
“shadow” markets). In this sense, moonlighting, clandestine employment, household 
economies, bartering, tax evasion, drug trafficking, trading illicit goods or service, and 
bribes or grafts were all sectors of exchange in the informal economy, meaning that 
almost everyone participated in the informal economy in some form or another.  
The International Labor Organization (ILO 2012) differentiated between 
informal employment and informal sectors in Brazil—the former being representative 
of work in any sector without a formal labor contract, taxation, or legal protections, and 
the latter being representative of unregistered, and thus unregulated, enterprises 
including (but not limited to) self-employed small vendors or peddlers producing goods 
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for sale or barter, informal cooperatives of producers, unregistered domestic workers, 
and prostitution, drug trafficking, and other “illegal” enterprises. In Latin America more 
broadly, Portes et al. (1989) identified the informal economy as the whole of 
unregulated “income earning activities” that occur in markets in which similar activities 
are practiced within the purview of the state. In this definition, participation in the 
informal economy was defined by one single feature: employment. That is to say, 
informal economies were characterized by the presence of wage laborers working apart 
from state regulation, but in positions paralleling those in the formal economy. This 
definition privileged production activities (and “legal” activities), and traditionally, 
economists in Latin America have focused on sectors like subcontracting in their 
considerations of the informal economy. In Brazil, subcontracting has occurred at the 
most basic level of production and has included activities responsible for gathering and 
assembling primary inputs for production. Benería and Roldán (1987), for example, 
observe that subcontracting in the informal economy regularly involved labor such as 
picking cotton, transporting cotton, working in cotton mills, and sewing garments in 
homes. None of these forms of labor were regulated by the state, and the laborers were 
usually without labor contracts or legal protection, even though their products 
eventually ended up exchanged in the formal economy.  
While a production-focused definition of the informal economy is helpful to 
tracing relations of production within globalized contexts, it is problematic in that it 
ignores the sum of exchange actions that occur informally for purposes other than 
income earnings. Thus, it fails to capture the motives people hold for engaging in the 
informal economy for consumption. To these ends, Pahl (1984) argued that the majority 
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of participants engaged in the informal economy around the globe participated to 
procure goods and services rather than employment. The role of consumption in the 
informal economy is significant to understanding broader relationships between the 
market and social organization (Baudrillard 1997). De Soto (1989) argued that informal 
economies in mercantilist societies in Latin America arose as creative responses to the 
state’s inability to provide for the popular classes. Instead of linking informal 
economies to formal labor markets, de Soto suggested “informalization” was tied to 
consumption. The state’s failure to provide adequate food supplies, health services, and 
public works drove people to engage in informal economies to meet their basic needs.  
This was certainly the case in Brazil at the turn of the twenty-first century. In an 
ethnography of a Rio slum (favela), Alves and Evanson (2011) tracked the informal 
exchange activities of residents through the mutirão—the informal work organized by 
neighbors to construct sewer systems, pave roads, build houses, or extend “stolen” 
electric and cable networks in communities where basic necessities were not provided 
by the Brazilian state. Often, the materials used in these projects were acquired on the 
informal economy and donated by drug lords and militia leaders in the community. 
Moreover, in highly bureaucratic systems in Latin America, the informal economy 
bypassed bottlenecks, accessed luxury goods, and made basic health services accessible 
(Clark 1988). Thus, the informal economy not only paralleled production and 
consumption in the formal economy, but it also functioned to legitimate those who 
opposed the state’s claim to authority and governance via labor, unregulated enterprises, 
and private provisions of infrastructure and basic services. 
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Portes (2010) argued that the further away informal economies operate from the 
control of the state, the more important cultural systems of organization, hierarchy, and 
behavior were to maintaining relations of exchange. Although some economists 
maintain that the informal economy represents a “true” market unencumbered by 
regulation, it is often the case that social structures intervene and constrain market 
principles in ways similar to the role of the state in the formal economy (Doukas 2010).  
In Brazil, the informal economy reproduced social hierarchies and inequities in 
much the same way as the formal economy. Zlolniski (2010) observed that informal 
work reduced the amount of interaction participants had with the state, distancing them 
from formal avenues of recognition in terms of citizenship, civil rights, and personhood. 
Racial and gendered identities were also appropriated to the sphere of informal work, 
undermining the status of participants as “first class” citizens (King-Calnek 2006).  
Historically in the Brazilian labor market, women have tended to participate in informal 
employment more than men, even in formal sectors such as manufacturing, 
transportation, construction, and trade (ILO 2012). This trend continued at the time of 
my fieldwork, suggesting that gender remained a powerful factor in the labor market. 
Thus, in Brazil, as elsewhere, informal economies were rooted in culturally specific 
exchange systems.  
At the same time that over half of the labor force was employed in the informal 
economy in Brazil, the public sector increased at an average annual rate of five percent 
and government consumption as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
doubled (Rodriguez et. al 2008).  The growth of municipalities alone was staggering: 
almost 1,200 new municipalities were founded since 1990, an increase of 27 percent 
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and an industry some termed “lucrative” due to the privileged employment of several 
hundred thousand Brazilians (Reid 2014:276). Moreover, in nominal terms, the average 
monthly income of a public employee rose from R$2,000 to R$3,299 in the first decade 
of the millennium—R$4,342 if the end-of-year disbursement (decimo terceiro) was 
included! In other words, adjusted for inflation, the average monthly income of a public 
employee rose almost R$1,000. In the years between 2004 and 2014, public sector 
wages rose 55 percent, while private sector wages rose only 35 percent, and GDP, a 
mere 12 percent (The Economist 2015). 
It is in this context that I suggest the desire for public sector employment has 
became increasingly feverish. While arguably inconsistent at maintaining real wages 
during periods of hyperinflation and currency devaluation, public employment 
functioned to buffer some of the ill effects of economic and political turmoil and offered 
generous protections under the law and benefits from organized labor. In her 
examination of the labor market during the 1990s, O’Dougherty (2002) maintained that 
employment in the formal economy constituted middle class identity, even though many 
families were unable to subsist without earning additional income informally during 
economic crises. When forced to enter the informal economy to supplement earnings 
from the formal economy, O’Dougherty argued that other forms of consumption 
became more rigid. Thus, it was imperative to utilize private education, maintain 
particular consumptive practices, and travel internationally (e.g. trips to Disney World) 
when other markers of social class (e.g. occupation) became more flexible. 
O’Dougherty provided a particularly helpful analysis of the cultural significance of 
occupation and the significance of particular types of employment (informal versus 
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formal, public versus private). But by the time of my fieldwork, her findings were more 
than two decades old and the context of the labor market had changed considerably. For 
example, in the decades prior to 2000, hyperinflation in Brazil constrained the capacity 
to consume and employment options were flexible, with social actors participating 
heavily in the informal economy to access resources necessary to maintain consumptive 
practices. In the decade following 2000, however, both public and private sector labor 
markets experienced significant growth—creating jobs, expanding education, extending 
domestic credit, and, ultimately, thrusting a new group of social actors into the “middle 
class.”  
Private versus Public 
Public work provides stability (estabilidade). But what does stability mean? 
When asked to define the stability afforded by the public sector, every single person I 
surveyed during my fieldwork responded, “You can’t get fired” (não pode ser 
demitido). Families went to great lengths to achieve public employment, even when 
employment in the private sector offered greater pay. So what does job security actually 
mean and why does it seem to matter so much more than monetary income? Contrary to 
popular opinion, it was not the case that the private sector offered no assistance upon 
termination. Employees in the private sector had access to ample unemployment 
benefits including pay, health care, and resources for job procurement. In fact, during 
my fieldwork, I observed many Brazilians request to be terminated when they were 
ready to leave their jobs, in order to collect unemployment benefits. There was often a 
great deal of negotiation between the employee and the business owner about whether 
or not termination would be initiated by the employee (“I resigned”) or the employer (“I 
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was fired”). The consequences were substantial—determining who would pay or who 
would get paid. Nevertheless, for many Brazilians, unemployment benefits did not 
equal stability, and the private sector did not provide job security. Consider the 
language used by Rafaela in expressing her anxiety about the private sector: 
 Let me tell you the history of private business. Because there are businesses that 
do not fire an employee for any reason, but there are businesses that fire at will. 
So, if you go with a business that does not fire at will, you get fired anyway. 
Because one day the business wants, who knows, like maybe, someone who is 
more specialized. So you are fired. If you are not serving their interests 
anymore, you are fired. The business does not care. Then you are going to be 
unemployed and too old to work! If the business fires you at age forty, then you 
are not going to be able to find another job. Finding a job at forty years old is 
very difficult. 
 
Rather than keep an employee around regardless of performance, as might have 
been the case historically in familial models of corporate management, the private 
sector now functioned as a representation of maximizing capitalist principles. Rafaela’s 
accusation of duplicity—that a business with a history of loyalty and favorable job 
security would turn on a dime and fire its employees—revealed an underlying anxiety 
about the uncertainty of private sector work. The word trade (trocar) used in this 
context as the verb acting on an employee carried a sense of the subject being 
disposable, like the trade-in of a used car. Private employees were servants, only useful 
in so far as they accomplished the purposes of the company. Perhaps even more 
stinging in this narration was the choice of the word for company (empresa). The 
gendered word selection required the repetition of the feminine pronoun “her” (ela), and 
it was used to striking effect since it invoked a subject identity most commonly 
associated with concern, nurturing, and protection. She (the company) was devoid of 
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feeling; the phrase tá nem ai is a common expression used to communicate the lack of 
concern, or rather, the lack of presence to be concerned in the first place.  
Gender is a powerful factor in the labor market. Of the women employed in the 
formal economy in Brazil, almost half of them worked in the public sector compared to 
only a quarter of men (Panizza and Qiang 2005). In other words, the public sector itself 
was privileged as a site of work (and production) among women. Whether or not this 
trend represented agency among women is less clear. It is possible that job security was 
a gendered value, holding greater weight for women than men. Indeed, for many of the 
families in this project who lived through the instability of the 1990s, one parent 
maintained employment in the public sector and the other in the private. Of the eight 
families in this project with both parents actively employed in the formal sector, women 
worked in the public sector in six of them. It is also possible that employment in the 
public sector was a form of gendered work. That is, the job positions themselves were 
perceived as more fitting for women than men. This may certainly be the case with 
entry-level and mid-level positions, many of which were administrative, secretarial, and 
support staff roles. But it is not clear that the women I surveyed intentionally chose 
these forms of work, or experienced gender bias more broadly. It is worth mentioning 
that at the time of my fieldwork, the public sector remained a largely paternalistic work 
environment, where power was organized from the top down and the state assumed the 
“traditional” role of the father (Chilcote 1990, Conniff and McCann 1989, Silveira and 
Crubelatte 2007). Structurally, then, the higher rate of participation among women in 
the public sector may point to historically-situated mechanisms funneling women into 
forms of work that reflected and reproduced the paternalistic system. 
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Returning to the topic of job security, another participant, Tiago, a 40-year-old 
mail carrier, expressed similar ambivalence about private sector work while relating a 
story about a concurso his sister-in-law had just passed: 
Tiago: She is doing well there.  
L: How is she doing well? Explain it to me. 
Tiago:  Financially well. It is guaranteed income, every month. 
L: Right, she will receive it, won’t she? 
Tiago: Exactly, it is not contract work: “Oh, I got a contract job for one or 
two years.” Then the year is over. And if the contract is not renewed 
and they go after another employee, what then? 
L: Right, that is a problem, isn’t it? 
Tiago:  Contract jobs are problematic. Contracts end. You think it is not 
going to end. Then one year, two years, or a month is over, and you 
have no hope, you have to start filing for what we call 
“unemployment.” Because when you are unemployed, that money 
you put into the pool will support you while you find another job. 
Like many Brazilians I surveyed, Tiago framed the stability of public sector 
work in contrast to private sector work. Contract work (e.g. work in the public sector 
contracted by private companies) carried the constant threat of uncertainty. Unlike 
contract work in the US, for example, where laborers might be optimistic about finding 
work upon completion of a contract, Tiago demonstrated just how pessimistic 
Brazilians felt about job prospects in the private sector. He suggested that actively 
recruiting new employees indicates the private sector’s partiality for instability. Or, put 
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another way, that private businesses prefer instability. Furthermore, Tiago’s assertion 
that the essential “problem” with contracts was that they had an end date was revealing. 
Even though job descriptions and requirements were spelled out in the legal terms of 
employment to which laborers consent, Tiago argued that there was no way to know for 
certain when a contract would actually end. The only certainty for the laborer (or, 
perhaps, the most pressing certainty) was that employment would end. Thus, at least 
from the perspective of many Brazilians, the private sector was viewed as less 
concerned with honoring terms of employment and providing for the employee. Finally, 
and most telling in the quote above, was Tiago’s simple statement that contract workers 
had no hope (não tem esperança). Thus, labor in the private sector was no longer about 
familial models emphasizing loyalty, protection, or concern. Rather, it had become a 
source of anxiety, uncertainty, and instability for laborers. 
Public sector work, on the other hand (and, perhaps, curiously), embodied the 
familial model for many of the participants in this study: loyalty, protection, concern for 
the social welfare of its members. That is, the public sector assumed the role previously 
held by family businesses in the private sector. In his examination of the making and 
remaking of the state, Bourdieu (1994b, 1998) argued that the state is comprised of two 
bureaucratic fields—one serving the interests of the public and the other serving the 
interests of the market. Neither of these fields is homogenous, and sometimes their 
larger purposes overlap, but they represent spaces where officials compete for power 
and determine how the state allocates its resources and energy. Wacquant (2012) further 
defined Bourdieu’s conceptualization by associating the left hand of the state with 
public welfare, education, and societal health and the right hand with discipline, 
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elevation of market principles, and the penal system. He suggested one consequence of 
neoliberalism is the actual expansion of the state rather than its paring down, as the 
penal system grows to manage the effects of neoliberal policies such as deregulation, 
protection of property rights, establishing flexible labor markets, and “punishing the 
poor” (Wacquant 2009). Drawing from the characterizations of these two authors, I 
suggest that the qualities associated with the left hand of the Brazilian state—public 
welfare—are now available to Brazilian citizens through the expansion of the right 
hand—in ever increasing numbers of public jobs supporting (directly or indirectly) the 
penal functions of the state.  
In Brazil, neoliberal state-craft did not result in the reduction of the overall size 
of government, but rather, of particular sectors within the government. In the first 
decade of the millennium, for example, the public sector in Brazil added some 600,000 
positions (growing from 2,080,000 to 2,650,000, IBGE 2014a). Of these, approximately 
450,000 (or 75 percent) were positions linked to the expansion of the penal wing. That 
is to say, about 75 percent of the growth of the Brazilian state consisted of positions 
related to 1) policing—federal police, military police, municipal police, army, navy, air 
force, firefighters and the like; 2) legal functions—judicial, legislative, and municipal 
court administrators; and 3) expanding structures of governmentality—public 
enterprises associated with governing and maintenance of order in new municipalities. 
On the whole, the growth of the public sector labor market was concentrated in systems 
of penality. Thus, while it may appear counterintuitive, neoliberal policies implemented 
by the Brazilian state in the first decade of the millennium actually increased state 
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involvement in the market and expanded the state—the latter of which had a direct 
effect on the size and composition of the labor market at the time of my fieldwork.  
Neoliberalism, then, induced anxieties (labor flexibility, economic insecurity, 
and social insecurity) and prescribed solutions to them (public sector work). Or put 
another way, anxieties introduced through the market framed the penal state as a refuge 
from instability, insecurity, and individuality. I will examine the meanings of 
neoliberalism to participants in this project in more detail in Chapter 4, but for the 
purposes of this chapter, I want to stress that public sector work in Brazil has come to 
reflect the “protective (feminine and collectivizing) pole” of the bureaucratic field 
(Wacquant 2012:73).  
Job Security 
Employment in the public sector in Brazil is provisioned by the constitution and 
provides a range of benefits related to court arbitrations, collective bargaining rights, 
upward mobility, and secure work environments (Panizza 2002). Employee benefits in 
the public sector in Brazil are governed by two pieces of legislation: the Consolidation 
of Labor Laws (CLL) of 1943—consolidação das leis do trabalho—and the Public 
Service Statute (PSS) of 1990—lei n° 8112 dos servidores públicos civís. While 
informal, direct appointments to positions of public administration can secure a job in 
the public sector, these positions do not afford in Brazilian legal frameworks the 
benefits packages and workers’ rights available through formal hiring channels. Under 
the CLL, celetistas (CLL “employees”) secure a job by participating in an application 
process outlined by the employer. For private sector firms, this process can vary 
considerably and usually involves the Brazilian jeitinho—the (cunning or clever) 
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practices used in everyday life to secure access to privilege (DaMatta 1979). Recall that 
familial models of corporate management facilitated these practices in the past. In the 
public sector, on the other hand, most positions require applicants to complete an entry 
exam specific to the job opening and rank in the top tier of test takers to be offered the 
position of employment. Entry exams often have their own requirements depending on 
the job description, but include language qualifications, proficiency in subjects relevant 
to job tasks (like math, science, or reading), and broader competencies in ethics, 
customer service, and vocabulary. Entry exams are ranked by levels (entry, 
intermediate, advanced) based on the minimum qualifications required of test takers to 
take them, and applicants must demonstrate work experience or educational attainment 
credentials prior to registering for the exams. Employees hired under the CLL are 
granted benefits such as social security, partially paid leave, and annual bonuses equal 
to one month’s wages. Additionally, the constitution requires that public employees 
who are laid off continue receiving salaries even if they are not required to report to 
work. Entry-level public employees, such as those in custodial positions, typically work 
an average four hours in a six- or eight-hour work day (Zylberstajn 1994), while 
attendance in mid-level and upper-level positions can vary wildly. 
While the CLL governs public and private sector employees, the PSS is limited 
to employees in the public sector and governs the most coveted public employment 
positions (Zylberstajn 1994). Many of these positions are upper-level state and federal 
job openings, but they also include mid-level positions. Applicants follow the same 
application procedures outlined for public sector hires under the CLL and participate in 
entry exams. Employees hired under the PSS (estatutarios) receive the greatest range of 
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benefits including guaranteed pay raises, paid leave, full salaries through civil service 
pensions in retirement, and protection from termination. The latter benefit has become 
the defining characteristic of public sector work in Brazil. 
In the first formal interview I conducted in this project, Rafaela addressed the 
topic of job security. Her treatment of the subject was so “typical” that I missed the 
importance of her comments until months after returning from the field. The fact that 
protection from termination was often cited as the definition of stability reveals just 
how salient it is to the many who pursue to public sector work. The following excerpt is 
from her first interview: 
L:   Why do you think public work is valued in Brazil? 
Rafaela: Because of its stability. 
L: And what does stability mean? 
Rafaela: That you cannot be fired. Like, after the probationary period. You 
cannot be fired. 
L: And why is that important? What is the benefit? 
Rafaela: You will always have a job. You will always have income, even if it 
is a small income, it is guaranteed. It is better than earning a lot but 
getting fired at any time and becoming unemployed. 
This exchange was echoed by hundreds of Brazilians I surveyed in informal 
conversations during my fieldwork. Their responses read like a script. When asked 
about why public employment was so desirable, respondents immediately cited stability 
(estabilidade); when pressed about the meaning of stability, respondents always pointed 
to job security, exclaiming: “You cannot get fired!” The agreement in public opinion 
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was staggering. Even when I invoked legal frameworks outlining the conditions for 
dismissal of public employees, respondents firmly defended their positions citing 
examples of protection from termination in even the most extreme cases. In one 
student’s words, “You cannot get fired for any reason except murder, and even then, the 
chances are pretty good you will keep your job!” The overarching perception of public 
employment was that it provided indefinite, irrevocable job security. 
Whether or not this is actually the case is debatable. During the crisis of the 
1980s, public employment was reduced as a larger effort of austerity and debt 
reduction. Lucinete actually lost her public sector job due to budget cuts during this 
time. Laws governing public sector work are regularly presented in the legislative 
houses challenging or reducing public sector benefits. Pensions are increasingly likely 
targets for reform, as they account for a huge percentage of GDP—approximately the 
same percentage of national income as pensions in Greece, even though Brazil has less 
than half the proportion of elderly (Reid 2014). As the Brazilian population becomes 
more geriatric (and draws heavily from the pension system), the topic of reform for civil 
service will certainly become more prominent. During my fieldwork, the Brazilian 
Senate passed a piece of legislation eliminating a portion of retirement benefits for 
public sector workers. The pension reform “[raised] the years of service required to 
retire and [capped] pensions for public-sector workers” (Reid 2014:145). The bill was 
limited to those making about R$3,900 or less a month—concerning, essentially, entry-
level and mid-level positions of the public sector hierarchy—but reactions were by and 
large unfavorable (Diário de Pernambuco 2012). Ironically, laborers in the private 
sector were especially vocal in their disapproval, perhaps interpreting the legislation as 
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an attack on their own aspirations for public work. Laborers in the public sector were 
equally concerned but more dismissive, attributing the move to political tactics aimed at 
convincing foreign heads of state that Brazil was serious about economic health. In the 
end, the prevailing sentiment was that public employment was not in any real danger of 
being constrained, and the government would not cut any more benefits for fear of 
public discontent.  
I remember discussing this issue with a friend, Maria, who was also a public 
employee. I remarked about how unsustainable the ever-expanding public sector 
seemed to be and was surprised that she appeared to be unconcerned. “The Brazilian 
public,” she reasoned, “has a lot more leverage now than they did in the 1990s because 
of their status as consumers and the reliance on consumption for economic growth.” Her 
rationale for the permanence of public employment? A severe reduction in the size of 
the public sector would never happen because the outcry of “consumers” would be too 
great. So, at least collectively, the threat of cutting the public sector was considered 
untenable by the Brazilian public. 
While public sector work was literally representative of economic stability in its 
guarantee of employment, it was also figuratively representative of stability. Consider 
the following excerpt about job security from Ricardo, a 27-year-old environmental 
engineering student: 
L:   Ok. In your opinion, what does stability mean to a Brazilian? 
Ricardo:   To a Brazilian? 
L:   To a Brazilian in general. Because it is different for you, isn’t it? 
Ricardo:   Public work! Public work! 
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L:   Public work? Why? 
Ricardo:   The certainty of not being fired tomorrow. 
L:   But why is this so important for stability? 
Ricardo:   Family, responsibility, education of children, travel. 
L:   And all this comes through public work? Can it not come through 
private work? 
Ricardo: Whoever works in a private job can make payments for a maximum 
of four months. 
L:   Make payments? 
Ricardo:  Make payments on purchases. For a maximum of four months on 
credit cards. Whoever works in the public sector can take on debts 
indefinitely. Twelve years, or sorry, twelve months of payments. The 
fear of being fired tomorrow is restrictive. I cannot, I cannot, cannot 
plan a trip five years from now with the private sector job I have 
today. Because private sector work is urgent, it meets my immediate 
needs. It does not satisfy my desires. For the Brazilian, a public job is 
going to satisfy the desires of tomorrow, not just my immediate 
needs. 
When asked to explain the importance of public work in securing stability 
(estabilidade), Ricardo immediately identified job security—a quality synonymous with 
public sector work in the Brazilian context. But when pressed to articulate specifically 
the benefits of job security, he framed public work in very particular terms: the ability 
to carry debt indefinitely (a perder de vista). This sentiment was repeated over and over 
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by Brazilians I surveyed and reflected in advertisements, shopping malls, and retail 
stores. Participants characterized public sector pay as extending into old age (velhice) or 
for “the rest of your life” (o resto da vida), suggesting that the meanings of stability 
went well beyond financial security in the present to include the “symbolic 
provisioning” for a complete and full life in the distant future (Demerath 2009). This is 
enormously important to getting at the heart of what public sector work, and ultimately, 
economic development, meant to Brazilians themselves. The ability to maintain 
expenditures (gastos) directly reflected the importance of consumptive practices to 
Brazilian families.  
During my fieldwork, a local television news station reported that 49 percent of 
Brazilians were equilibristas—maintaining a debt to income ratio of one to one. In other 
words, their income was just enough to cover liabilities but not to build any savings. 
The economic condition of these families was increasingly fragile because of growing, 
excessive debt (Souza and Lamounier 2010). In fact, in a report on the rise of the 
middle class across Latin America, the World Bank identified middle class households 
in Brazil in particular as “over-indebted” (Ferreira 2012:141). The trend to live as an 
equilibrista speaks to why having a guaranteed income was so important in gauging 
exactly what expenditures, or monthly payments, were sustainable at the household 
level (Figure 3). Aspirations to live as equilibristas necessitated the certainty of future 
employment. While private sector work afforded a mere four months of guaranteed pay 
upon termination, public sector work offered a permanent income, guaranteed without 
termination.  
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Figure 3. Window display advertising by monthly payments (author 2012) 
 
The quality of permanence was so closely related to public sector work that the 
young man interviewed above framed employment in the private sector as offering only 
emergency (emergencial) relief. Essentially, Ricardo’s comments reflected the popular 
opinion that four months of pay upon termination from employment was a precarious 
and risky situation. Moreover, he argued that public work had the potential to “satisfy 
my desires” (satisfazer os meus desejos) rather than simply meet basic needs. Thus, 
public employment was closely linked to consumptive practices and class identity (a 
point to which I will return Chapters 6 and 7). There is an additional value of public 
employment implied in the characterization of private work as urgent or necessitated by 
crisis. “Emergency” employment was preferable only in situations where participants 
must provide for basic, immediate needs. It was a short-term solution: a form of 
sustenance that was base, instinctual, and almost primitive in its inherent limitation to 
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satisfy more lofty, long-term desires, such as aspirations of success and markers of class 
identity. 
During my fieldwork, I observed that aspirations of success were also tied to 
notions of financial responsibility. In this conceptualization, concursos were reflective 
(though sometimes contradictorily) of an ideal of financial responsibility. In Brazil, 
identifying someone as responsible (responsável) was commonly used as a statement 
about his or her financial responsibility. A young woman, when explaining what she 
was looking for in a man, often included this quality: that he be responsável. The 
implication was that he was financially able to care for a family and maintain a (very 
particular) standard of living. Many participants used this phrase to describe the 
meaning of stability in their own lives. Though the ever-growing expansion of the 
public sector might not appear to be a financially responsible project on behalf of the 
state when evaluated in economic terms, it was used by Brazilians to achieve financial 
responsibility in their own lives. Thus, I suggest it represented an alignment of 
interests—among Brazilians aspiring to be responsável and in a state aspiring to 
produce (govern) responsável citizens. 
Collective Aspirations 
Aspirations of success comprise the core of the “new middle class” in 
northeastern Brazil. Ortner (2003), in her examination of class mobility in the US 
during the latter half of the twentieth century, suggests that employment acts as a 
general indicator of class identity but that aspirations to particular social classes 
actually form the experience of that identity. Through life histories and success 
narratives—what she terms “imaginings” of success—she argues that the expansion of 
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the middle class during the middle of the twentieth century was fueled by the practice 
of collective aspirations. In the Brazilian context, I am less concerned with investigating 
the structure of class as a natural object than I am with exploring the discourses 
surrounding it. Collective aspirations to public employment formed a shared experience 
of identity for the participants in this project. While I hesitated to frame their narratives 
in class terms—as a class “project” for example—I found that all participants, both 
parents and children, readily identified their own class belonging when asked, even if 
they did not regularly bring it up in conversations about their motives, choices, or 
dreams. Moreover, all of the participants identifying as middle-class Brazilians shared 
in the febre do concurso (concurso fever). At the time of my fieldwork, the pursuit of 
public sector work was described in epidemiological terms: feverish, all-consuming, 
often irrational. In popular discourse, a person caught up in the concurso fever could not 
be reasoned with, as if their senses had been dampened. The reasons behind this local 
category were often explained in terms of the outcomes of landing a public sector job. 
Parents used words like “opportunity” and “stability” to describe the meaning of public 
sector jobs for their children, while their children used words like “competition” and 
“pressure.” Both spoke of their desire for public sector work. There were generational 
differences in aspirations of success: Tiago, the mail-carrier mentioned earlier, tied 
public sector work to aspirations of building a savings account—a common topic for 
parents I interviewed—while none of the students discussed stability in these terms, but 
talked about public sector work in terms of consumptive power: using the popular 
phrase “house, car, and computer” (casa, carro, e computador). In a study of mobility 
among the middle class, Newman notes that, “Class is clearly a critical factor…but it is 
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not the only one. Generation is at least as powerful a source of conflict” (1998:110). 
Similarly, the family members I surveyed were often at odds about how best to allocate 
the household economy and distribute the “winnings” of successful concursos passed 
by adult children. Certainly, students wanted to maintain the consumptive markers of 
class identity displayed in their parents’ generation; but by the time of my fieldwork, 
some of these markers (like maintaining domestic workers in the home) were 
increasingly out of their reach, while other markers (such as home ownership) were 
increasingly available. I will examine these two markers in more detail in Chapter 7. 
But in this section, I want to suggest that even though the desire for public sector work 
remained strong among parents and children, differences in the “imaginings” of success 
(Ortner 2003) revealed generational shifts in the meaning of public sector work. 
Public employment is a central pursuit to Brazilians who view themselves as 
part of the “new middle class” and a critical component to the development of an 
emerging class consciousness. I use the term “new” or “emerging” because there are 
massive changes that have occurred in the horizontal strata of Brazilian society, 
especially in the northeast. While there is disagreement about how to characterize these 
strata in class terms, there is wide consensus that it exists. In the past decade Brazilian 
researchers themselves have coined the term “new middle class” (nova classe media) to 
describe the aggregate changes in income classes (Neri 2010). Thus, even though the 
term “emerging” may reflect an infusion of rhetoric (many times, foreign) into public 
discourse, it also reflects the growing awareness among a particular subset of middle 
class Brazilians who are using the term to describe themselves and employing particular 
strategies to obtain and maintain middle class identity. In this sense, the desire for work 
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is part of larger “learned position” through which subjectivity is constructed (Steedman 
1987) as they grapple with the meanings of being labeled “new middle class.” Rather 
than framing class consciousness as being learned upon entry to the labor market as 
Willis (1981) famously argued in his examination of the working class, I take the labor 
market as a learned object of desire in the emergence of class consciousness, one that 
competes with other fields of accumulation (such as education, home ownership, travel, 
and other consumptive practices) to produce the experience of class.  
In Brazil, income classes are characterized by monthly household earnings (see 
Table 1). The most recent data from the OECD indicates that the number of people 
belonging to the middle class, represented by income class Classe C, has nearly doubled 
in the first decade of the 2000s from 66 million to 115 million (Arnold and Jalles 2014). 
The growth was fueled by upward mobility among the lower income classes, Classe D 
and Classe E. However, very little upward mobility has occurred between Classe C and 
higher income classes (Arnold and Jalles 2014). 
Table 1. OECD Income Classes 
Income Class: Household Income  
(monthly, 2011 BRL) 
Classe A More than 9,745 
Classe B 7,475-9,745 
Classe C 1,734-7,475 
Classe D 1,085-1,734 
Classe E Less than 1,085 
Source: data adapted from Arnold and Jalles 2014. 
 
Even though Brazil has not experienced the same kind of social revolution that 
has occurred in other parts of Latin America, there have been remarkable changes to the 
horizontal strata in the past two decades.  The Brazilian Institute of Geography and 
Statistics (IBGE) estimates the percentage of Brazilians belonging to the middle class 
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has nearly doubled in the years between 2003 and 2011 (IBGE 2012). The growth 
reflects upward movement into the middle class from socioeconomic groups 
traditionally marginalized and located in the demographic labeled by the Secretariat of 
Strategic Affairs `(SAE) as “lower” class: residents of rural areas, those with little or no 
primary education, workers in the informal economy, and black Brazilians (SAE 2012). 
In my fieldwork, it became apparent that much of the class mobility experienced by 
Brazilian families coincided with a “capitalist revolution” of sorts (Berger 1986): the 
expansion of the private sector, the opening of domestic consumer credit, 
commodification, and the growing importance of consumptive practices to class 
identity. That capitalism is capable of producing social and economic transformations is 
not a new argument, but few have investigated how it has altered every day life for 
many Brazilians and intensified the desire for public sector work among families 
pursuing upward mobility. 
In the years between 2003 and 2011, the number of Brazilians belonging to the 
middle class grew from 66 million to 115 million (IBGE 2012). The expansion of the 
middle class was not particularly unique to Brazil—multiple countries in Latin America 
experienced growth after the turn of the century—but it reflected one of the highest 
rates of growth in Latin America and, aside from Ecuador, the largest change in class 
composition for a single nation since the turn of the century. Development initiatives 
aimed at expanding the labor market through privatization and formal work in the 
public sector greatly fueled this growth. While upward mobility among these groups 
represents a decrease in inequality, at the time of my fieldwork, it was too early to see if 
it guaranteed a long term change to class composition. For example, even though 
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newcomers maintained “Classe C” income levels, class belonging was precarious in 
many ways: their consumptive practices were financed by indebtedness in a country 
with household debt levels near 21 percent of disposable income and high interest rates 
near 34 percent (Arnold and Jalles 2014). Moreover, in periods of economic stress, 
these families would most likely be the first to “fall out” of the middle class, as material 
markers become increasingly important to maintaining identity. 
Changes to horizontal strata in societies are certainly not new phenomena in 
Latin America. Pastore (1982) charts changes to class composition in Latin America 
during the period between 1960 and 1980 and finds that the expansion of the middle 
class most often reflected upward mobility of families occupying the “upper tier” of the 
lower class. Although Pastore ascribes class identity to “occupational status”—a 
product of educational qualifications and income levels within particular occupations—
he nonetheless finds that 72 percent of intergenerational upward mobility in the decades 
leading up to the 1980s occurred among “upper-lower” classes. In Brazil, families on 
the verge of middle class status during the 1960s and 1970s had secured entrance by 
1980. However, with the poor economic conditions of the 1980s and 1990s, many of 
these families experienced downward mobility as the middle class contracted (Portes 
and Hoffman 2003). In our own North American context, this phenomenon has been 
observable most recently in the declining values of home ownership, higher education, 
and relative income during the 1990s and 2000s (Newman 1999, Jensen 2002, Graeber 
2011). 
With the exception of two families, all of the participants in this project would 
be characterized in Classe C according to their monthly incomes. Curiously, though, all 
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participants self-identified as middle class, even though the household incomes of two 
families exceeded Classe C levels—placing one in Classe B and the other far above the 
threshold for Classe A.  Thus, it is important to note that the income class scheme can 
obscure notions about class identity that are affected by other aspects, like race, 
ethnicity, education, and occupation. It is also important to note that the income 
schemes used to study class in the aggregate are relatively arbitrary and vary widely for 
the middle class. For example, the income range for Classe C is especially large, 
estimated at some R$6,000! Thus, it would be reasonable to expect that a variety of 
lived experiences are lumped together and categorized as “middle class.” I do not want 
to challenge this characterization as much as I want to explore the different strategies 
families employ within this classification system, as they face being told they have 
arrived at the “middle class” after years of being labeled “developing” or “poor” 
families. That is, I am curious about their experiences aspiring to a particular identity 
(the “new middle class”) and reproducing desire among their children. 
Family Histories  
While stability in the labor market is grounded in larger historical processes, for 
many of the families in this project, it is also expressed in family histories of job 
selection and employment experiences. Aspirations of success and strategies for 
intergenerational transmissions of wealth can inform larger movements in Brazil 
privileging the individual as an extension of the family. For example, the process of job 
selection among many students in this project was especially shaped by the employment 
experiences of their parents. One mother explained how she chose a profession in the 
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banking industry for her son, after her husband enjoyed a successful career at one of the 
state-owned banks:  
Fatima:  We knew it was good work. Stable work. So I enrolled him in 
cursinhos for Caixa Econômica. He studied for two years. Then I 
registered him for the next concurso that came out for upper 
management, which happened to be in the state of São Paulo. When 
he passed, I flew down there and got him a nice apartment. He 
worked for one year and then my husband arranged for him to be 
transferred here. 
L: How did your husband do that? 
Fatima: He worked with the regional manager several years ago. He asked for 
a favor. 
More important than having the intellectual aptitude to pass concursos, perhaps, 
is having the informal connections and insider knowledge necessary to navigate the 
labor market. Fatima’s son passed a highly competitive test in a system intended to be a 
meritocracy. Participation in the public sector, especially at higher levels, grants entry 
to circles of privilege, capital, and accumulation in the informal economy. Parents 
regularly operated in the informal economy to obtain advantages for their children—a 
practice observed in multiple social contexts (Kipnis 2011, Lareau 2000, Peshkin 2000, 
Shore and Nugent 2002). Daniel secured a job for his daughter, Sandra, at a prestigious 
private school in an upscale neighborhood by circulating her resume among church 
members and calling on affluent contacts to arrange for an interview with the director. 
In an effort to measure social mobility, some have argued that the socioeconomic 
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identity of an individual is defined through kinship; in other words, social mobility is 
not solidified until everyone in that individual’s family achieves the same status 
(Newman 1993). Consider the following discussion about job selection with Lucia, a 
28-year-old graduate student in elementary education: 
L: Did your mother and father want you to be a teacher? Did they 
pressure you or have an opinion? 
Lucia: Dad had that dream, I guess. It was his dream that his children would 
be doctors. 
L: Oh right. Why? 
Lucia: I don’t know. It is that old dream, that parents want their child to be a 
doctor. 
L: Why? 
Lucia:  I do not have the slightest idea why he wanted that. 
L: So why is it the Brazilian dream? 
Lucia: I don’t know. I think it is because medicine has a certain glamour. 
“Oh! He’s a doctor!” Maybe that is why. That is what we see most in 
medical and law graduates. 
L: Mhmm. So, how did you become a teacher? 
Lucia:  My mother, my aunts, my two grandmothers, all are teachers. 
L:  All? Like teachers in school? Or teachers… 
Lucia: High school teachers. Elementary teachers. Junior high teachers. All 
are teachers. I never saw myself as a teacher. I never wanted to be a 
teacher. So I think, like they say, it was in my blood. It must be. 
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Because when I got into the classroom, I liked it. I decided I would 
be a teacher. 
When I first met Lucia, she was teaching grade school at several private schools 
in the city. She had passed two concursos for employment in public schools, but had 
turned one down and requested to be terminated from the other after having worked for 
a few months. When I asked her to explain her employment decisions, she said public 
employment was not fulfilling and insisted that she did not really want to be a teacher. 
However, after one afternoon with her family, I quickly noted that all of her closest 
female relations were teachers. Her mother was a high school Portuguese grammar 
teacher, her maternal aunt was a university professor, her maternal grandmother was a 
Portuguese grammar teacher, and her paternal grandmother was a history teacher in 
secondary education. I commented on this correlation and asked the women why they 
all seemed to have followed in the same profession. Her mother remarked, “It’s in our 
blood.” Thus, despite Lucia’s insistence to the contrary, her own process of job 
selection, and indeed her aspirations for stability in the labor market, was heavily 
influenced by the professional experiences of her family.  
Her example was also illustrative of how privilege was passed down 
intergenerationally. Her mother and aunt both negotiated tutoring and test preparation 
resources for Lucia from contacts in their social networks, some of whom were public 
sector employees, but all of whom agreed to provide the services in exchange for some 
other goods or services in the informal economy (making favors for birthday parties or 
tutoring for their own children). Rafaela recounted similar strategies at the familial 
level. Her father regularly sought information about public sector work from the 
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attorneys and professors he shuttled around the city as a taxi driver, obtaining, on more 
than one occasion, complimentary cursinhos for his daughters from the passengers who 
served as part time instructors at local test preparation centers. 
Meanings of stability in the labor market go well beyond one’s immediate 
financial security to include “symbolic provisioning” for a stable life for one’s family in 
the distant future (Demerath 2009). Consider the following comment from Tiago 
explaining stability in the labor market: 
L: So, why is public work so valued? 
Tiago: In my case, I am holding on to it because of the insurance plan for 
my mother, daughter, wife, and myself. If everyone gets sick, and 
there is a huge expense, I can pay it. They can spend money, and I do 
not even notice. The money comes in every month. There may be an 
expense here or there, but I will be fine that year. 
During my fieldwork, I found that families with a history of public employment 
continued to pursue public sector work via concursos, allocating significant portions of 
their household economy to the construction and reproduction of desire. Additionally, I 
observed many families of the “core” middle class—those solidly established in the 
middle class but for whom there has been almost no upward mobility despite the growth 
in the sector as a whole—grappling with “newcomers” to both their socioeconomic 
status and their sector of employment. Lines which historically distinguished families 
had become blurred with the expansion of the public sector in the Brazilian labor 
market. In the following chapters, I examine the strategies, moral economy, and 
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combinations of capital accumulation demonstrated by individuals, families, and the 
state itself in renegotiating these boundaries and identities.  
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Chapter 3: Higher Education 
At the outset of my fieldwork, I intended to study the relationship between 
higher education and income earnings in Brazil. In particular, I was drawn to 
inconsistencies in the correlation between higher levels of education and increased 
earnings. Grounded in literature review, my initial focus was on the instances in which 
higher education failed to generate greater pay in the labor market. However, after my 
first visit to Brazil in 2011, it was immediately clear that any investigation of higher 
education without consideration of the public sector labor market would be incomplete. 
In fact, for many of the participants in this project, the desire for public sector work 
trumped the desire for higher income levels afforded by a postsecondary degree. As I 
quickly discovered, any investigation of the public sector labor market without 
consideration of higher education was equally incomplete, especially in light of Brazil’s 
unique history with respect to higher education. The following sections examine why 
this history is critical to understanding the desire for public sector work and explore 
how inequality, aspirations of success, and the present context of higher education in 
Brazil shape the families of participants in this project. 
Colonial Legacy 
Portuguese society was strictly hierarchical in the colonial period. The family 
was the central unit of organization and familial networks determined social standing 
and income distribution (Skidmore 2004). An aristocracy ran the state, organized under 
a monarchy. In the Portuguese colonies, these structures of power were replicated in the 
social order. Initially, this meant the colony was peopled by an aristocracy of colonial 
outsiders exercising control over a population of indigenous peoples. Not long after the 
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“discovery” of the Americas, however, Africans were incorporated into these lower 
ranks as the Portuguese imported the largest number of slaves in the Western 
hemisphere to work their sugar and coffee plantations (King-Calnek 2006). 
The elite family was a powerful force in colonial Brazil. In 1534, the Portuguese 
divided the entire landmass of Brazil into 15 sections and distributed the territories to a 
handful of royal officials (Wolford 2003). In the centuries that followed, through 
networks of patronage and practices of squatting, a class of wealthy landowners 
emerged from this small number of colonial elite. Elite families were adept at 
consolidating land holdings, controlling access to resources, and commanding 
indigenous slave labor in the frontier territories. Families developed a system of 
maneuvering and exploiting the colonial political and economic institutions established 
by the Portuguese to regulate the economy and extract profit through taxation and 
exports. They infiltrated town councils, local militias, and the church by strategically 
marrying their daughters to powerful merchants and royal officials and requiring their 
sons to participate in the priesthood and positions of colonial governance. They 
maintained well-endowed kinship networks and manipulated complex inheritance laws 
by arranging familial ties to preserve large family land holdings. Thus, “family life in 
colonial Brazil…was critical to the formation and perpetuation of the elite” (Metcalf 
2005:6). 
Education was primarily available to elite, male colonialists whose investment 
in education served the greater purpose of maintaining the social hierarchy. 
Consequently, inequalities of access to higher education were correlated early on with 
distinctions of race and gender. Citizens of marginal races, gender, religion, sexual 
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preferences, or legal status were denied full participation in colonial institutions, 
including those of higher education. The elite family controlled both the purpose of and 
access to higher education in colonial Brazil. 
Inequalities in higher education were present at the outset of colonialism in 
Brazil. Unlike colonies in Spanish America, where universities were founded in Mexico 
and Peru as early as the sixteenth century, the Portuguese refused to establish 
universities in Brazil during colonial rule (Skidmore 2004). Higher education in Brazil 
was virtually non-existent for three centuries, and opportunities for advanced training in 
the nineteenth century were limited to about a dozen Jesuit schools offering courses in 
Theology and Philosophy for entrance into the priesthood (Teixeira 1999). Colonial 
subjects who wished to participate formally in higher education were required to do so 
through institutions outside the colony—in Spanish Latin America or Europe. In other 
words, while higher education was available to colonialists abroad or through religious 
seminaries, it was not offered through the state in the form of an institution (such as a 
university). The official position of the Portuguese crown, as recorded in royal 
documents, was to force colonial dependency in Brazil by limiting the availability of 
services in order to regulate the autonomy of colonial elite (Russell-Wood 2001). 
The Portuguese monarchy repeatedly rejected petitions from the colony for the 
expansion of higher education. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, for example, 
the crown denied requests from the governments of Bahia and Minas Gerais for 
universities on the basis that “liberal movements” posed a threat to the long-term 
viability of colonial rule (Figueiredo-Cowen 2002:471). In fact, the Portuguese crown 
was so concerned about teaching and learning in the colony that it prohibited the 
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operation of a printing press, “with the result that no books, newspapers, or magazines 
were ever published in colonial Brazil” (Skidmore 2004:138). Severe restrictions on the 
production and dissemination of printed information only exacerbated the challenge to 
educational attainment. 
That colonial Brazil was without a printing press, however, is not to say that 
printed works were unavailable. As early as 1618, colonial histories such as Ambrósio 
Fernandes Brandão’s Diálogos das grandezas do Brasil, were compiled in the colony, 
even though the texts had to be exported to Portugal for publication before they could 
be brought back to the colony for distribution. Ecclesiastical works were available in 
Brazilian parishes, monasteries, and (by the end of the eighteenth century) national 
archives. Despite this presence, the educational purposes of texts were often limited to 
training for the priesthood or official positions. As Angel Rama (1996) demonstrates in 
The Lettered City, written documents in the colonial period were often the intellectual 
domain of a privileged few. Colonial texts were accessed only by those qualified to do 
so; official scribes (letrados) did not provide written works for the instruction of 
colonial citizens and printed sources did not necessarily function to educate. 
The limited visibility of higher education in Brazil fostered the colony’s reliance 
on institutions abroad and reinforced an “aesthetic and cultural uniformity that reflected 
hierarchy, virtue, and royal splendor” in colonial society (Schultz 2000:9). Higher 
education functioned to serve the interests of the crown by preparing members of the 
aristocracy for a highly stratified society. Only the elite had access to higher education, 
and apart from universities and religious training, the only option for higher education 
in the Brazilian colony took the form of “royal lessons”—private instruction provided 
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by Portuguese tutors. Universities remained located in the Portuguese metropolis until 
the nineteenth century, regulating the autonomy of colonialists by redirecting them to 
the crown and preserving the integral role of the colonial motherland. 
In 1807, the Portuguese royal court moved to Rio de Janeiro in response to the 
Napoleonic invasion (Schultz, 2001). Official letters from elite colonialists noted that 
the move challenged “long-standing political, cultural and economic hierarchies of 
empire” (Schultz, 2000:7). The printing press was established in Rio de Janeiro in 1814, 
as well as a school of medicine, a royal library, and royal lessons for education and 
professional training. However, the establishment of a university remained unrealized. 
Universities were forbidden in the Portuguese colony, even though the development of 
such institutions was promoted in neighboring colonies. The first universities in Spanish 
Latin America were modeled after the University of Salamanca and encouraged the 
political participation of students in self-governance within the university (Figueiredo 
2002). To a certain degree, institutions of higher education in Spanish America fostered 
autonomy and critical consciousness in the colonies. In the early nineteenth century, 
Spanish colonial universities adopted a French Napoleonic model. The university 
became “a fundamental element of national reconstruction…aimed at strengthening the 
national political identity through the preservation and enhancement of the national 
culture” (Magalhães and Amaral 2000:439). Universities fashioned after the Napoleonic 
model promoted nationalism and prepared the students of elite members of society in 
intellectual, non-utilitarian methods (Figuierdo 1986). 
By the nineteenth century, while there were approximately 26 universities in 
Spanish Latin America, colonial rule in Brazil had yet to establish a single university 
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(Figueiredo-Cowen 1987). In stark contrast to the multiple university offerings of the 
Spanish crown, the University of Coimbra and the University of Évora—both in 
Portugal—were the only formal universities accessible to Portuguese subjects. The 
pattern of Spanish preeminence in higher education was striking. 
In 1932, a full century after independence, the first university was founded in 
Brazil. While the ideology of higher education in Brazil generally followed the Spanish-
American university model, Brazil did not necessarily replicate the efforts of 
institutions of higher education to promote social equality. In 1918, for example, 
students and faculty at the Gaceta Universitária of Córdoba in Argentina issued the 
Córdoba Manifesto, a document challenging authoritarianism in university 
administration and demanding greater self-governance for students and faculty alike 
(Schultz 2001). The document, and the student strike that ensued, resulted in increased 
freedoms in the university experience through the participation in democratic elections 
of the university rector and dean, a greater say in course development and offerings, and 
the cessation of a policy requiring attendance at lectures. Institutions of higher 
education in Brazil, however, remained committed to the Napoleonic model for most of 
the twentieth century. Aside from basic educational programs, like those of Paulo Freire 
targeting literacy and fundamental education for adults during the 1960s, Brazil did not 
invest in institutional designs that were especially progressive. 
Higher Education in the 21st Century 
The colonial legacy remains visible in the distribution of inequality in modern 
Brazilian contexts. In present-day Brazil, a small number of elite, approximately just 3 
percent, still own almost three-quarters of the arable land (Wolford 2003). Just as elite 
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families used colonial institutions to protect their interests and reinforce the hierarchical 
order of colonial society, the modern landowning elite of Brazil exert influence in 
political and economic institutions through a system of political patronage, governance, 
and clientelism. Likewise, the preeminence of education initiatives in colonial Spanish 
America appears to still affect Brazil to this day. Spanish American countries such as 
Argentina and Chile boast literacy rates near 100 percent. Brazil, however, has the 
worst record of literacy and school completion rates among major Latin American 
countries (Birdsall and Sabot 1996). Of Argentina, Colombia, Mexico, and Chile, for 
example, Brazil has the lowest percentage of educational attainment at the tertiary level. 
The Brazilian economy, as it appears to many economists, lacks an adequate supply of 
skilled labor (Giovannetti and Mendezes-Filho 2006). Approximately 12 percent of the 
total population in Brazil has completed training at an institution of higher education, 
and of those in the labor force, only 15 percent are college or university educated 
(Manacorda et. al 2010). Just as colonial subjects were required to enroll in institutions 
of higher education abroad and export scholarship to European systems of publication 
and distribution, scholars in modern Brazil overwhelmingly pursue higher education 
abroad, especially in the “soft” sciences (Bernasconi 2008). Dissertations, theses, and 
academic works by Brazilian nationals are published at much lower rates in their native 
countries than are the works of their North American or European counterparts 
(Russell-Wood 2001). Much of the archival material from the colonial period is still 
held in Portugal, requiring Brazilian scholars to travel to the “motherland” for research 
and educational projects. Moreover, until recently, expert scholars on Brazil were not 
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even Brazilian themselves, but imports from academic traditions in the United States 
and Europe. 
In institutions of higher education, upper class white (branco) males are still 
overrepresented (Schwartzman 2004). Even though Brazilians on the whole reject the 
concept of race (Hasenbalg 1991), inequalities in educational attainment remain tied to 
racial categories and are greater among women than men. Brazilian institutions suffer 
from an “urban bias” whereby those of urban origins are more likely to pursue higher 
education than those of rural origins (Fernandes and Neves 2010). On average, only 1 in 
12 students gains entrance into federal universities (Schwartzman 2004). While tuition 
at federal universities is free to Brazilian citizens, enrollment in these institution is 
appointed through an entrance exam—the vestibular—the passing of which generally 
requires attendance at expensive private primary and secondary schools. At the time of 
my fieldwork, Daniel paid R$990 per month in tuition for his son to attend a prestigious 
high school known for its successful test preparation program. In fact, the number of 
students without prior education in the private sector and who are enrolled in high-
earning degree programs such as medicine or law, is statistically nil (McCowen 2007). 
In other words, the great irony in Brazil is that those who would benefit most from 
public university education cannot afford the private education necessary to get into 
federal universities. Advantages in economic hierarchies are maintained through 
consumptive practices in educational hierarchies (Rutz and Balkan 2009). Thus, class 
identity and income levels continue to act as gatekeepers to tertiary education. While 
most students are aware of these inequalities and are themselves able to identify 
educational hierarchies, they remain active (re)producers of the distinctions on the basis 
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of their own educational experiences—federal or private universities, day or night 
classes, for-profit or public institutions. As one student put it, “I am lower class because 
I have to pay for college.” 
Elite families still prepare their heirs for estate management through 
professional degrees from public institutions of higher education and maintain social 
status with markers of educational attainment. Educational attainment has long been 
recognized as a major determinant of income distribution, job procurement, and 
socioeconomic status (Comitas and Dolgin 1978; Silva 1977; Tsang 1988). University 
students in Brazil are strikingly similar to those involved in higher education in colonial 
contexts, “the majority of whom could afford to pay part or all of the university tuition 
costs” (Skidmore 2004:137). Structural inequalities of class, race, and social status 
continue to perpetuate inequalities of educational attainment in Brazilian society. 
That class and income markers are observable in the enrollment at federal 
universities is not to say that for-profit institutions are not avenues of upward mobility. 
Some have argued that the middle class has seized private education as a class project 
of its own (Wisdahl 2013). Initiatives to privatize higher education in Brazil provided a 
greater number of Brazilians the opportunity to attend post-secondary institutions 
without (or perhaps, in spite of) the completion of the vestibular entrance exam. In fact, 
in the past 20 years alone, the total number of enrolled students in higher education has 
more than tripled, primarily as upwardly mobile families seek to participate in higher 
education (Bertolin and Leite 2008, Reid 2014).  
Targeting economic inequality through “investment in human capital” (e.g., 
increasing the creative thinking, knowledge potential, and personality attributes of 
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individuals) has gained popularity in the last century as Brazilian scholars and public 
officials alike have focused on education as means of increasing human capital and 
reducing income disparity. Many of these strategies are based on the argument that 
education is the single most important long-term measure for raising income 
(Psacharopoulos et al. 1997). The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
and the United States government contend that the production and consumption of 
knowledge in the knowledge economy is the “main driver of [economic] growth…and 
that tertiary education is central to knowledge creation and production” (Peters and 
Besley 2006:24). Institutions funded by the Brazilian state are, by extension, funded by 
these entities and driven in their political agendas accordingly. Thus, private institutions 
of higher education have multiplied rapidly, unable to keep up with growing numbers of 
postsecondary students eligible for enrollment though government subsidies and 
repayment programs (Albrecht and Ziderman 1995). They represent 90 percent of the 
2,400 institutions of higher education in Brazil and enroll three-fourths of the student 
population in Brazil (Reid 2014 and Schwartzman 2013, respectively).  
While enrollment numbers among the top 10 percent and lower 50 percent of 
income distributions have declined, students from middle class backgrounds have 
comprised the greatest demographic of growth in higher education (Schwartzman 
2004). This phenomenon is a direct result of the growth of the “new” middle class 
discussed in the previous chapter. Unprecedented access to credit and the expansion of 
the public sector not only grants many families the funds necessary to participate in 
higher education, but also the “imaginings” of success (Ortner 2003) via upward 
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mobility and new class identities. Consider the following narrative explaining Ana 
Paula’s dream (sonho) to enter higher education: 
I thought about going to college, but I thought it was such a long shot, such an 
unlikely possibility that I stopped dreaming about it for a while. And I said, I, I 
do not want to plan for this anymore, I do not want to dream about something I 
cannot do. I need to, like, to keep my feet on the ground, right, in reality, right? 
 
Imagery invoking “dreams” is integral to constructing desire for higher education and 
public sector work. A well-known slogan of a local prestigious test prep center—
“Seizing Your Dreams”—emphasized “imaginings” of success among many of the 
Brazilian families in this project (Figure 4). Another boasted “absolute success” in all of 
test prep courses offered that year. 
 
Figure 4. Cursinho pamphlet with slogan "Seizing Your Dreams" (author 2012) 
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In some ways, test prep centers form a bridge between the two, allowing 
families who once aspired to higher education to transition to aspirations of working in 
the public sector. This is especially true spatially, as the actual physical locations inside 
test prep centers (classrooms, lecture halls, and study spaces) function as sites of 
production for the cultivation of desire—desire of both higher education and public 
sector work. 
Classroom Experiences 
During my fieldwork, I accompanied most of the student participants in this 
project to classes at their respective universities. The following section draws from 
several such experiences in the classroom in an effort to “study up” (Nadar 1972) and 
contribute to the ethnographic material on identity formation, exclusion/inclusion, and 
the process of ethical subjectivation in institutions of higher education. 
Social scientists recognize that institutions are ascribed to segregated tiers (e.g., 
Ivy-Leagues versus Community Colleges) that keep them from competing outside of 
their respective “class status” through funding, administration, and disciplinary 
measures (e.g. boycotts) by the community in which the institution is based (Williams 
2002). Brazil is no different in this regard, and with the privatization of higher 
education, a hierarchy of institutions exists with respect to institutional status and 
prestige (McCowen 2007). These hierarchies are not inherent in the institutions 
themselves, but rather discursive constructions—part of a “prevailing value system” 
which, some have argued, reproduces social inequality and inferiority through higher 
education (Williams 2002:34). In recent decades, the purpose of the university in Brazil 
has become splintered: “elite” public universities are endowed with federal funds for 
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research and development leaving for-profit institutions to be financed by a small, 
usually “proletariat” student body. Some private institutions have capitalized on the lack 
of regulation by the state, infusing market principals and corporate governance into 
university management. Recent legislation has allowed universities to profit from joint 
ventures with businesses, furthering the entanglement of corporate and academic 
interests (Reid 2014). They have branded themselves as prestigious institutions, 
investing in large capital projects for new campus buildings and state of the art 
technology, and recruiting from the most affluent families. In the northeast, there are 
very few private universities with this characterization, as national trends expanding 
private education and work have lagged in the regions considered “peripheral” to São 
Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. Consider the following comments from Rebeca, a 25-year-old 
graduate student, about the quality of private universities in the northeast: 
Here in Recife there are none. In São Paulo, for example, there are some big 
universities that are private. But here, we do not have any. We only have the 
Catholic University, which only has good programs in humanities. Some 
professors who worked there formerly went to public universities. They passed 
concursos for a public university, so the quality of education decreased. 
 
Rebeca raises two important concerns about the structures of higher education that 
shape the identities of individuals in the classroom: first, private institutions are not 
well-rounded. In other words, they offer expertise in specialized areas. Because of the 
draw of public universities, the expertise at any given private university is 
unpredictable. Professors may not last through the entire educational career of a student. 
Secondly, private institutions are second-class spaces for professors and, by 
extension, students. “Good” professors at private universities will eventually gain 
entrance into public universities and leave their original institutions underperforming 
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and understaffed. For many of the participants in this project—for students of both 
private and federal institutions—public universities represented the best of higher 
education, despite complaints about the quality of the facilities and professors not 
required to be present for class or held accountable for the quality of their instruction. 
Federal universities remain associated with affluence. Consider the following comments 
from Laura, an 18-year-old law student, reflecting the bias against private universities in 
favor of public ones: 
L: What is the difference between the federal universities and the 
private ones? 
Laura: The name. 
L: What do you mean? Explain. 
Laura: The name means if you go for an internship somewhere, for example, 
and you say, your curriculum says you graduated from the Federal 
University, and another says you graduated from the Catholic 
University, NASSAU or some place like that, the Federal University 
graduate will be chosen. Without a doubt. The others will not even be 
considered. 
The prevailing perception of public institutions in Brazil could be likened to the 
estimation of the so-called “ivy league” universities in the United States. The name 
alone is a credentialing technology, and gaining entrance to one of these institutions 
confers prestige on the individual. Even though Laura was enrolled at the Catholic 
University—one of the most prestigious and expensive private institutions in the city—
she doubted her own competitiveness as a job candidate. The hope for her own 
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employment prospects, she later commented, is that her resume would not be 
considered alongside that of a federal university graduate. Thus, student participants not 
only inhabited institutions of higher education, but they also internalized cultural 
assumptions about inclusion/exclusion through their affiliation with those institutions 
(Nathan 2005). 
One of the most pressing topics concerning inclusion/exclusion in higher 
education arose in discussions about recently implemented “affirmative action” 
programs.  I use the phrase “affirmative action” because participants themselves 
actually used it—in English—perhaps to stress the origin of a strategy popularly 
believed to have been transplanted from the United States to institutions of higher 
education in Brazil. Participants regularly expressed resistance to the quota system at 
federal universities, demonstrating the permanence of racial and class-based divisions in 
higher education. Consider Rafaela’s following comments: 
Rafaela: It just changed, the Federal University now has a 50 percent quota, 
the quota is 50 percent. I think it is absurd! 
L: Why? 
Rafaela: Because race has nothing to do with it. A person is black and has to 
have a quota? Because there may be black and white people studying 
in the public schools, but on paper, only the black person gets the 
higher ranking. 
L: But do you not agree that there are more blacks studying in the 
public schools? 
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Rafaela: But the government could place the quota on public schools in 
general. Because as it stands now, half of the students are admitted 
through the quota and half are admitted without it. So think about 
how it lowers the standards in the classroom, not because of the 
black person, but because of the quality of education that he had. 
Public schools do not have the same standards as the federal 
universities, do you understand? 
With the exception of one student (who had herself been granted entrance to a 
university through a quota program), I heard iterations of this rationale from every 
student I interviewed and from many of the Brazilians I surveyed, including those 
identifying as black (negro). Sometimes, the discussion was less heated than my 
discussion with Rafaela, but other times it was openly hostile. Complicating discussions 
was the correlation between race and socioeconomic status, a longstanding feature of 
class identity in Brazil. The single student participant who expressed support for racial 
quotas in formal interviews was also the participant from the lowest income-earning 
household in my project. 
Racism continues to be veiled as socioeconomic disadvantage, and rather than 
support efforts to reduce inequality by targeting racial and socioeconomic barriers, 
many Brazilians do not consider legitimate the distinction of the two in higher 
education. However, the inequity is obvious in the classroom. For example, when I 
accompanied student participants to classes, I observed very few students of color and 
confirmed my counts in subsequent interviews by asking participants to estimate how 
many black students (raça negra) were in their year group (turma). None of the student 
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participants enrolled in public universities had more than one student they personally 
identified as a person of color in their class. Students at the private Catholic university 
had similar numbers. But in the classrooms of smaller for-profit institutions, many of 
whom serve nontraditional students via night course offerings, the diversity was slightly 
better at three to four “negros.” While my observations can by no means serve as 
statistical samples, they do in fact reflect demographic data collected at the national 
level at that time estimating participation of black students in higher education at 2 to 5 
percent (McCowen 2007). So, at the time of my fieldwork, institutions of higher 
education created rigid structures for mobility by refusing to recognize and validate the 
participation of certain students (e.g., by limiting enrollment, impairing degree 
completion, or denying educational qualifications for the labor force). But the 
underrepresentation of minority students in higher education is expected to change. In 
2012, the president passed a series of legislative measures establishing quotas based on 
race and socioeconomic identity. In public universities, quotas required 50 percent of all 
enrollment be filled by students from these disadvantaged backgrounds. 
Finally, during my fieldwork, one frequent classroom experience highlighted the 
methodological complexity of studying the student as a subject both shaped by and 
shaping the university setting. On multiple occasions accompanying student participants 
to their evening classes at smaller private colleges, I observed groups of students 
actively organize themselves and pressure professors for answers to the upcoming test. 
Usually, the organizing began before class, as students discussed the upcoming exam 
and expressed insecurity about its contents and/or their preparedness. Once class 
started, the group was directed by a “ringleader”—a student who was particularly vocal 
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on behalf of the students—to press for hints (dicas) for the test. Requests generally 
became more demanding as the class went on, and students incorporated additional 
strategies to interrupt, ignore, converse, and even shift their chairs turning their backs to 
the professor. In one such class, the students became so loud that the professor could 
not continue his lecture. In all three instances where I observed this behavior, the 
professors ceded the test answers before the end of class. Under different circumstances, 
I might have attributed my experiences to an unruly class. But what struck me as odd 
was the procedural nature of the escalation: the disruption in the classroom was actually 
very orderly and predictable—it happened in the same way on multiple occasions, 
despite occurring at different institutions. When I commented to Sandra, a 20-year-old 
secondary education student, about my observation, she proudly remarked: 
Yes, we got a professor fired once. He was horrible. He did not know how to 
teach. We got together, signed a petition, and 15 of us marched into the office of 
the director of the university and showed him the petition. We told him we 
would withdraw and go to another university if he did not do something. We are 
paying for these classes. It is our money! We deserve to have good professors. 
The professor did not come back the next semester. 
 
I did not realize the significance of these stories until I accompanied student 
participants to classes at the federal university several months later. Professors at the 
federal university had been on strike for nearly six months during my fieldwork and I 
was unable to observe their classrooms until much later in my project. In fact, there was 
a running joke at the time that students at federal universities took twice as long as their 
counterparts in private universities to complete their degrees due to the regular, frequent 
striking of the federal university workforce. In any case, my classroom experience was 
entirely different from the evening classes I had visited months earlier. First, there were 
very few distractions in the classrooms. Students did not converse with each other 
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during lectures and most cell phones were left in purses or bags. Secondly, professors 
governed desirable conduct by conferring advantages in credentialing technologies. At 
the beginning of one class, for example, one professor stated: “If you pay attention, I 
will give you hints (dicas) about what will be on the test. So, no conversation while I 
am teaching!” For students already familiar with the use of standardized testing to 
advance familial agendas and feed their sense of self, embodied practice in the 
classroom was altered with this reward system and appeared very different from that 
observed in the private universities I visited. 
When I asked João about this, he said simply, “Students can fail at federal 
universities. They cannot fail at private ones.” In other words, since students (or their 
parents) pay for education at private universities, it is in the best interest of the 
institution to retain students and bolster enrollment by giving passing grades. Public 
universities, on the other hand, benefit from the enormous investments of personal 
finances and time that families have made to secure entrance into the federal 
universities. Credentialing technologies—whether they be national exams or final 
exams—privilege the individual as an extension of the family. Student performance is 
both a reflection of family status and a contributor to it. 
I do not wish to read too much into these classroom experiences, but I want to 
suggest that they play a part in ethical subjectivation: forming identities through what is 
considered “right” behavior in the classroom. This process begins with learning how to 
“organize” within institutional walls and extends to organizing along professional 
identities beyond higher education. During the mass protests against the government 
that began in the southern part of Brazil late in 2012 and eventually swept the country, 
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it became clear that demonstrations were increasingly organized around class lines. 
Though some of the participants in this project supported the movement in its initial 
stages and indeed were very active on social media promoting in its cause, by the end of 
2014, most were openly critical of the demonstrations and used social media to 
advocate the dissolution of the movement. Between 2012 and 2015, the middle class 
appeared to distance itself from protestors, associating discontent with working class 
professions, trade groups, and those perched precariously on the lower boundary of the 
middle class: public school teachers, garbage collectors, bus drivers, and the like.  
My point here is simply to note that strategies of organizing are performed in 
classrooms of higher education and contrast the differences reproduced at the 
institutional level. Students in federal institutions of higher education may have learned 
to organize by observing their professors on strike. Even though disruptions to their 
degree programs were to their own (the students’) detriment, organizing maintained 
privilege and established authority by accessing formal channels of unions and national 
governance. Students in private institutions, on the other hand, may have learned to 
access power by seizing a consumer identity, organizing themselves as consumers, and 
bypassing perhaps more traditional forms of authority, appealing to the corporate 
interests of the university. 
Familial Pursuits 
Institutions of higher education are structurally situated social forms (Bourdieu 
1988), but as several authors have observed, they have “yet to be constructed as an 
object of analysis (Fahy 1998:15). Moreover, while a handful of ethnographic works 
devoted to the topic of higher education are presented here, there is virtually no 
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ethnographic data directly addressing higher education in the Brazilian context. But 
higher education remains central to discussions about social changes underway in 
Brazil. According to the Pesquisa Social Brasileira (PSB), “having or lacking a 
university education is the primary determinant of the social chasm dividing Brazilians” 
(Almeida 2008:241). Higher education is at once complementary and in competition 
with public sector work, so evaluating higher education at the familial level defines a 
space in which to observe contestations and assertions about the moral economy, 
consumptive practices, and class identity. Securing access to higher education was one 
of many potential projects families considered when managing the household economy. 
Parents and students were sometimes at odds as to how this distribution should take 
place or what success looked like. Being present in the homes of the participants of this 
study afforded a unique opportunity to observe the negotiation and construction of 
desire as it related to higher education. However, it is important to note the bias in my 
ethnographic sample: since the research design for this project stipulated enrollment in 
higher education as a condition for inclusion, I did not interview any families for which 
public sector work did not interact with postsecondary education in some manner. 
To illustrate this point, I want to draw from two ethnographic examples of the 
complex relationship between higher education and public sector work. The following 
observations arose in direct response to a project linking the practice of breastfeeding to 
enrollment in higher education (Barros et al. 2008). Initially, the project caught my 
attention because of its longevity. Researchers followed a cohort of children born in 
southern Brazil in 1982 and indicated a correlation between breastfeeding and 
educational attainment. The study suggested breastfeeding serves as a socioeconomic 
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marker for Brazilian families in addition to providing greater nutrition and increasing 
neurological development among infants. Postsecondary students who were breastfed as 
infants were more likely to come from families in which the mother was not required to 
enter the labor force immediately after giving birth. The study speculated about the 
nature of the correlation between breastfeeding and higher education, concluding that in 
two-parent households, where financial stability was such that one parent did not have 
to work, greater resources were available for educational pursuits. While this rationale 
could certainly account for higher levels of educational attainment among breastfed 
babies, I was struck by the simple fact that the researchers privileged explanations in 
masses of data that individual Brazilians could never express themselves. I knew from 
my own conversations with participants that it was both possible and plausible to 
consider ethnographic material from unrelated projects to inform findings of more 
quantitative projects such as the cohort study. 
For example, of the eight confirmed breastfed student participants in my project, 
five had mothers who were not working at the time of their birth and two had mothers 
working in the public sector. So with respect to the above-mentioned study, in addition 
to not participating in the labor market, it is possible that mothers were employed in the 
public sector.  
Secondly, public work could have afforded greater flexibility in work schedules 
for mothers in the cohort and allowed them to remain at home after the birth of a child 
without fear of termination. For example, when Fernando and Michele were expecting 
their first child about ten years ago, she had passed a concurso as a medical technician 
in the local public hospital. Recounting the story of the birth one evening, they 
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explained her decision to “take off” for several years to raise him. Somewhat 
incredulous, I repeated their statement: 
L: Several years?! 
Fernando: Truly. Six years. 
L: Six years?! Did you still receive your salary during this entire 
period? 
Michele: Well, I asked to be dismissed in the third year. Then, when I decided 
to return, I called my boss, and she said that my job was still held for 
me, since it was a public job, because I was on the reserve list. Then I 
returned, continued receiving my salary and my benefits. 
Through public sector work, Fernando’s household remained a two parent, dual 
income family, even though Michele did not physically participate in the labor market 
for three of the six years and she did not work. In other words, employment in the 
public sector facilitated the optimal environmental conditions for breastfeeding, 
providing a steady source of income and time to prepare her children for elementary 
education. When their children reached school age, Fernando enrolled them private 
elementary schools at the cost of about R$180 a month. Both parents regularly stressed 
their expectations for their children to eventually participate in higher education. 
Of the two families in this project with mothers working in the public sector at 
the time of the birth of their children, both families had children enrolled in federal 
universities. While this may not seem striking in itself, I think it speaks to the tacit 
knowledge involved in securing access to higher education. Consider the following 
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exchange with Juliane. Note the intergenerational knowledge her parents passed on to 
reproduce educational attainment in her family. 
L: And where are you going to college? 
Juliane: I am studying physical education at the Federal University of 
Pernambuco. I also was doing physical therapy at the Catholic 
University. But I took a leave of absence there. 
L: So you were at the Catholic University? 
Juliane: Also. I did both. 
L: Is that common? Is it common? 
Juliane:  It is not like, common. In my family, it is. It is not common here. But 
in my family it is common, because this is how it is: my sister 
studied at both the Federal and Catholic universities. 
L: Really? 
Juliane: My sister studied social work at the Catholic University, and did law 
at the Federal University. And I did physical therapy at the Catholic 
University and physical education at the Federal. And my mother did 
law at the Catholic and education at the Federal. My father did 
mathematics at the Rural Federal University and physical education 
at the Federal. Because in times past, you could go to two federal 
universities at once. Now, you can no longer do that… My family 
has always done this. When it cannot be done, we take a leave of 
absence. We can take leave for a period of six months, and then go 
back. 
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L:   And what are the advantages in doing that? 
Juliane:  We get two diplomas. We can take a concurso in either field. 
Juliane and her sister completed their secondary education at one of the top 
private military schools in Recife, where their father had studied. Through private 
education, Juliane’s parents not only utilized financial resources to get their children 
into the best public and private institutions, but they also employed “insider” knowledge 
from their own experiences in higher education to help their daughters maintain 
simultaneous enrollment in two universities. Each family member alternated attendance 
on a semester basis through the leave of absence system. At the time of our interview, 
the monthly household income of Juliane family was R$6,200—solidly Classe C but 
clearly upwardly mobile once the adult children succeeded in landing public jobs. Thus, 
Brazilian families who could afford private education used it to further familial goals 
and maximize income. Practices such as these among middle class families are part of 
larger aspirations to seize public resources, whether it be public education or public 
work.  
This is an important point since it speaks to why private education has appealed 
so powerfully to the middle class. While private elementary and secondary schools have 
been available in Brazil since the 1970s, they did not become fetishized until the arrival 
of the “new” middle class and consumer culture. This is visible in the sheer number of 
private schools now available, the emergence of elite school “franchises,” the branding 
of which is heavily advertised in newspapers, on billboards, and on street corners. In 
this sense, the desirability of higher education and public sector work are rooted in 
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similar histories. The director of a prestigious test preparation center in Recife 
explained it in the following terms: 
In the case of the vestibular and the concurso, this new consumer culture we 
have in Brazil has created symbolic capital for test takers. This has resulted in 
the rising demand for experts—tutors, test preparation centers, test courses—and 
the infusion of new players on the free market. This, in turn, has fueled growth 
in the labor market, whether it be in the area of education—for teachers, 
professors, and administrators to work in the new private high schools and 
colleges—or in areas related to industries like construction—which is in the 
business of expanding the size and quality of campuses, for example. 
 
According to this perspective, public sector work and higher education are 
interconnected precisely because of the commodification of their activity. The 
fetishization of private education and standardized testing confers celebrity status on 
those students who excel in these fields (Figure 5). In the vestibular of 2011, for 
example, João passed in the top position of test takers from the state of Pernambuco. He 
quickly gained recognition in the local community of aspiring middle class families as 
his test results granted him first place (and first pick) among tens of thousands of 
students. The symbolic capital accumulated with his fame—giving interviews to 
newspapers and television stations and offering informal seminars on test taking tips 
(dicas) at his local church and community center—strengthened interactions with the 
test prep market. Both in the market and in their utility to the Brazilian family, public 
sector work and higher education complement and reinforce each other. 
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Figure 5. Top student being interviewed by reporters (author 2011) 
In Brazil, private education is the pathway to public education, which has 
traditionally been the pathway to class belonging. With the expansion of the public 
sector, however, several structural changes occurred, making stability and upward 
mobility accessible to people without a college degree. The director quoted above noted 
an increase in the number of students enrolling in cursinhos without a college degree. 
This is significant because it suggests that parents may prefer to pay for prep courses 
that will land their adult children public jobs rather than pay for college classes that may 
not have as clear a return. If this holds true for the foreseeable future, concurso-mania 
holds the potential to impact the relevance of higher education in Brazil. While 
education was once the avenue to social mobility, public sector work now offers 
mobility and stability to more Brazilians. This competition has changed higher 
education in two ways: first, degrees of higher education are no longer necessary to 
achieve stability in the labor market. Many concursos do not require undergraduate 
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degrees. Thus, families can forego investments in higher education and choose instead 
to invest in test prep and inscription fees for entrance exams. Once secured, the public 
positions offer students the job security and guaranteed income necessary to pursue a 
degree of higher education or a better paying public job. In any case, this strategy 
allocates resources from the household economy to public sector market rather than that 
of higher education. Consider the following discussion with Flavia, a 52-year-old 
mother of three sons: 
L: So what about your other boys? 
Flavia: João got into the federal university. But his brother does not know 
what he wants to do. I do not know if he is even going to take the 
vestibular. He has not studied for it and this is his third year [of high 
school]. We enrolled him in a cursinho for a concurso that opens 
next year. 
L: Really? What for? 
Flavia: It is for a midlevel position at the technical college. 
L: And then? 
Flavia: Then, he could have some stability and maybe he will be ready to 
study for the vestibular. 
L: And what about the youngest one? 
Flavia: It is too early to see what he wants to do. His grandmother said she 
would help with the cost of materials if he gets into the federal 
university. By then, João and his brother should have a public job too 
and can help. 
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I asked João about his brother’s attitude toward higher education. “He does not 
want to go to the federal university,” he said simply. While regular school days are 
relatively short (running in four hour shifts from 8:00 to noon or 1:00 to 5:00), 
vestibular classes usually run in the evening three times a week for three hours each 
night and on weekends for up to 12 hours (6:00am to 6:00pm). Without a certain return 
on her investments, it made more sense at the familial level for Flavia to invest in her 
second son’s test preparation for public sector work since he was not showing interest in 
studying for the national university exam. Preparing for concursos was a reasonable 
alternate use of funds—interchangeable with preparing for federal university. When he 
was ready to pursue employment requiring the completion of a college degree, João 
noted that his brother could attend a private university, bypassing the process of 
preparing for the vestibular. So, while there remained disagreement between parents 
and children about the pathway to stability, the expansion of public sector work offered 
an alternative route, rendering postsecondary education less compelling at the familial 
level. 
The second way that the expansion of the public sector has changed higher 
education is with respect to the data on income earnings. Recent numbers from the 
IBGE suggest higher education is becoming less and less effective in raising income 
levels. Higher education has steadily lost its value as an income raiser—and, in some 
cases, an inequality reducer—during the past three decades (Crespo and Reis 2009). My 
suspicion based on my own fieldwork is that this data is misleading since many 
graduates are opting for public sector work at any cost rather than seeking employment 
in their field with corresponding greater pay, as discussed in the previous chapter. 
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Higher education, then, has not lost its income-raising potential as much as it has “lost 
out” to the desirability for public sector work. In the competition for household 
resources, the claim for time and funds for higher education is weaker than that of 
public sector work for the first time in Brazil’s recent history. Essentially, some families 
are opting to delay potential growth in income earnings through postsecondary 
education because it is only realized in the long term and instead participate in the 
public sector because it provides steady income in the short term. 
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Chapter 4: Technologies of Power 
The previous two chapters sketch a brief history of the labor market and higher 
education in Brazil with the aim of providing a context in which the desire for public 
sector work is historically rooted, constructed, and reproduced over time. While this 
dissertation is not about the labor market or higher education per se, it is important to 
demonstrate how the desire for public work overlays on preexisting, established forms 
of governmentality (Foucault 1991). Governing conduct via credentialing technologies, 
for example, is a longstanding feature of higher education in Brazil, and extending these 
technologies to the labor market through concursos is both familiar and enticing to 
many Classe C families. Moreover, when meritocracy and stability associated with 
higher education and the public sector, respectively, gain mass appeal through the 
expansion of concursos, the demand for public sector work among upwardly mobile 
families is greatly intensified. 
In this dissertation, I frame the desire for public sector work as part of a larger 
learned subject position, cultivated in citizens by governing aspirations through 
“technologies of power” and “technologies of self” (Foucault 1988). This chapter 
examines structural elements that have shaped the desire for public sector work by 
dominating conduct and objectivizing the subject. In particular, I focus on mechanisms 
in the political economy—state-crafting projects often referred to as “neoliberalism” in 
Brazil—and class identity, both of which introduce anxiety to the process of 
subjectivity. In the most fundamental sense, I take anxiety as central to subject making 
since, at both the individual and collective levels, subjectivation is inclined to make 
orderly and interpretable the material and symbolic surroundings. In other words, I take 
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the formation of cultural subjects, at its core, to be an interpretive process in which 
subjects alleviate “anxieties of interpretation and orientation” (Ortner 2006:119). In the 
Brazilian case, anxiety has come most recently through significant changes to the 
political economy and class structure. Neoliberalism, for example, has altered markets, 
social organization, and household economies relatively quickly (in the span of a few 
decades). The exponential growth of the middle class has altered consumption patterns, 
success narratives, and symbols of class identity. Together, neoliberalism and class 
identity have shaped bureaucratic fields, work, and pathways of upward mobility. Thus, 
new technologies of power have made disorderly and opaque that which was previously 
orderly and interpretable. Geertz, in his famous discussion of Balinese subjectivity, 
terms this “chaos”—a condition defined by “a tumult of events which lack not just 
interpretations but interpretability” (1973:100 emphasis original). Drawing from his 
insights, I suggest that dramatic shifts in the political economy and class structure of 
Brazil create an environment lacking interpretability for many families in this project 
and link the desire for public sector work to neoliberal state-craft and class identity. 
“Chaos” 
 Brazil experienced substantial economic growth in the first decade of the new 
millennium. According to the OECD, approximately 40 percent of the economic growth 
experienced was due to the expansion of labor force (Arnold and Jalles 2014). While 
the significance of this statistic may be lost in the average news bit about the Brazilian 
economy, it actually has enormous consequences in technologies of power governing 
many of the participants in this project. In the late 1980s, after the fall of the military 
dictatorship, the Brazilian state began shifting policies to stimulate growth via trade 
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liberalization, privatization, and foreign investment (Bulmer-Thomas 2003). While the 
overall market system after the dictatorship could not be labeled as capitalist, state-
crafting projects did indeed draw from “free market” economics to severely curtail 
protectionism in many sectors and expand trade.  
In the 1990s, after a “lost decade” of hyperinflation, high unemployment, and 
economic stagnation, the Brazilian state continued to incorporate capitalist policies as it 
deregulated the economy, privatized large sectors of industry, and implemented fiscal 
measures aimed at reducing public expenditures. Unfortunately, public services were 
already underfunded and these measures only soured the attitudes of many Brazilians 
toward foreign intervention. One of the strongest critiques of the Cardoso 
administration among participants in this project was the perceived link he forged 
between the Brazilian state and neoliberal policies from the north. The Plano Real, for 
example, tied the currency directly to the US dollar. Though it had the effect of 
reducing inflation (which had neared 3,000 percent at the beginning of the decade!), it 
also increased foreign investment and, in the minds of many Brazilians, subjected the 
country to foreign agendas and interests abroad. The political economy underwent 
significant changes during this time, demanding more “flexible” forms of labor from the 
labor market. That is, employment boomed among the self-employed and workers 
without legal contracts (carteira assinada), formal benefits, or protections by the state. 
Recall from the chapter on the labor market that almost half of all Brazilians held 
employment in the informal sector near the end of the decade. While the definition of 
informality may be debatable, it is my position that the sheer number of families who 
experienced economic and social insecurity during the transition to flexible labor in the 
91 
1990s brought about a staggering shift in the collective aspirations of Brazilians going 
into the twenty-first century.  
At the turn of the millennium, the Brazilian state experienced a decade of 
relative stability and implemented a hybridity of economic policy—intensifying 
capitalist activities while maintaining state control over capital and production. Brazil 
repaid its IMF debts early, the Central Bank cut interest rates, and the real traded strong 
against the US dollar. Steady growth in commodity exports and demand for raw 
materials (especially from China) benefitted “leftist” governments across most of Latin 
America (Miroff 2016). While the labor market of the 1990s expanded flexible labor in 
the private sector, the labor market of the 2000s enlarged the public sector 
exponentially. In one decade alone, the public sector in Brazil added some 600,000 
positions—an expansion of almost 30 percent (IBGE 2014a).  The northeast 
experienced the greatest percentage of growth in public employees relative to other 
regions in Brazil—approximately 2.2 times greater than the south (Pochmann 2008). 
The public sector increased at an average annual rate of five percent in the four decades 
preceding my fieldwork, while government consumption as a percentage of GDP nearly 
doubled (Reid 2014). At the time of my fieldwork, 15 percent of all Brazilians were 
engaged in public work (Ferreira et. al 2012) and in some metropolitan areas—
municipalities with populations greater than 250,000—public employees constituted 28 
percent of the labor force (Pessoa and Martins 2006). A large number of these jobs were 
obtainable via concursos. 
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Neoliberalism 
The economic model in Brazil is widely recognized as state capitalism or 
bureaucratic capitalism, but I would suggest a characterization along the lines of 
neoliberalism-managed-by-the-state. In other words, in the years since the turn of the 
century, neoliberal state-craft has emerged as the political project of choice in Brazil—
robust, encompassing, and targeting the formation of cultural subjects—but also firmly 
located in the public sector. Drawing from Wacquant (2012), I define neoliberalism as a 
political project associated with commodification, individuality, and the reformation of 
the state through the expansion of the penal wing and the reduction of the welfare wing. 
The desire for public sector work in Brazil is a direct result of these three technologies 
of power.  
Commodification involves the transformation of goods, social relations, and 
people into objects of trade available for sale or purchase on the market. It is the 
product of a number of calculations by the state—some economic in scope (e.g. 
deregulation or liberalization of markets) and others social or political in nature (e.g. 
desocialization of wage labor or hyperconsumerism). It includes the extension of private 
property rights to immaterial entities such as intellectual property and bodies of virtual 
data (Dent 2012). The circulation of information on the so-called knowledge economy 
is one such example that has resulted in the creation of new markets for the supply, 
exchange, production, and consumption of information and has made “human capital” 
and “knowledge production” buzzwords in the fields of higher education and labor 
management (Peters and Besley 2006, Shumar 1997). Recall from Chapter 3 that 
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investments in human capital have been the primary focus of initiatives targeting 
economic inequality and disparity by Brazilian scholars and public officials alike. 
The expropriation of public entitlements for private exchange in the open market 
is another example of commodification. For instance, in Brazil, safety is no longer a 
component of public welfare available to all citizens, but instead an object obtainable 
through sale and purchase by citizens with the necessary capital. About this, Pereira 
notes, “the purchasers of private security are often buying state protection, because 
private security firms are staffed, managed, and sometimes owned by police officers” 
(2008:202). Even though the state technically continues to provide security, it does so 
through the market. That is, the market mediates public entitlements. While 
commodification is primarily located in the market, its effects extend far beyond the 
circulation of capital when, as in the case above, consumption of security and 
surveillance shape class identity, politics of exclusion, and markers of elite status 
(Caldeira 2000). Commodification, at its core, advances “accumulation by 
dispossession” (Harvey 2003); that is, it alienates marketable dimensions of public 
welfare, personhood, public welfare, and belonging and requires monetary payment for 
the return of those components.  
During my fieldwork, commodification was a principle driver of domestic 
credit, and credit was central to the desire for public sector work. Recall from an earlier 
chapter Ricardo’s characterization of the public sector as affording the “ability to carry 
debt indefinitely.” Public sector work at once qualifies consumers for credit and drives 
the expansion of that credit by facilitating consumption levels that are unsustainable 
without debt. “House, car, and computer,” (casa, carro, e computador) as the popular 
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saying went, were the most desirable markers of stability and overwhelmingly 
purchased on credit (Reid 2014). With respect to debt, commodification transforms 
what was once fundamentally a social relation—the exchange between creditor and 
debtor—into a circulation of capital (Graeber 2011). That is to say, commodification 
not only acts on material goods purchased through credit but also “informational 
commodities” now assembled in virtual sites of production (Lace 2005).  
In what some have termed the “virtual debt factory,” consumer profiles and 
databases of credit worthiness enable the sale and purchase of the creditor-debtor 
relationship. At the time of my fieldwork, access to consumer credit was at its peak: few 
of the Brazilians I surveyed were leery of debt, none had personal knowledge of the 
“virtual” debtors prisons created by defaulting on debt (bankruptcy, repossession, or 
“bad” credit histories, for example), and the commodification of mortgage securities 
was fueling a housing “bubble” that distracted many Brazilians from the indicators of 
economic recession and instability quickly appearing on the horizon. Speaking to the 
link between neoliberalism, commodification, and credit in the US, Manzerolle (2010) 
argues:  
Easy access to credit acted as a stabilizing mechanism while a patchwork of 
neoliberal policies rolled back workers’ wages, and protections. Consumerism 
on the whole acted to channel all desire and affect into consumption of 
commodities; distractions of various kinds (video games, reality television, 
internet surfing) therefore counterbalanced social anxieties. (226)   
 
Manzerolle’s insights are useful in the Brazilian case because they highlight the role of 
consumption in distracting Brazilians from social anxieties. Ten years ago, many 
Brazilians defined their personal stability with the phrase “house and car” (casa e 
carro). At the time of my fieldwork, however, the phrase had been modified to include 
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“house, car, and computer” (casa, carro, e computador). Examining the link between 
technology, commodification, and neoliberalism in Brazil is a formidable project, but 
one that would be worthwhile, as commodification has changed the definitions 
Brazilians themselves hold for stability. 
In Brazil, it is still hotly debated if neoliberal policies have indeed resulted in 
diminishing wages (recall that the expansion of the labor market accounted for almost 
half of the economic growth experienced in the country!). Certainly, wages among 
many Brazilians actually increased in the decades preceding my fieldwork. In the years 
between 2004 and 2014, for example, public sector wages rose 55 percent, private 
sector wages rose 35 percent, and GDP rose 12 percent (The Economist 2015). 
However, these figures do not reflect calculations accounting for reductions in social 
benefits, pensions, or other social protections. So it is quite possible, as some have 
argued (Wacquant 2003), that wages have actually diminished in Brazil during the past 
four decades. In any case, the thrust of Manzerolle’s argument, which is relevant to this 
project, is that neoliberal state-craft links desire and affect to commodification in 
environments of social insecurity. In other words, the desire for public sector work 
overlays on existing structures of governmentality shaping subjectivity—namely the 
“structural dependency on commodified consumer debt” (Manzerolle 2010:234). 
Comor (2008) identifies commodification globally as a primary structuring institution, 
facilitating “efforts to rule” though consent—consent that is obtained through active 
participation in commodification. For many of the participants in this project, 
consumption of commodities like security, housing, healthcare, and education affirmed 
(and perhaps legitimized) the relocation of entitlements from the realm of public 
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welfare to the market. Recall from Chapter 1 the notion that the desire for public sector 
work motivated participants to engage in “fields” of accumulation (Bourdieu 1994a). 
Concursos themselves are commodified, available for sale to aspiring families, and they 
compel students to actively participate in related markets, such as education and test 
preparation, while at the same time reproducing anxiety through competitive relations. 
Participating in consumption signals a form of consent. Thus, neoliberalism itself is 
reworked, reproduced, and made acceptable to many Brazilians via consumerism and 
commodification. 
I opened this chapter with the argument that the formation of cultural subjects is 
an interpretive process inclined to make sense of symbolic and material environments 
and alleviate anxieties. The expansion of domestic credit is just one way 
commodification has made opaque class belonging, social organization, and household 
economies involving participants in this project. The shift to individuality has also had 
the effect of producing social and economic anxieties. In Brazil, as in many places in 
Latin America, modalities emphasizing familial or collective belonging have dominated 
subjectivation for decades. But, for many of the participants in this project, 
neoliberalism has advanced individuality as central to subject formation, by way of 
capitalist social relations and state-ordered institutions and apparatuses (such as 
education and consumer credit). The desire for public sector work is reproduced at the 
level of the individual, enacted by individual social actors, and expressed in narrative 
form by individual subjects. For example, credentialing technologies in higher 
education, and indeed, in public sector work, necessitate individuality for enrollment in 
preparation courses, participation in standardized tests, and personal accumulation of 
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social capital (status) in the attainment of public sector work. Consumer credit profiles 
privilege the monetary value of individual income over the unremunerated value of 
household production. Legal structures overwhelmingly favor personal and intellectual 
property rights over collective identities (French 2009). Since public sector work 
inheres in the state, the individual desire for public sector work is both a function of and 
a contributor to neoliberal state-craft.  
Many students displayed clear ambivalence toward the focus on individuality. 
Recall from Chapter 2, parents used words like “opportunity” and “stability” to describe 
the meaning of public sector jobs for their children, while their children used words like 
“competition” and “pressure,” reflecting much more individualistic and internalized 
structural pressure. Many students verbalized fear rather than celebration of the market. 
Consider Rafaela’s anxiety about landing a public sector job. When I returned to Brazil 
for a follow-up visit in 2014, she still had not obtained a position in the public sector. 
To the contrary, she had taken a part time internship in the private sector to help finance 
an elite test prep course for an upcoming concurso. In our final interview, she 
sheepishly confided:  
I am anxious to get a job. My parents have spent so much money. And I am 
under a lot of pressure to get a return [on their investment]. All I do is study for 
this concurso. Study, study, study. I work Tuesday and Thursday and then I 
study. It is all on me. 
 
In securing access to highly selective institutions of higher education or public 
sector positions, anxiety is often expressed by the individuals under pressure to compete 
(Demerath 2009). When the collective does not assume and diffuse this pressure, 
individuals are forced to make sense of it themselves. Like Rafaela, many of the student 
participants in this project interpreted the quest for public sector work through the lens 
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of neoliberalism. That is, they were aware of the individualistic nature of the quest and 
the structural obligation to provide a “return” on the economic and social investments of 
their parents. Framing success in highly individualistic market terms is indicative of 
how pervasive individuality is in constructing and reproducing the desire for public 
sector work. In fact, a long-term ethnographic project in southern Brazil recently 
published about this very change. Fieldwork conducted with participants between 1969 
and 2001 highlighted changes in “the ability to distinguish rights from 
duties…[showing] that structural change did indeed change people’s cognitive maps” 
(Perlman 2008:269). Individuality is not simply a structural imposition on passive 
subjects, but one internalized by social actors. 
 Of course, this is not to say that individuality eliminates solidarity. Solidarity 
remains a project of neoliberal state-craft. Nationalism, public sector work, and the 
union/corporation/government block (which will be explained shortly) all function to 
build solidarity amidst the internally contradictory and often fragmenting effects of 
neoliberalism in Brazil. In an examination of neoliberalism in Italy, Muehlebach (2012) 
tracks the evolution of the “moral neoliberal” through the rise of volunteerism. She 
argues that the state incorporates “an actively oppositional leftist culture” by employing 
moral discourses that make some forms of work more desirable than others, especially 
unwaged labor (Muehlebach 2012:51). Unremunerated labor—referred to by volunteers 
as “relational labor”—distances people from the monetary underpinnings that taint 
wage labor and allows the state to craft an “anticapitalist narrative at the heart of 
neoliberal reform” (Muehlebach 2012:8). Volunteerism, as a form of work, mobilizes 
the participation of traditionally oppositional political groups by using moral discourse 
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to draw them into volunteer projects co-opted by the state. Many of these projects 
include “highly feminized forms of work that are today decreasingly provided by the 
state,” including those serving the elderly, disabled, and socioeconomically 
disadvantaged (Muehlebach 2012:8). Recall from the discussion with Rafaela about 
business as a gendered form that sentiments like loyalty, protection, and concern for 
social welfare are accessible in the public sector. That is, for many Brazilians, the 
public sector undermines individuality central to the neoliberal project, emphasizing 
affect rather than market rationality in its laborers. Thus, the state makes use of 
individuality to produce solidarity. In much the same way that volunteerism in Italy 
represents both participation in the neoliberal project and resistance and struggle against 
the state, public work in Brazil also functions as a site of struggle against neoliberalism, 
even though participation in the public sector facilitates solidarity with the state. 
Finally, following Wacquant’s (2012) discussion, the last consequence of 
neoliberalism considered in this chapter is the actual expansion of the state rather than 
its paring down, as the penal system grows to manage the effects of neoliberal policies 
such as deregulation, protection of property rights, establishing flexible labor markets, 
and “punishing the poor.” Recall from Chapter 2 that in Brazil, neoliberal state-craft did 
not result in the reduction of the overall size of government, but rather, of particular 
sectors within the government. In the first decade of the millennium, the public sector in 
Brazil added some 600,000 positions (growing from 2,080,000 to 2,650,000, IBGE 
2014a). Of these, approximately 450,000 (or 75 percent) were positions linked to the 
expansion of the penal wing. That is to say, about 75 percent of the growth of the 
Brazilian state consisted of positions related to 1) policing—federal police, military 
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police, municipal police, army, navy, air force, firefighters and the like; 2) legal 
functions—judicial, legislative, and municipal court administrators; and 3) expanding 
structures of governmentality—public enterprises associated with founding new 
municipalities. Public employment in education and health sectors—that is, those 
positions associated with the welfare wing of the state—comprised the smallest segment 
of growth in the public sector. This is not to say strides were not made in improving 
public health and access to education for many Brazilians. Minimum wage rose by 50 
percent in the first decade of the millennium (Reid 2014) and a handful of government 
transfer programs, like Bolsa Familia, greatly improved education, literacy, and 
healthcare for elementary and secondary students while raising household incomes for 
their families. During the first decade of the millennium, the Lula administration 
founded 14 federal universities and 214 public technical colleges and increased 
enrollment in higher education (Reid 2014). 
On the whole, however, the growth of the public sector labor market was 
concentrated in systems of penality. Thus, while it may appear counterintuitive, 
neoliberal policies implemented by the state in the first decade of the millennium 
actually increased state involvement in the market and expanded the state—the latter of 
which had a direct effect on the size and composition of the labor market at the time of 
my fieldwork. Bourdieu (1994b) argues that the state is comprised of two bureaucratic 
fields—one serving the interests of the public, the other serving the interests of the 
market. Neither of these fields is homogenous, and sometimes their larger purposes 
overlap, but they represent spaces where officials compete for power and determine 
how the state allocates its resources and energy. Wacquant (2012) further defines 
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Bourdieu’s conceptualization by associating the left hand of the state with public 
welfare, education, and societal health and the right hand with discipline, elevation of 
market principles, and the penal system. Drawing from these characterizations, I 
suggest that the qualities associated with the left hand—public welfare—are now 
available to Brazilian citizens through the expansion of the right hand—the ever 
increasing numbers of public jobs supporting (directly or indirectly) the penal functions 
of the state. Wacquant concludes, “Neoliberal penality is paradoxical in that it purports 
to deploy ‘more state’ in the realm of the police, criminal courts, and prisons to remedy 
the generalized rise of objective and subjective insecurity which is itself caused by ‘less 
state’ on the economic and social front” (2008:56). 
Neoliberalism induced anxieties (labor flexibility, economic insecurity, and 
social insecurity) and prescribed solutions to them (public sector work). Ortner terms 
this process the “new-old concept of culture” and argues that acceptance of the cycle of 
build-up/collapse in market rule is constantly reworked and embedded “in a narrative of 
capitalist reproduction” by participants themselves (2006:14). Additional cuts to public 
entitlements after years of repression under the military dictatorship functioned to 
associate neoliberalism with a sentiment of fear in the public psyche. It is possible that 
the desire for public sector work arose from a place of fear in the public psyche: an 
environment in which “social insecurity” threatened to pull down anyone perched 
precariously on the boundaries of middle class (Newman 1999). Finally, recall 
Rafaela’s discussion about accepting a position for any public sector concurso she 
passed. The positions for which she was testing—bank tellers and bank receptionists—
were a direct result of the influx of foreign investment and expansion of domestic credit 
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in the banking industry. While comparable expansion occurred in the private banking 
sector, banking concursos grew exponentially due to the unique ways in which 
neoliberalism was managed by the Brazilian state. I will discuss this in greater detail in 
Chapter 7, but consider the example of mortgage securities: prior to the real estate 
boom, the Brazilian state tied public banks to the housing market by requiring they 
allocate R$0.65 of every real deposited in a savings account to financing housing 
(Martins et. al 2011). As the number of savings accounts doubled and the demand for 
mortgages increased, so did the amount of employment positions at public banks. In 
other words, job positions in the public banking sector were made possible by neoliberal 
policies implemented within the context of state capitalism. So, in this environment, the 
desire for public sector work was at once a proactive alignment with the neoliberal 
project of the state and a reaction to shrinking public entitlements and instability in the 
labor market.  
Class Identity 
Class is one of the most powerful analytics used to investigate subjectivity and 
meaning. Much has been made about the emergence of the so-called “new middle class” 
in Brazil and its involvement in higher education and the labor market. Since the 
burgeoning of the public sector is associated with middle class Brazilians, it is worth 
examining the designation and changes to the horizontal strata that have occurred in the 
past twenty years. In this section, I will sketch the development of middle class identity 
in recent years and discuss theoretical approaches that have gained traction among 
social scientists investigating class identity.  
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The term “new middle class” was first coined by Neri (2010) in an article 
documenting the entrance of some 50 million Brazilians to the middle class in the first 
decade of the millennium. The newcomers were assigned middle class status based on 
their income levels—having achieved the designation Classe C in the classification 
scheme outlined by the OECD. Usage of Neri’s terminology by major media outlets and 
leading think-tanks, especially the Centro de Politicas Sociais (CPS), further 
popularized the term in public discourse and facilitated identification with “new” or 
“emerging” middle class identities by Brazilians themselves. 
In formal interviews, participants themselves seldom invoked the phrase “new 
middle class.” Instead, they spoke of work, education, home ownership, and travel. 
Outside of formal interviews, however, the phrase pervaded public discourse. It was 
featured in news reports and magazine articles; I heard it in conversations on the bus, at 
the mall, and around the table at mealtime. So, the infrequency of mentions of class in 
formal interviews does not indicate a lack of relevance or awareness to participants. On 
the contrary, multiple authors have observed the absence of overt class references in 
structured interviews. Though structurally constraining, class is often indexed on other 
markers of identity when expressed in narrative form. Race, gender, education, and 
consumptive practices, for example, provide some of the richest texts for the expression 
of class. In Brazil especially, class is written on racial identity in ways that are 
exceptionally complex, a point to which I will return later in the chapter. For the 
purpose of this section, however, my focus is the objectification of the subject via class 
identity. Class itself is a form of domination—representing (whether objectively, 
abstractly, or constructively) power afforded by primarily economic positions in the 
104 
sociopolitical strata. Thus, more than any other category of identity, class is an 
economistic marker concerned with quantitative expressions and exchanges taking 
place in the market. This is an oversimplification, of course, but insofar as it expands 
our understanding of income, concursos, and aspirations, it is useful to organize 
technologies of power under the theme of class. 
During my fieldwork, much of the public discourse about the “new middle 
class” concerned its link (perceived or real) to economic growth. Consider the following 
use of the phrase by Cristiane, a 25-year-old student in tourism: 
Cristiane: Tourism helps the local economy, the national economy. So it is 
really important. 
L: Why do you think it is so important, at this moment, here in Brazil? 
Cristiane: Because tourism has grown a lot in Brazil, in comparison to other 
countries. Today it is much easier, um, to have, you have more 
people visiting Brazil than you have leaving. I can tell. So Brazil has 
a really high growth rate of annual visits from tourists. And this has 
the result of growing the economy. And also helping various social 
classes. Like the new middle class. This is important for Brazil. For 
cultural and economic growth in Brazil. Especially Recife. Even 
more so with the coming of the [World] Cup. 
This was one of the few explicit references to the “new middle class” by 
participants in structured interviews. While Cristiane’s narrative is not entirely clear as 
to how the tourism industry aids the “new middle class,” it is obvious that she links the 
two via “economic growth.” This is important for two reasons: first, it demonstrates 
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how Brazilians themselves make sense of state-crafting projects employing capitalism 
and neoliberalism. Second, it reveals larger notions about how class is defined and 
operationalized as a theory of identity in Brazil. 
Acceptance of the relationship between the “new middle class” and “economic 
growth” illustrates the efficacy of recent state-crafting projects employing capitalism 
and neoliberalism. Cristiane’s explanation is based on the assumption that tourism 
represents opening markets, attracting foreign visitors to Brazil, not because of any 
attraction that is culturally unique, but because of an attraction that is rooted in the 
market: globalization, opening of the economy to “trade.” Explanations for economic 
growth are constantly reworked and “embedded in a narrative of capitalist 
reproduction” (Ortner 2006:14). 
Secondly, linking economic growth and the new middle class speaks to larger 
beliefs about how class is defined and how it is operationalized as a theory of identity. 
The exact nature of the “new middle class” continues to be a point of contention among 
social scientists. At some point, every anthropologist is introduced to the familiar, often 
overused, metaphor of the anthropologist’s toolbox. In its strictest sense, the toolbox 
contains a collection of conceptual approaches—analytical constructs—which aid the 
professional in understanding and deconstructing lived experience in the cultural 
context. While these “tools” are utilized in multiple disciplines, such as sociology, 
political science, and economics, there are particular uses within anthropology that 
merit consideration in this dissertation project. 
Throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, multiple theoretical 
frameworks of class identity advanced by social theorists have been incorporated and 
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refashioned in anthropology. Many of these frameworks evolved in tandem with larger 
intellectual shifts in the social sciences, including those of positivism, structuralism, and 
postmodernism. For the purposes of this section, I want to highlight two approaches to 
theorizing class identity that are especially compelling in investigating the desire for 
public sector work. Since most readers are familiar with Marxist and Weberian 
frameworks, the following paragraphs sketch a general summary of the intellectual 
traditions, emphasizing in particular the formulation of class as a concrete structure of 
stratification, an abstract structure of social positions, and an historical accumulation of 
lived experience. 
Marxist frameworks tend to tie class identity to production and portray the 
ownership of property as fundamental to class divisions and, therefore, social 
stratification. Marx (1948) conceptualizes two classes based on these relationships: the 
bourgeoisie and the proletariat—those who own productive property and those who do 
not. In Capital, Marx (1965) expands this classification by further segmenting the 
bourgeoisie into two ruling classes: the aristocracy and the capitalists. At the most basic 
level, Marxism posits that class exists as a concrete structure due to its connection to 
subsistence systems (the “base”) and determines peripheral components of culture 
including ideological, political, religious, and social practices (the “superstructure” of 
lived experience). Thus, concrete structures of stratification take class as a distinct 
category: more material, more objective, and more fundamental in the formation of 
group identity than other social categories (cultural, natural, or otherwise). Class 
identity is a group identity and it is constructed via class-consciousness—an awareness 
of solidarity or belonging to the class group. Moreover, it is reproduced through conflict 
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and struggle with other class groups in ways that can be revolutionary to economic and 
social organization. For this reason, many anthropologists working in Brazil have drawn 
from Marx or refashioned his theoretical frameworks to investigate inequality, 
resistance, and agency within structures of domination. 
Ribeiro (1995), in his seminal work O Povo Brasileiro, defines class identity in 
a fairly traditional Marxist sense. He identifies two classes—those with economic 
power, and those without—and distinguishes the elite based on their political clout 
(business executives, political leaders, and agents of foreign enterprise). Chilcote (1990) 
also considers economic and political power the defining factor of class identity, though 
he considers “ruling classes” to be economic classes that rule politically. He identifies 
members of the ruling class by their reputation as elites, their position in the upper class 
hierarchy, or their preeminence in the political institutions of decision-making in 
northeast Brazil. Conniff and McCann (1989) demonstrate the extent to which class 
identity remains conflated with political power and economic resources, rooted in 
definitions of class from the colonial era. Since Brazil has not experienced the kind of 
social revolution that has occurred in other parts of Latin America, many Marxist 
conceptions of class identity remain focused on land holding, large scale 
agriculturalists, and the aristocratic owners of production. 
With respect to the “new middle class” in Brazil, social scientists emphasizing a 
concrete structure of stratification do not consider the inclusion of 50 million Brazilians 
to Classe C a new structural reality. To the contrary, they frame it as a quantitative 
expansion of the proletariat. Singer (2013), for example, calls newcomers to Classe C 
an incorporation of the “sub-proletariat”—laborers drawn from the upper ranks of the 
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destitute into the working class. According to the most recent data on the composition 
of the “new middle class,” upwardly mobile, traditionally marginalized socioeconomic 
groups represent the fastest growing segment of Classe C. In some sense, locating the 
“new middle class” in a preexisting proletariat structure is an obvious move: historically 
in Latin America, growth in class membership on such a large scale is more likely to 
come from below via upward mobility than from above via downward mobility (Pastore 
1982). In the Brazilian case especially, private industry was directly responsible for 
over five million jobs in the formal economy during the first decade of the millennium. 
In the northeast, the rate of growth in the private sector was almost two and a half times 
that in the south. So, the explanation that the number of formal laborers has simply 
grown with the intensification of capitalism in Brazil is fairly reasonable and self-
evident. 
But while Marxist frameworks may serve neatly to explain a segment of Classe 
C benefiting from the expansion of private sector jobs, they lack the explanatory power 
to investigate the desire for public sector work—a desire which often cuts across class 
lines, traversing fundamentally opposed group identities (bourgeoisie and proletariat), 
and aligning interests rather than initiating conflict in class formation. Privileging 
concrete structures of stratification obscures the effects of “technologies of power” on 
subjectivation: the role of institutional forms of power, the domination of conduct, and 
the centrality of anxiety in constructing subjectivity. Broadly speaking, Marxism frames 
class consciousness as learned (and reproduced) upon entry to the labor market. But in 
the case of the public sector, and indeed for many of the participants in this project, the 
labor market itself is an object of intense desire (and, one might even say, consumption) 
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at both the individual and the collective (e.g. class) levels. Rather than mobilize its class 
members to political awareness, wage labor in the public sector makes an ally of the 
state and reunites laborers with modes of production otherwise alienated. So one of the 
most poignant critiques of Marxism is the general failure of history to vindicate its 
theoretical predictions: that class consciousness eventually leads to massive 
reorganization of the class structure. By and large, inequalities in class structures appear 
to have been reproduced throughout the course of history and remained stable over long 
periods of time. 
One way around the constraints of Marxist conceptions of class is to frame class 
as an abstract (rather than concrete) structure of social positions. The following 
overview groups frameworks loosely under the term “Weberian” because they take 
class as a real structure of domination but accept multiple systems (beyond subsistence) 
for organizing the horizontal strata. Like Marxist notions, Weberian frameworks 
associate class identity with ownership. However, Weber (1946) characterizes 
ownership as the result of consumption rather than production. In direct contradiction to 
Marx, Weber does not view class identity as a group identity. Instead, he frames class as 
one of many bases of stratification representing “typical chances” of economic 
opportunities, access to scarce goods, and life experiences afforded to social actors 
(Weber 1946:181). Social classes are the manifestation of structural positions of class 
“within which individual and generational mobility is easy and typical” (Weber 
1968:305). Class markers can be objectively measured (income, occupation, education) 
or subjectively constructed (status, ranking, hereditary prestige), but they are ultimately 
reflective of structural locations. In frameworks incorporating status attainment models, 
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status is the driving force of stratification and status groups form across traditional class 
divisions by monopolizing privilege and preventing other social actors from mobilizing 
their own resources or access. Structures of stratification influence ideological, political, 
religious, and social practices, but do not determine them. Moreover, class conflict is 
not privileged as the site of reproduction of class identity; the market is. Thus, “the 
potential for class membership is not real until the determining factor is used in a 
market to secure access to privilege” (Pakulski and Waters 1996:15). The market 
provides the location at which class structures and the individual intersect to reproduce 
class identity. 
Weberian approaches offer a critical insight into the desire for public sector 
work in Brazil: multiple bases of stratification make possible the formation of new 
classes, and thus, the “new middle class.” The horizontal strata in Brazil have 
undergone massive changes within the last two decades. In a compelling project 
documenting the rise of the new economic elite during the Lula and Rouseff 
administrations, Zibechi (2014) charts the evolution of the Partido de Trabalhadores—
the traditional party of the working class—and contends that union involvement in 
pension funds and state-owned development banks is constituting a new structural 
reality. He argues that unionists have not only fused with corporations to monopolize 
economic power, but they also have secured state power by obtaining employment in 
the public sector via political and electoral processes. Thus, union leaders have gained 
legitimate access to and maintained control of public resources (pension funds and bank 
loans, for example), as well as promoted the capitalist growth of these resources by 
locating them in the market. Rather than viewing this process as the development of a 
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labor aristocracy (as would be the case in a Marxist framework), Zibechi characterizes 
the emergence of the “union/government/corporation” power bloc as a “qualitative 
leap” in the aggregate of social classes. Brazilian sociologist De Oliveira agrees, 
arguing that the new class formation “has unity of purpose, was formed with ideological 
consensus around the new role of the state, works within management of state or semi-
state pension funds, and creates the link to the financial system” (2003:148). 
The Partido de Trabalhadores operates at all levels of the state apparatus, 
controlling approximately 16 percent of Brazil’s GDP through management of pension 
funds and accounts at the Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social  
(Zibechi 2014). Pension funds finance national debt, public infrastructure, private 
industry, and multinational operations. While Brazil is not unique in its domination of 
pension funds by unionists, what is unusual is that financial accumulation takes place in 
the realm of the state rather than the private sector. Some have dubbed this organization 
of the market state-capitalism or bureaucratic capitalism, but what is most relevant to 
this project is that the change took place in a relatively short period of time—within the 
span of two decades—and resulted in a dramatic shift in the lived experience of many 
“ordinary” Brazilians on the other end of the class spectrum: essentially the “new 
middle class.” For many Brazilian families in this project, within the span of one 
generation, the union/government/corporation bloc has altered their own anxieties, class 
consciousness, work, and the ability to organize politically. On this topic, Zibechi 
contends, “It is neither chance, nor error, nor a case of co-optation that those same 
union leaders are working with the state and the corporation to prevent or destroy 
strikes” (2014:256). Indeed, demonstrations, conflict, and struggle are in decline, with 
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fewer strikes in the entire decade since the millennium than in a single year in the 1980s 
(Zibechi 2014). While Marxist frameworks may interpret these figures as representative 
of stagnation or weakening mobilization among the proletariat, Weberian approaches at 
least offer the possibility of a new emerging class consciousness. In other words, 
declining struggle and conflict numbers may signal the exodus of 50 million Brazilians 
from one structural position into another—a “new middle class” in which an 
emancipatory or revolutionary class consciousness is not 1) politically, economically, or 
socially compatible with newly-desired forms of labor and consumptive practices, and 
2) profitable in subjectivation alleviating anxiety introduced by new class identities.  
So what does the “union/government/corporation” bloc have to do with the 
“new middle class” and the desire for public sector work? First, through the rise of a 
new economic elite, the consolidation of power (political, economic, and social) is 
occurring simultaneously at the site of public employment and the market. I suggest the 
effect is twofold: first, it intensifies the desire for public sector work among those in 
Classe C undergoing class formation; and secondly, it fuels consumptive practices in 
the market to solidify class belonging. Governing desire for public sector work is 
intensified by the state, as the Partido de Trabalhadores transformed “one of its core 
constituencies—current and retired public-sector workers” into a “pillar of the corporate 
state” (Reid 2014:141). Recall Muehlebach’s argument about solidarity in the neoliberal 
project. Leftist or oppositional groups are incorporated in the state through moral 
“work”—that is, through “practices that are both oppositional and complicit at the same 
time” (2012:9). The simultaneous advancement of union interests and corporate 
interests in the realm of the state makes public sector work a site for solidarity, desirable 
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precisely because of the intersection of morality and class. Consumptive practices are 
fueled through direct initiatives increasing the numbers of public sector jobs and raising 
wages, but also through indirect initiatives targeting secondary education. Since entry 
level positions in the public sector require the equivalent of a high-school diploma, the 
more educated the Brazilian population becomes, the larger the pool of candidates for 
concursos grows (and the greater the revenues for the state). Education, in Weberian 
frameworks, is one of many commodities for consumptive actions in the market 
signaling class identity. So, class belonging is manifest in the market through 
consumptive practices like education and concursos, while the state, private industry, 
and political elite shape the formation of the “new middle class.” 
Additionally, fusing labor interests with the state and the market is in line with 
Brazilian ideology about class mobility more broadly. While American ideology might 
frame class mobility as more “open” than it actually is—emphasizing meritocracy and 
economic opportunity—and British ideology might frame class mobility as more “rigid” 
than it actually is—emphasizing status and traditional ranks—Brazilian ideology frames 
class mobility as more “paternalistic” (or “neo-patrimonial,” Schwartzman 2007) than it 
actually is—emphasizing clientelism and public grafts. This is a gross 
oversimplification, of course, but it illustrates the point about the persistence of public 
grafts in the Brazilian system. While it may not actually be the case that the public 
sector ensures upward mobility—by some estimates, for example, the expansion of the 
formal private sector labor force accounts for almost half of the economic growth in 
Brazil during the decade since the turn of the century (Reid 2014)—it is nonetheless the 
prevailing ideology that positions in the state apparatus afford upward mobility and 
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legitimate access to public funds for personal use. I employ the term “legitimate” here 
because, despite the illegality of some forms of public grafts within existing legal 
frameworks and the criticism surrounding political corruption scandals often featured in 
the media, Brazilians themselves display a great deal of tolerance (one might even say 
endorsement) for the practice of public grafts in everyday life. 
My evidence for this is largely anecdotal, though there are several authors who 
have tackled explicitly the topic of corruption as a cultural phenomenon. DaMatta 
(1979) is perhaps the most famous to do so with his description of the Brazilian jeitinho 
used in everyday life to secure access to privilege. Almeida (2008) also discusses the 
jeitinho. Multiple authors have compared corruption in Brazil cross-culturally (Fisman 
and Miguel 2006, Vieira 2008) and bestowed the unenviable distinction that Brazil 
displays a “high level of abuse of the perks of public office, even by Latin American 
standards” (Power and Taylor 2011:10). Recall the discussion with Lucinete about 
corruption in the Brazilian system. Without straying too far from the topic at hand, 
consider her observation that ordinary practices are “just as corrupt, just as dishonest as 
the, the politicians” (o faz tão corrupto, o faz tão ladrão quanto os, os políticos). 
Despite her disapproving tone, she maintained these practices in her own daily life. 
Maria demonstrated a similar practice, criticizing her fellow public school teachers for 
expropriating computers and office furniture for their own “personal” (próprio) use. But 
while having dinner in her home one evening, I commented on a stack of industrial rolls 
of toilet paper in the corner of her living room. She laughed and said simply, “I got 
them from work.” To offer one more example, in 2013, Sandra participated in mass 
demonstrations in Recife protesting inequalities in the implementation and adjudication 
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of the law. Her primary complaint was expressed as follows, “Everyone should have to 
obey the rules.” In 2013, she vacationed to the United States and I accompanied her to 
New York City. While going through security, she was pulled aside by a Transportation 
Safety Administration (TSA) agent for packing a snow-globe souvenir that exceeded 
liquid restrictions. I acted as her translator as she argued with the agent, until she turned 
to me and demanded, “Is there not a way (jeitinho) to get my souvenir through? Why is 
he being so rigid with the rules? Can’t you slip him a little cash?” 
In discussions about class mobility (whether explicitly framed as such, or 
alluded to in narratives), Brazilians generally agree that upward mobility is hampered 
by corruption. But many of the same Brazilians willingly identify their own “corrupt” 
practices when asked about them. In this chapter, I am less interested in the moral 
economy of these practices than I am in the larger structural elements shaping conduct. 
In the case of corruption, I suggest that it is a very particular form of corruption that is 
objectionable to the middle class. By the time many of the Brazilians I surveyed gained 
access to the public sector, they felt entitled to its resources and viewed, to an extent, 
public grafts as legitimate. The exception was for those at higher levels (as viewed from 
“below”) of the public sector hierarchy—essentially those politicians in public office. 
That it was objectionable for career politicians to engage in public grafts, but acceptable 
for “ordinary” employees of the public sector, is in part, I suggest, a matter of class 
identity and relevant to discussions about the desire for public sector work. 
Alesina et. al (2000) sees public employment as redistributive when policies 
such as tax-transfers are not politically viable. For the “new middle class” then, and 
indeed for Brazilians in general, seizing the public sector for private gain is simply an 
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expression of the ideology surrounding class mobility. In some sense, it is no different 
than street attendants seizing public parking spaces for personal use (“looking after” 
your car for a small fee while you dine or shop), or carnival managers seizing public 
plazas to set up their amusement rides (during my fieldwork, one rotated through our 
residential neighborhood every three months, see Figure 6), or union leaders in public 
office seizing state funds to finance their lifestyles (as occurred in the “mensalão” 
scandal). Thus, Weberian frameworks emphasize the formation of the “new middle 
class” as a manifestation of emerging structural positions in multiple bases of 
stratification. 
 
Figure 6. Carnival in residential neighborhood park (author 2012) 
 
  
117 
Chapter 5: Technologies of Self 
In this chapter, I want to examine some of the ways in which participants in this 
project construct themselves as ethical subjects. As outlined in the introduction, I take 
the desire for public sector work as part of a larger, learned subject position through 
which “technologies of power” and “technologies of self” (Foucault 1988) govern the 
aspirations and practice of individual subjects. In this chapter, I offer examples of the 
latter—how, rather than shaping conduct via domination, technologies of self “permit 
individuals to effect, by their own means or with the help of others a certain number of 
operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being so as to 
transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, 
perfection, or immortality” (Foucault 1988:18). Building on discussions in the previous 
chapter about structural pathways of anxiety, this chapter investigates how anxiety is 
mitigated through the desire for (not the actual attainment of) public sector work. For 
many Brazilians, the desire for public sector work exists in tension with the practice of 
living a “good” life. This is especially true for evangélicos (evangelical Christians) and 
their families. Of the participants I surveyed, 7 of 19 identified as evangélico, and it is 
in their narratives that the ambivalence surrounding the morality of public sector work 
is most apparent. 
Ethical subjectivity is not simply an imposition of authoritative religious 
structures upon passive subjects, but it is “the multiple ways in which one inhabits 
norms” (Mahmood 2005:14). Embodied practice is essential to the process of ethical 
subjectivation. That is, for many of the participants in this project, “right-living” 
supersedes attachments to categories of identity such as gender, race, nationalism or 
118 
class. The preeminence of righteousness (justificação or piedade) in the lives of 
evangélicos represent a “category of practice” (Fassin 2012:11) in which self-making is 
located in the moral domain. Indeed, I propose that technologies of self, operationalized 
in the construction of the evangélico subject, account for significant cultural changes 
underway in many areas of Brazil, including the labor market. Recall Muehlebach’s 
(2012) examination of ethical subjectivity amidst neoliberal state-craft. She argues that 
technologies of self can be framed as political actions when they take place in the 
market, altering meanings of work and even wage labor itself. Drawing from her 
insights, I propose that the evangélico subject can function as a form of insubordination 
to the neoliberal project, even though the desire for public sector work makes 
evangélicos themselves complicit in political articulations of the state. Muehlebach 
suggests, “it is precisely because of the moral neoliberal’s capacity to appear…as a 
form of critical emancipation that ethical citizenship has become so persuasive” 
(2012:4). Similarly, the rise of evangelicalism in Brazil is closely linked to sentiments 
of resistance and cultural critique, making technologies of self especially effective in 
navigating politics of exclusion in an environment of Catholicism, corruption, and 
neoliberal state-craft. 
Evangélico is a term used by social scientists and evangelicals alike to identify 
members of Protestant movements in Brazil. Evangélicos are characterized by an active 
recruitment to salvation, individualized faith experiences, and two major tenants of 
faith: the supremacy of Christ and the gifting of the Holy Spirit. As of 2010, the Pew 
Research Center (PRC) reported that more than 22 percent of Brazil’s population 
identified as evangélico, a figure that had quadrupled over the past 40 years (PRC 
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2013). By 2020, some speculate the number will have increased to over half of the 
population (Burdick 2013). There is disagreement, however, about what exactly 
constitutes evangélicos. In a recent ethnography on religion in Brazil, Burdick (2013) 
characterizes the term as encompassing denominations of “historical” churches 
(Baptists, Lutherans, Methodists, Anglicans, and Presbyterians), “classic Pentecostal” 
churches (Assemblies of God, Congregação Cristã do Brasil, Igreja Quadrangular, 
Brasil Para Cristo, Casa da Benção, and Deus é Amor), “neo-Pentecostal” churches 
(Igreja Universal do Reino de Deus, Igreja Internacional de Graça de Deus, Renascer 
em Cristo, and Igreja Nova Vida), and “millennial Protestant” churches (Seventh-Day 
Adventist and Jehovah’s Witnesses). The PRC has a similar classification of 
evangélicos, with the exception that it excludes Jehovah’s Witnesses and Mormons 
from its tabulation of evangelical denominations. Based on my own experiences, 
Brazilians of mainline and Pentecostal branches of Protestantism would likely question 
association with Seventh-Day Adventist for the simple reason that they do not 
congregate on Sundays, and with Mormons and Jehovah’s Witnesses for reasons 
relating to their preferential estimation of the Book of Mormon and Watch Tower 
materials respectively. It is precisely this difference in embodied practice that fuels the 
self-policing—or governing—of membership in each group and prevents the latter-
mentioned denominations from being included in the category evangélico.  
There are additional distinctions that should be made about the term evangélico. 
There is a growing divide in practice and in theology between charismatic and non-
charismatic mainline groups in Brazil (and elsewhere). In practice, differences are 
expressed at congregational gatherings through the public display of gifts of the Holy 
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Spirit. Speaking in tongues, faith healing, casting out demons, and possession by the 
Holy Spirit are a few of the most common supernatural giftings performed in 
charismatic circles, and confirmation of salvation is closely tied to the public 
demonstration of one’s supernatural gifting (Mariz and Machado 1994). Non-
charismatic groups, on the other hand, generally do not practice speaking in tongues, 
faith healing, or possession by the Holy Spirit, opting instead for technologies of self 
shaping the “inner state” as an intellectual rather than existential exercise (a point to 
which I will soon return). In terms of political economy, charismatic congregants tend 
to tithe more than do congregants from non-charismatic churches, relative to their 
income, and protestant groups more than Catholic ones (Duin 2001). And while most 
religious branches in Brazil are wary of involvement in politics (Burdick 2013, von 
Sinner 2012), in my experience, non-charismatic mainline Protestants tend to be the 
most reluctant of evangélicos to engage in politics, rejecting assertions that their own 
activity is in any way political. 
 From a theological perspective, differences between charismatic and non-
charismatic groups coalesce around concepts of sanctification and salvation. These are 
gross oversimplifications, of course. Charismatic churches tend to emphasize the 
spiritual battle between God and Satan, encouraging congregants to rid themselves of 
demons by enacting gifts of the Holy Spirit (Smith and Prokopy 1999). Material 
blessings flow from God’s approval of these efforts and the amount of faith. This 
theology has come to be known in popular vernacular as the “gospel of prosperity.” 
Non-charismatic churches tend to emphasize work ethic, estimation of the biblical text, 
and the sovereignty of God’s will. Weber’s (1952) insights about the protestant ethic are 
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relevant here: in non-charismatic churches, reformed theology is central to 
understanding salvation. Predestination means that congregants do not know with 
certainty their eternal fate, or if they do, they are driven by anxiety to work hard to 
ensure it. Moreover, material blessings are a result of hard work: the accumulation of 
wealth is evidence of “right-living,” or more specifically, “right-working,” as subjects 
attempt to discern the will of God, seek sanctification, and attain salvation. 
Finally, it is worth noting that “charismatic” (progressivo) branches of 
Catholicism emerging as of late share distinguishing features with charismatic 
Protestantism including the emphasis on individual relationships with God, direct 
accessibility to Christ, and charismatic gifts of the Holy Spirit (Peterson and Vásquez 
1998).  In time, it is possible that these groups may become associated with evangelical 
movements as their visibility grows, since their agendas are salient in charismatic 
evangelical circles. As with any category of identity, the boundaries of group belonging 
are not fixed. There is a growing (yet small) number of charismatic Pentecostals turning 
to reformed theology and altering congregational rituals accordingly (Lopes 2012). 
Additionally, though neo-Pentecostal groups vary quite a bit from Pentecostal branches 
of Protestantism, there remains a significant amount of movement from one group to 
another, especially in the realm of politics when congregants unite to endorse 
evangelical politicians or stand behind legislative measures (Dreher 1997).  
For the purposes of this chapter, when I use the term evangélico, I mean to focus 
on the mainline non-charismatic variants of Protestantism. My reason for doing this is 
simple: even though all of the participants I identify as evangelical self-identified as 
evangélico, in practice and theology, they most closely resemble non-charismatic 
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branches of Protestantism in Brazil. While the process of ethical subjectivation is 
certainly not new in the field of anthropology, its significance in the lives of participants 
in this project initially surprised me. At the outset of my fieldwork, I did not intend to 
confront the moral domain so overtly in discussions about labor and aspirations of 
success. However, the presence of “ethical dispositions” (Mahmood 2005) in participant 
narratives about public sector work was so prevalent, it demanded my attention and 
challenged earlier conclusions about the intersection of desire and moral practice. This 
chapter examines technologies of self and the construction of the ethical subject through 
three examples: receiving peace, seeking fulfillment in life, and objecting to corruption. 
A Peaceful Self 
For many of the self-identified evangélicos in this project, being a moral subject 
necessitates discerning the will of God and obeying it. The uncertainty of God’s will is 
foundational to Weber’s (1952) framework concerning the Calvinism and relevant to 
many of the participants in this project. Even though one’s eternal fate may be 
predestined or assured within the Protestant framework, the expressed will of God for 
individual believers is often unclear and must be determined experientially. That is, 
God’s will must be discerned in a “moment of production” (Holland et al. 1998:45)—a 
process shaped discursively by participants mitigating the anxiety of an uncertain 
eternal future. For example, for many of the evangélicos I surveyed, the will of God was 
not known prior to registering for a concurso or pursuing a public sector job. Rather, the 
successful passing of concursos functioned as one of many indicators considered by 
evangélicos in confirming their interpretation of God’s desire for their lives. One of the 
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ways this affirmation was embodied was by bending one’s will to achieve a state of 
peace.  
Peace is at once a passive state—signified as the absence of anxiety (mental or 
emotional)—and an active one—operationalized through conscious decisions to submit 
“rational” thoughts and conduct to the perceived will of God. In investigating peace, I 
do not use the term “rational” to suggest that technologies of self produce irrational or 
illogical subjects, incapable of thinking critically or acting sensibly. To the contrary, the 
process of constituting a peaceful self requires a great deal of thought, logic, and 
purposeful behavior. Rather, I use the term “rational” after the apostle Paul’s 
characterization of peace in the epistle to the Philippians: “The peace of God, which 
surpasses all comprehension (entendimento), will guard your hearts and your minds in 
Christ Jesus . . . for I have learned to be content (contente) in whatever circumstances I 
am” (NASB Philippians 4:7, 11). This biblical text was regularly invoked during the 
course of my fieldwork to explain the process of discerning the will of God. Accepting 
a peaceful state does not necessitate human understanding; in fact, for the apostle Paul, 
and according to many evangelical Brazilians, the peace of God is characterized by the 
lack of a rational explanation. In this sense, the constitution of a peaceful self functions 
as a “dimension of everyday life in which [actors] are not aspiring to escape the 
ordinary but rather to descend into it as a way of becoming moral subjects” (Das 
2012:134).  
Moreover, peace is a learned state of satisfaction with present circumstances—a 
mental exercise in simplicity rather than complexity. Receiving peace is a conscious 
process of contraction, reducing what constitutes “well-being” to the most basic level of 
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existence: merely being alive. Contentment-regardless-of-circumstance implies sheer 
satisfaction with life itself, no matter the quality or substance. Thus, as an embodied 
practice, a peaceful state requires evangélicos to elevate the value of life above any 
other material or immaterial concern. Consider the following discussion with Lucia: 
Lucia:  I always ask for guidance from God to decide. Should I do it or not. I 
frequently ask people to pray for me. It helps me decide and such. I 
talk to this one and that one. And when I feel peace. When I 
declined, for example, the concurso and still felt peace. I was not 
distressed. I was…  
L: What is peace? Explain it to me. 
Lucia: Peace, peace, peace. I am not distressed, not doubtful, I do not think, 
“Wow, I should have gone.” I stop questioning myself. It is like, it 
was not meant to be. God has something better for me. Understand? I 
believe it is like that. That is how I perceive things. I pray, I ask. 
Then I read the Bible. I was trying to decide yes or no, then I read, “I 
am the Lord your God, and I will guide you with My eyes.” Then I 
thought, “My God, how are you going to guide me with Your eyes? 
What now? Where do I go? What do I do?” And the more I thought 
about going, the more distressed I became because I was going to 
take on too many things. And I heard this, too. The people of the 
church said to me, “You have to focus on what you want.” A 
colleague from church, she was concursado in physical therapy, I do 
not know if it was mid-level or advanced. She gave it over to God, 
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and God confirmed in her heart that she needed to leave her job to 
study medicine, because her dream was to be a doctor. So she left 
two concursos to study! <emphasis original> To do six more years of 
medicine. So why could I not let go of one concurso to study for 
another that would give me more satisfaction in the future? So, I 
have to risk it. I have to pursue what satisfies me, and what really 
brings me peace. 
Lucia is a self-identified evangélica. At the time of our interview, she had 
recently passed a concurso for a position as a public school teacher, but despite her 
desire for public sector work, she had elected to “let it go” (abrir mão) because she did 
not receive peace about accepting the position. In her opening narrative, she explains 
that, through prayers and consultations with other Christians, she discerns the will of 
God by feeling peace (quando eu sinto paz). When pressed to explain peace, she depicts 
a mental state free from anxiety, doubting, and second-guessing. But this state is 
discursively constructed—that is, it is formed in the realm of discourse to 
counterbalance the anxiety surrounding eternal destination. 
In his analysis of culture change among the Urapmin, Robbins (2004) outlines 
“technologies of self” employed to construct ethical subjectivity, specifically that of a 
“sinner” in a Christian moral system. He identifies a “peaceful, calm inner state” (231) 
as one such transformation enacted on a daily basis through self-reflection and 
renunciation of the will. In Robbins’ framework, cultural change is facilitated by a 
model he terms “adoption” (2004:11), and while I do not believe it completely accounts 
for the changes hereafter presented in the Brazilian case, I do believe there are 
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similarities in his analysis of Christianity as a cultural phenomenon. Lucia’s initial 
description of peace is reminiscent of Robbins’ description of Urapmin Christians who 
“experience the Spirit’s guidance as a heart filled with clear thoughts about which they 
feel no ‘ambivalence’” (2004:231). She qualifies the peace she receives by giving it 
permanency—she literally “remained” in peace (fiquei em paz) after foregoing the 
opportunity to work in the public sector—further evidence of its divine origin.  
In addition to the absence of mental and emotional anxiety, a peaceful state also 
entails the active discipline of thought and conduct. Note the mental efforts Lucia 
devotes to receiving peace: “It was not meant to be,” and “God has something better for 
me,” are both examples of conscious reasoning. The physicality of flipping through the 
bible’s pages in search of guidance represents transformative conduct that initiates a 
conversation with God. He speaks through Psalm 32:8. Reading the bible, praying, and 
self-reflection illustrate the deliberate actions required in the realms of thought and 
conduct to constitute a peaceful self. Moreover, since God resides in the mind of the 
evangélico through the presence of the Holy Spirit, thought is a means by which divine 
power can be accessed. On this point, the distinction between charismatic and non-
charismatic evangélicos cannot be overstated. Thought is regularly recognized through 
discourse as a realm of divine presence. Thus, possession of the Holy Spirit occurs in 
non-charismatic variants of Protestantism, but with the effect of altering the internal 
state and producing stillness in the body (rather than movement, such as dancing or 
falling). Embodiment of the peaceful self is itself a signaler of identity—proof of 
salvation—much like the demonstration of spiritual giftings. 
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Moreover, Lucia’s assertion that public sector work would complicate her life 
(acumular muita coisa) speaks to the importance of simplicity in embodying peace. In 
this example, it is precisely because the desire for public sector work would have 
complicated her conceptualization of moral subjectivity that it was rejected. Finally, 
Lucia points to the very nature of her decision—its seemingly irrational character—as 
proof of it being from God. She references a friend from church who resigned from two 
positions in the public sector to begin a new profession. The lack of rationality is 
implied in Lucia’s emphasis that the woman left her job “to study!” a minimum of six 
years, without guarantee of future employment. In the evangelical moral framework, it 
is acceptable to understand peace as incomprehensible from the human perspective, 
even more so in the face of great personal risk. As Lucia explains on behalf of her 
friend, to do anything other than bend her will to the desire of her heart would have 
been immoral—rejecting that which God had purposefully placed there. Lucia’s 
comments reflect the theological underpinnings of evangelical individual aspirations: 
namely, God’s sovereign purpose and predestined decisions about individuals shape and 
direct their own aspirations. 
Discerning desire as part of the will of God regularly requires evangélicos to 
balance pursuing their own wills—represented as divinely-appropriated desire—and 
exercising peace—a byproduct of successfully following the will of God. Aligning 
oneself with God’s will at once supersedes the desires of one’s heart and satisfies those 
desires (if they are pursued within the will of God). This is important because it stresses 
the experiential nature of discerning God’s will. Recall that many non-charismatic 
evangélicos draw heavily from reformation theology, emphasizing work ethic as a 
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location in which to discern the will of God (Weber 1952). However, I regularly 
observed evangélicos extending technologies of a peaceful self beyond public sector 
work to discerning the will of God in areas such as vacation planning, degree selection, 
and romantic relationships. Additionally, since ethical subjectivity is not constructed in 
a vacuum and involves the embodied practice of other Christians, evangélicos have the 
additional task of engaging with the technologies of others to constitute a peaceful self. 
For example, João passed the vestibular in the top position of test takers from the state 
of Pernambuco. His test results granted him first place (and first pick) among tens of 
thousands of students. He chose to pursue a degree in medicine, but in the years leading 
up to passing the vestibular, it was not entirely clear that he had God’s blessing to 
pursue his desired profession. Note the multiplicity of interpretations of the will of God 
in the following discussion: 
João: I tried three times, ok? When I did not pass the second time, some of 
the brethren of the church said to me, “João, I do not think it is God’s 
will that you become a doctor, because if it was,”—because the 
common thought was—“if it was the will of God for you to be a 
doctor, then you would have passed the vestibular. So since you did 
not pass, it must not have been the will of God. Listen to the voice of 
God, João. Go get a different degree. Medicine is not what God 
wants for you.” Understand? 
L: Yes. 
João: So I think it is, I think it is dangerous to be guided by concluding, “It 
is the will of God” simply by what you see happening. Simply by 
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trying once and not achieving. Trying again, and not achieving. To 
conclude that “It is not the will of God” that you do such and such. I 
think this is a little dangerous, you know, to follow this line of 
thought. But I do think that God has a plan for me in medicine. In my 
opinion, wherever I go, whatever profession I pursue, God has a plan 
for me. God wants me to accomplish something. And I have no doubt 
that I will discover it at the right time. Understand? 
While recent work in anthropology has provided an excellent framework for 
understanding how evangelicals discern the will of God, hear his voice, and interpret his 
plan for their lives (Luhrmann 2012), I want to focus on the constitution of a peaceful 
self and the ways in which peace is embodied in practice. João describes peace as a 
process of enduring criticism—via doubting and second guessing—from fellow church 
members. His personal knowledge that, “God has a plan for me,” (Deus tem plano pra 
mim) facilitates a peaceful state through discursive negotiation. In João’s case, even 
though his professional ambitions are unclear, apart from being located in the field of 
medicine, he argues it is dangerous (perigoso) to interpret the will of God without 
regard for the desires he has placed in the heart. I will return to the topic of desire in a 
moment, but for now, I want to point out the importance of constituting a peaceful self 
despite repeated failures. Being at peace with disappointment is a confirmation of “right 
living”—a state of being which must be maintained in the pursuit of righteousness. 
Failure to do so can constitute sin. And in the face of adversity, peace must be seized to 
preserve right living (or so goes the popular discourse). It is possible that for many 
evangélicos, peace is framed in terms of agency (“seized”) rather than passivity 
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(“accept”) to reinforce constructions of power and resistance. Recall Muehlebach’s 
(2012) characterization of ethical subjectivity as having the capacity to appear 
emancipatory. Peace—though it may actually be a byproduct of alignment with God’s 
will—is often framed in discourse as an active pursuit that acts in opposition to the 
dominant order. In her ethnography of evangelical Americans, Luhrmann observes a 
peculiar rationale among participants—“sin is something you do…that drives the peace 
of the Lord from your grasp” (2012:104)—a rationale with which many of the 
evangélicos in this project would agree. “Grasping” or “seizing” peace conveys the 
empowerment through which evangélico subjectivity is understood to be emancipatory 
in the spiritual realm. 
Fulfillment in Life 
“Delight yourself in the Lord, and he will give you the desires of your heart” 
(NASB Psalm 37:4). During my fieldwork, I not only encountered references to this 
frequently quoted scripture in interviews explaining professional pursuits, but I also 
observed it regularly on graduation cards, office knick-knacks, and congratulatory 
notices in church bulletins announcing a member’s passing of a concurso or vestibular. 
It was invoked, for the most part, in association with major life events, but specifically, 
it was linked to employment and higher education.  Since my aim is to investigate the 
desire for public sector work, I want to turn to the centrality of job satisfaction in 
narratives of evangélicos and the mechanisms governing the sense of fulfillment 
(realização). In the excerpt quoted earlier, Lucia concludes her discussion by linking 
peace and job satisfaction. She posits that employment which truly grants peace 
(realmente me dá paz) is characterized by a sense of fulfillment: doing what you want 
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to do (o que você quer). Thus, in this section, I examine the topic of job satisfaction and 
investigate how the concept of fulfillment both constrains and introduces aspirations for 
employment.  
That evangélicos seek, and indeed expect, job satisfaction comes from the 
notion that desires are placed in the heart by God.  Among the participants I surveyed, 
this belief was especially strong with respect to the desire for particular kinds of work. 
Professional ambitions are perceived as highly individualized affinities that occur 
“naturally”—natural in the sense that they originate in the heart and are placed there 
prior to one’s earthly existence—and reflect a personal relationship with God. 
Participants were quick to distinguish the desire for public employment from the desire 
for the kind of employment one was designed to do. The first reflects a temporal, 
earthly aspiration, while the latter, an eternal, heavenly one. To pursue employment in 
the public sector on the basis of monetary gain alone is at odds with the directive to 
“Delight in the Lord.” In fact, seeking satisfaction in anything other than that which 
God provides is a major source of anxiety for evangélicos. It indicates a carnal, banal 
focus. To achieve compatibility between one’s employment and one’s inner design, on 
the other hand, is to participate in the supernatural. Consider the following discussion 
with Paulo, a 29-year-old student in environmental management: 
In theology, there is a framework called creation theology. It concerns the 
physical creation. You probably are familiar with this. So the creation belongs to 
God. And man ruins creation. So in some sense, we should be caretakers of 
creation. This was my approach to the environment. Why did I go into 
environmental management? Because I understand that through environmental 
management, I can care for God’s creation. Understand? So I can develop 
professionally, earn money, and still have a connection between theology and 
environmental concern. That which defines the thought process is the Bible. 
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For Paulo, employment not only represents a sphere of value, but it actually 
functions as a site of redemption in which the original intent for creation is embodied, 
practiced, and fulfilled. From the point of view of evangélicos, the created world 
belongs (pertence) to God and was intended to be stewarded by humankind. But 
through sin, humankind spoiled (estragou) what was formerly perfect, transforming it 
into a fallen state. Paulo chose to enter the field of environmental management because 
it allowed him to, “take care of God’s creation,” rectifying the consequences of original 
sin. Thus, it is the very nature of the fallen world itself that ascribes pollution, 
conservation, and preservation entirely new meanings for evangélicos—meanings of 
supernatural significance in the moral domain. Ethical subjectivation at once constrains 
aspirations for employment by limiting those in which the connection to the 
supernatural is unclear or not established and by introducing those in which 
employment can function as a location for embodied practice with eternal significance.  
One final point should be made about the tie (ponto de ligação) between the sacred and 
the profane: it is fashioned in the realm of discourse, not conduct, and socially 
constructed through the interpretation of biblical texts in evangelical circles.  
In Brazil, as in other areas in Latin America, a strong tradition of Liberation 
Theology has long framed stewardship in terms of environmental management (von 
Sinner 2012). However, stewardship extends beyond environmental concerns to include 
engaging in the material world. In evangélico circles, stewardship is directly linked to 
fulfillment through the parable of the talents. In the Gospel of Matthew, Jesus recounts 
a parable in which three servants receive talents—or drachma—from their master, “each 
according to his own ability” (NASB Matthew 25:15). A long time passes before the 
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master settles accounts with his servants. He finds the first two have doubled their 
talents and commends them with the following statement, “You were faithful with a few 
things, I will put you in charge of many things” (NASB Matthew 25:21). When he finds 
the third servant, however, he discovers the talent was hidden—buried—to avoid losing 
it. The master responds by taking the talent from the “wicked and lazy” servant and 
ordering he be thrown out where “there will be weeping and gnashing of teeth” (NASB 
Matthew 25:26, 30). In this parable, stewardship is the overriding principle at work, 
shaping the embodied practice of earning a living.  Good stewardship results from 
making the best of one’s abilities to “double” one’s impact in the world. Poor 
stewardship, on the other hand, is only concerned with the spiritual self. Unlike the first 
two servants who make choices in the earthly realm evidencing faith, the third servant 
refuses to engage in the material world. It is consciously not using one’s abilities to 
make a living and it results in banishment. Fulfillment comes from acknowledging 
one’s talents and using them in the interest of increase. Ultimately, it represents the 
proper and acceptable alignment of the evangélico work ethic with God’s sovereign 
will. The lack of fulfillment, on the other hand, is expressed in anxious discourses about 
God’s will: am I doing what God wants me to do? References to the parable of the 
talents were littered throughout conversations with participants and their families. They 
ranged from short comments such as, “God wants me to administer my talents well” 
(Deus quer que eu administre meus talentos bem), to more lengthy comments such as 
those from Lucia: 
Lucia: Now I feel fulfilled by my students in the course, the language course, 
when I walk into the vocational-technical class, the students are older, adults. 
They have completed high school or are just finishing. And I can help them in 
some way. They already have an idea of what they want. So I can help them 
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grow. I like working with languages themselves. I think that I, that it is my, my 
“talent,” I don’t know, don’t know, working with languages. I help people 
understand the structure of language and the interpretation of text. I like it a lot. 
I like it a lot. 
 
During my fieldwork, evangélicos regularly framed their comments about public 
sector work in terms of satisfaction or fulfillment. Reasons for not holding public 
employment consistently returned to these issues. And even though most of the 
participants in this project critiqued the public sector for a lack of job satisfaction, all of 
the students I surveyed were studying for, or had passed concursos at the time of our 
interviews. In other words, all of them still desired public sector work despite it being 
morally questionable to them. Why? One could argue that criticism of the public sector 
softens the pain of failure—rationalizing the private sector as preferable after being 
denied entrance into the public sector. One could also argue that criticism of the public 
sector is a byproduct of familial reproduction—choosing employment based on parental 
job choices or family welfare. But, returning to Robbins, I would suggest that, for 
evangélicos themselves, the desire for public employment is one of many “concatenated 
actions” (2004:121) organized in the moral domain and subverted to more important 
values in the construction of the ethical subject. That is, the will of God is not known 
beforehand, but is by nature discerned in practice—upon passing a concurso or entering 
the public sector—and experienced as a series of adjustments or shifts aligning oneself 
with the will of God. In this sense, evangélicos view as supreme their quest for 
fulfillment of God-given talents because it demonstrates their own obedience to God’s 
will—in the same way that speaking in tongues and possession by the Holy Spirit act as 
evidence of salvation for charismatic evangélicos. Consider the following comments by 
Ricardo: 
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Ricardo:   For me, as a human being, I believe that each of us has a mission in 
life. And I think that we should do what we like. I do not see myself, 
do I see myself in the public sector? Passing some type of good 
concurso in the future? Yes. Yes. Clearly. Obviously. But I do not 
see myself staying in something that will not give me happiness. That 
will not give me pleasure. 
L:   Right. It is satisfaction, isn’t it? 
Ricardo:   Satisfaction. And many have pursued this route and have continued 
there, and some of them are dissatisfied, like in my experience, in 
conversations with some friends, some are already public servants, 
but they are studying for another type of concurso in order to assume 
other roles. Not that they never liked the work. But that the monetary 
value is higher. 
Ricardo’s notion that every human has a mission in life (missão de vida) to do 
that which is personally enjoyable means that happiness, pleasure, and satisfaction are 
nonnegotiable expectations in shaping aspirations for employment. Recall the woman 
referenced in Lucia’s earlier narrative: money was relatively inconsequential when 
compared to achieving her goal of divinely-sanctioned fulfillment. In the excerpt quoted 
above, Ricardo portrays motivations of monetary gain negatively—as unsettling, 
unrelenting, and ultimately, unfulfilling. This was the single most common reason I 
encountered among evangélicos for not working in the public sector. The implications 
are clear: if one does not seek employment for a sense of fulfillment, then one seeks 
employment for earthly gain. Personal fulfillment indicates the proper discernment of 
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God’s will. The desire for public sector work, then, is actually rooted in the desire for 
money. The following three excerpts illustrate the juxtaposition of fulfillment and 
money.  
Christiane, a 25-year-old student majoring in tourism: 
So, I like the field. I want to stay in the field, however, I am anxious because 
finding a job is very difficult. More difficult than necessary. If I must have a 
graduate degree, then I am going to do it in a field that I like. In my opinion, it is 
not worth it to earn a lot of money without job satisfaction in your field. So I 
prefer to earn less and do what I like, rather than get a degree in a field that 
might have better job possibilities. 
 
João, a 21-year-old student majoring in medicine: 
Do what you like. Do not do something just because of the money. Because 
imagine what it would be like to work the rest of your life in something you do 
not like. That is very bad. 
 
Sandra, a 20-year-old student majoring in secondary education: 
You are not going to be working in something you like. And your work is going 
to be very bad every day even if you are earning well. The money is not that 
important. To me, the money does not matter if I like what I am doing. I think 
that job satisfaction is minimal in Brazil, and that is bad. Because most of the 
workers are not satisfied, they are not joyful or happy to be doing what they 
want. Job satisfaction is good, it is good because people who are working in an 
area that they like do a really good job. So when an employer has an excellent 
employee, it is because he has found satisfaction in that sector or job. 
 
Much has been theorized about the precarious relationship between money and 
faith in the Christian moral system. It is worth noting that concerns about job 
satisfaction are not limited to Brazilian evangélicos; this discourse occurs all over the 
globe in Christian and secular circles alike. While I recognize the insights this body of 
literature may bring to bear on evangelical subjectivity, for the purposes of this chapter, 
I want to remain focused on the value ascribed to the notion of fulfillment and the 
technologies enacted to receive it. First, earnings are not transmissible to the moral 
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domain. Cristiane prefers to work harder and longer, earning less but gaining more—
“pleasure” (prazer)—in the moral domain. Secondly, God grants material success as 
long as one remains faithful to the desires of one’s own heart. João took the vestibular 
three times before passing and concludes, “imagine working the rest of your life doing 
something you do not want to do.” By remaining faithful to what he wanted to do, João 
passed the vestibular in medicine. Third, employment without fulfillment is very bad, 
literally “ruined” (muito ruím). Employment for the sake of employment interferes with 
“a job well done” (bem feito) and leads to ruined labor force. Sandra goes on to link the 
demonstrations and protests that had just begun in late 2012 with a lack of job 
satisfaction. Job satisfaction is taken as an indicator of God’s will, and it remains crucial 
to discerning his will for many of the evangélicos I surveyed who stressed the 
expectation of job fulfillment and the precariousness of the lack of it. This form of self-
governing is unique to non-charismatic evangélicos. 
Ease of Life 
“Ease of life (facilidade). Having a job, that you don't have to go to, with a 
guaranteed paycheck, [long pause], ease of life. That's what Brazilians want. Brazilians, 
you know, are a lazy (preguiçoso) people." Or so I was told by a taxi driver one 
afternoon on my way to a test prep facility. Facilidade is one of the most often cited 
motivations for public sector work. In this section, I focus on the morality of public jobs 
themselves. In particular, I investigate what I found to be a growing criticism among 
evangélicos I surveyed of the public sector in Brazil and the internal tension many 
participants express between their desire for public work and their ambivalence about 
the moral implications of public work. For even among evangélicos, the promise of an 
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easy life fuels desires for public sector work. So how do Brazilian evangélicos come to 
see public work as “wrong” and view the public sector as a morally questionable space? 
How does the public sector work ethic, once justifiable in the Latin American cultural 
context, become “sinful”? Or rather, what is the mechanism by which evangelicals 
become vulnerable to the trappings of public employment? 
In popular Brazilian discourse, facilidade is synonymous with public work. 
Consequently, public employment is associated with a weak work ethic. For some, 
work ethic in the public sector is laughable. Consider the following depiction of public 
work by Rosemary, a 19-year-old evangélica student. 
The concursados at church work. They work. It is just that they have this thing 
about taking off, lots of days off, every single holiday they are off, I have never 
seen so many days off. They are on holiday or taking off work the entire time. 
[laughter] 
 
Contrast the statement above with the following sentiments about public work from 
Juliane, a 20-year-old Catholic student: 
Juliane:  In the public sector, whether you want to admit it or not, the 
workload is lighter. Here in Brazil, we have this saying that the 
workload is light (“lite”) It is only 4 hours of work. The work day is 
four hours. It is easier, “lite.” 
L:  And why is that good? 
Juliane:  Because we work less. 
L: Do you actually work less? 
Juliane: Yes, it is actually less. You work less. So it is good, much better. 
Juliane makes a clear declaration of value with respect to public sector work: “It 
is good, much better” (é bom, bem melhor). Presumably, public sector work is much 
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better than private because it requires less work. Rosemary, while not making an overt 
pronouncement about the value of public sector work, frames her comments in the form 
of a joke, disguising an underlying hesitancy toward making a judgment, for good or ill, 
about public work. Goldstein (2003) interprets this cultural practice as an effort by 
Brazilians to use laughter to mitigate the violence and corruption perpetuated by the 
state. O’Dougherty observes a similar reluctance among Brazilians “to name very 
negative things directly” (2002:181). However, the implication is clear: public 
employees never work (só tem feriado e tá folgando). When pressed to explain what 
was comical about this weak work ethic, Rosemary simply laughed, shrugged, and 
exclaimed, “It is absurd!” (É um absurdo!). 
While the differences between the two excerpts above are subtle, I chose to 
include them because I believe they represent broader distinctions among the 
constructions of evangelical and Catholic subjects. Conversions from Catholicism 
comprise a large percentage of evangelical growth in Brazil and thus offer a 
comparative perspective of new subjectivities being fashioned from an environment still 
dominated by the Catholic moral system. Hesitancy to assign the public sector a value 
(ie “good”) was present in many of my conversations with evangélicos. Moreover, 
while I heard most of them express their desire for public sector work, I recorded very 
few instances in which value judgments were made about the work itself. That is to say, 
among the evangélicos I surveyed, most expressed discomfort with the characterization 
of public work as “good” or “better” precisely because of its association with weak 
work ethic, invoking near textbook examples from Weberian frameworks about the 
protestant work ethic. Rather than critique it openly, I found evangélicos were much 
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more likely to express hesitancy behind a veil of laughter. I suggest that this hesitancy is 
a direct result of the constitution of the evangelical subject and reflects their 
ambivalence about a social sphere in which it used to be morally acceptable to 
participate. Appropriating public resources for the benefit of the individual (or family 
unit) is still commonplace, but for evangélicos in Brazil, ease of life is becoming 
increasingly linked to corruption. Consider the following comparison Ricardo makes 
between the public and private sector: 
The private sector does not allow you to sit down and get comfortable. You are 
always active. You are always studying, thinking, wanting more. And if you get 
situated within a big corporation, you know that you are empowered to grow. 
Deep down, you are always searching for ways to get ahead. The public sector is 
different. You had to fight and scrape by for a long time in order to assume that 
public role. When you get it, you become stationary, you sit down. And there 
you atrophy. And you get sedentary and fat. [laughter] You get no physical 
exercise. [laughter] 
 
The public sector, in Ricardo’s view, has real and imagined physical 
consequences: the caricature of a public employee is one of a stationary, lethargic, 
atrophied, overweight, out of shape individual. The private sector, on the other hand, is 
depicted as facilitating employees who are always on the move: active, ambitious, 
studying, thinking, growing. 
Now, it is worth noting that this is not a particularly new argument in 
anthropology. Weberian frameworks, for example, have long linked work ethic and 
religious identity. This chapter has drawn extensively from these well-known concepts 
to explore how evangelical participants in this project discerned God’s will and 
understood the “calling” on their life. In this final section, I want to extend Weberian 
frameworks to focus on the ways in which ethical subjectivity among evangélicos is 
actively constructed via critiques of corruption within the neoliberal state.  These 
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technologies of self assume the form of moral discourse required to abstain from 
painting in a favorable light public sector work ethic, the verbal acknowledgement (or 
confession) of corruption in the public sector, and the embodied practice of refraining 
from participation in the public sector. 
For some, participating in the public sector takes the form of “guilty by 
association.” Consider the following conversation with Ana Paula, a 37-year-old student 
in cosmetology: 
Ana Paula: I try to find things that do not interfere with my faith. Truly, I can be 
a Christian and I can be a beautician. But I do not feel good being a 
Christian and being a person involved in the public sector [laughter]. 
Understand? Because in general, politicians become corrupt, even if 
they do not mean to. So it is not something that I see in my future. 
L: And what about being concursado? How do you see this type of 
work in relation to religion? 
Ana Paula: Well, I do not think there is a problem. There is not a problem. As 
long as you pass them in an honest way. Because there are cases 
where concursos are offered, you know, where there is a certain 
number of people that should get in, but they already have the spots 
filled with family, friends, this and that. So if you pass a concurso in 
an honest way, that is, you studied, you passed, you were called for 
an interview. I do not see a problem. Now, if it was through John 
Doe’s help that you were chosen, for example, I took this concurso 
recently and I could have spoken with someone to facilitate my 
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passing, and I would have been accepted. But I don’t want to do that. 
I could do that. But I did not and was not called for the interview. 
In Ana Paula’s estimation, the public sector corrupts. Even if one resists, 
corruption will eventually undermine the righteous person. Technologies of self among 
the non-charismatic evangélicos I surveyed were all about relieving anxiety, and the 
public sector was a constant source of anxiety. Thus, the public sector would be an 
unlikely “calling” for any serious evangélico, unless, of course, he or she could 
maintain a serious work ethic in the public sphere. Ana Paula goes on to suggest that the 
corruptible nature of public sector work calls into question the legitimacy of passing 
concursos in an honest fashion. Later on in our conversation, she quotes from the epistle 
of James, emphasizing her responsibility to remain “unstained” (incontaminada): “Pure 
and undefiled religion in the sight of our God and Father is this: to visit orphans and 
widows in their distress, and to keep oneself unstained by the world” (emphasis added, 
NASB James 1:27). Thus, the rejection of public sector work is at once an act of 
opposition to the state and an act of solidarity with non-charismatic evangélicos. It 
requires a non-hegemonic framework drawing from Calvinism and discursively 
constructed in the realm of discourse to critique corruption, Catholicism, and neoliberal 
state-craft. 
At the time of my fieldwork, bribes and grafts were commonplace in many 
localities in Brazil. Public officials operated with little accountability, and public 
property was often available for the taking by enterprising employees. It can be said that 
these difficulties are characteristic of many countries in Latin America more broadly. 
Aron-Schaar (2002) observes that public office holders are often expected to be 
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independently wealthy, as public positions do not, in the formal economy, pay enough 
to maintain lifestyles of affluence. However, public office regularly grants officials 
additional income in the informal economy through bribes, fees for services, inside 
information about contracts, and alliances with foreign capital and other affluent 
families. In northeast Brazil, Lewin (1987) notes that elite oligarchic families use 
positions in the public sector to transmit economic capital and material wealth through 
informal channels to their heirs to avoid taxation and intervention by the state. Thus, in 
addition to critiquing the public sector work ethic, many evangélicos also critique the 
“climate” of corruption associated with the public sector. 
During the time of my fieldwork in 2012, nearly every federal agency went on 
strike—military police, federal police, public school teachers, university professors, 
prison guards, municipal and regional level administrators, to name a few. While 
Brazilians are generally proud of their right to organize, I encountered striker’s fatigue 
by late 2012 and repeated criticism of the demonstrations, especially with respect to lax 
working conditions of public employees. The undercurrents of dissatisfaction were 
beginning to show in public protests in southern parts of Brazil, but very little of the 
movement had made its way to the northeast. In 2013, nearing the height of the mass 
demonstrations and protests in Recife, I spoke with one of the parents who had 
participated in this project about the protests; note the disapproving tone of Lucinete’s 
discussion: 
There will always be more and more unprofessional public workers. That is 
because many public servants fall into corruption in our country. This is a 
question worth asking: “Why are most of our public servants corrupt?” They 
corrupt the whole system. It does not matter what makes you poor; corruption 
breeds poverty. And it does not matter if you live in a slum or if you live in a 
mansion. If you cheat on taxes, you rob the state. If you buy a cd—cd?—if you 
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buy a pirated cd, you also are cheating on taxes. You are just as much, excuse 
the expression, you are just as much a thief as the corrupt politician robbing the 
people. This is a vicious cycle in our country. That is why it is not going to end. 
I am a Brazilian dissatisfied with politics, but in my own house, I do small 
maneuvers to get by. I buy pirated cds, I cheat on taxes, I declare, I declare false 
information, declare false information on my income tax. And I try to barter so I 
can get a better deal. I go to the market to buy ten bananas, and I ask the seller to 
give me 11, and I give him some change under the table. These small practices 
of daily life are just as corrupt, just as dishonest as the, the politicians. So, 
please, my fellow Brazilians, don’t gripe about politicians when you yourselves 
do the same thing [laughter]. I’m sorry. Damn! 
 
Multiple themes arise in the excerpt above, some of which I addressed in the 
previous chapter. In this section, of most interest to me is the confessional, self-
reflective tone of her discussion about corruption: that it is inherent in Brazilian culture 
and that she herself is implicated in it. Lucinete claims that while the majority of public 
employees fall into corruption and, in turn, corrupt the larger governing system, the 
majority of Brazilians practice the same behaviors on a smaller scale. Her concluding 
statement essentially frames Brazilians as hypocrites (você é tão ladrão quanto 
politico), and undermines the legitimacy of their protests (não reclame da politica, você 
faz a mesma coisa). All of the examples she provides of theft—buying pirated cds, 
evading taxes, not declaring imported goods in customs, providing false information 
about household income, and convincing the street vendor to include an additional 
banana in the sale—are examples of corruption in embodied practice. Abstaining from 
these practices provide a concrete way in which technologies of self transform the 
everyday (cotidiano) into a space for constructing moral subjectivity. 
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Chapter 6: Travel 
Public sector work affords an infinite number of possibilities for consumptive 
practices. Central to the desire for public employment in Brazil is the desire to travel. 
Participation in the public sector not only affords the opportunity to travel, it “ensures” 
the opportunity to travel. This is an important distinction since it speaks to why 
concursos have become so pervasive in recent years. Stable employment—that is, job 
security through the public sector—provides a guarantee of sorts for the consumption of 
travel; and travel—be it abroad or domestic—holds a number of meanings for Brazilian 
families. This chapter aims to unpack some of the meanings of travel for the 
participants in this project and consider the social and economic fields in which their 
aspirations are historically grounded. 
During my fieldwork, I often encountered discussions about travel in success 
narratives. I use the phrase success narratives after Ortner ‘s (2003) work examining 
class identity through narratives reflecting “imaginings” of success. Ortner argues that 
while structural mechanisms such as occupation may act as a general indicator of class 
identity, aspirations to social classes form the actual experience of identity. In the 
Brazilian case, the aspiration to travel is not limited to a single class; however, it often 
functions to build cohesion among particular groups of people, especially those seeking 
public employment. Indeed, for many of the participants in this project, transnational 
experiences define the kind of person they envision themselves becoming with public 
sector work. Success narratives offer perspectives of the “temporary attachments” (Hall 
and Du Gay 1996) to subject positions formed by participants seeking public 
employment. These subject positions are not defined by any single kind of capital—
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cultural, economic, or symbolic—as much as they are by aspirations for similar 
experiences, a point I hope to stress in the following sections. Like Ortner (2003), I find 
that social actors participate in “imaginings and practice” of action—invoking subject 
positions that require external actors for comparison. These comparisons necessitate 
internal and external affirmations of that position by other social actors. To borrow from 
Abu-Lughod (1993), “positionality” shapes the manner in which success is discursively 
constructed and, in the Brazilian case, engenders travel as a critical component of the 
desire for public sector work. 
Public employment is made desirable by the practice of collective aspirations to 
travel. One of the ways I tracked this in success narratives was through contrast 
categories. Drawing from Ong’s (1999) work, I use contrast categories to identify the 
conceptual groupings that prejudice people against certain practices and govern what is 
considered acceptable in Brazilian society: namely, biases against working in the 
private sector and estimation of travel experiences. Ong investigates the accumulation 
of capital with respect to contrast categories and exposes racial prejudices in the disdain 
for affluence among ethnic Chinese huagiao in the United States (for example, 
white/ethnic, rich/poor). In the Brazilian context, I suggest contrast categories prejudice 
people against social practices, like particular forms of work, and link the aversion of 
working in the private sector to deeply rooted notions of stability (for example, 
public/private, stability/instability). These categories are especially visible when talking 
about travel. Consider the following comment from Ricardo linking travel to public 
employment: 
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Ricardo:  I cannot, I cannot, cannot plan a trip five years from now with the 
private sector job I have today. 
I heard an iteration of this rationale over and over. Very simply stated: public 
employment allows individuals to 1) plan for travel in the future and 2) pay for it. 
Conversely, employment in the private sector is viewed by many as an impediment to 
aspirations of travel. Now whether or not it is the case that earnings from the public 
sector actually fund more travel than those from the private sector is unclear. But it is 
certainly the case that the prevailing perception among the Brazilians I surveyed is that 
public employment facilitates the “planning” of travel. Many Brazilians who had 
traveled abroad recounted their experiences applying for visas, noting that the consulate 
required them to demonstrate future income. This is a helpful insight since it links the 
importance of “imaginings” of travel to the desirability of public work. During my 
fieldwork, I was surprised to find that no amount of effort or reasoning on my part was 
successful in challenging participants’ use of these categories. The public/private work 
dichotomy extended to travel in that public work facilitated it while private work did 
not. Moreover, this rationale is present in Classe B and Classe C families alike, 
regardless of household income. In other words, for these families, the perceived ability 
to travel has less to do with an actual, quantifiable amount of money and more to do 
with an occupation facilitating the “practice” of travel. 
Recent projects focused on job selection suggest that people select the jobs they 
do because of the perceived utility the occupations afford to maintaining or leaving their 
social context (Akerlof and Kranton 2010). Public employment, then, not only 
represents a steady occupation and source of income to consume travel, but it also 
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represents the free time to travel. Consider the following comments from two student 
participants about holiday schedules in the public sector: 
Rosemary: It is just that they have this thing about taking off, more days off, 
every single holiday, they are off, I have never seen so many days 
off. They are on holiday or taking off work the entire time. 
Tiago:  Many people desire to have a public job. Any holiday, you get off. 
Any little problem, you can get off. Isn’t that true? The demands of 
the job, I don’t exactly know, but the job does not demand that the 
person has to be there. Because I think the expectation is less. 
Paid time off is a defining feature of public employment even though it is not 
limited to the public sector. In fact, employees in the private sector also receive paid 
vacation and holidays, sometimes on days not afforded to public employees. For 
example, while working at a Catholic elementary school, Sandra received multiple 
religious holidays that were not observed on the public employment calendar. However, 
the prevailing perception, and indeed the view she held, is that public employment 
provides more time off, more time to travel, and more time for leisure (lazer). It is 
precisely this association with free time that privileges public sector work in discussions 
about travel. 
On one occasion, I was invited by Rebeca’s family on a day trip to a resort town 
in the interior, about an hour and a half drive from the city. They advised me we would 
eat and then walk around (passear). I dressed in tennis shoes and sunscreen, fully 
expecting to be out in the sunshine. We drove 90 minutes to town, pulled into a 
restaurant famous for its fried chicken dumplings (coxinhas), ate dinner, and then drove 
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back to the city. I was puzzled that such effort was taken to get out of the city and such 
little time was spent walking around. Each time I went with them, the itinerary was the 
same. After several visits, I asked Rebeca if their outings usually consisted of a drive 
and dinner. 
L:  Do you always go to O Rei Das Coxinhas? 
Rebeca: Always. 
L: Why? 
Rebeca:  Because it is the best. It is nice to get out of the city. Take the scenic 
route. Relax. It is very hurried and crowded here. It is more tranquil 
there. 
L: How long have you been taking these trips? 
Rebeca: Let me see, it has been a few years. I think it was when I started work 
at the Federal University. 
These day trips caused me to rethink the significance of travel to Rebeca’s 
family. While neither transnational nor lengthy, these day trips represented a lifestyle of 
leisure, newly-acquired due to public sector work (meu trabalho na federal). The ability 
to take a short trip inland for the sole purpose of dining at a trendy restaurant would 
have been all but impossible ten years earlier. Now, billboards for the restaurant lined 
the highway out of the city, directing a new class of consumers to leisurely dining 
(Figure 7).  
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Figure 7. Billboard for O Rei Das Coxinhas (author 2012) 
In fact, the family did not even own a car until Rebeca entered university. By the 
time of my fieldwork, however, they had two vehicles, funds for dining out, and leisure 
time to travel. The fact that these day trips did not happen until both children acquired 
employment in the public sector is no coincidence. Familial aspirations for public 
employment resulted in a household in which three of four adults held public sector jobs 
and traveled accordingly in their leisure time.  
History 
Being a well-traveled citizen was once the domain of the elite Brazilian subject, 
as for much of Brazil’s history, maneuvering in international settings represented an 
arena in which “formal education and social refinement” were acted out (O’Dougherty 
2002). The association between travel and privilege has its roots in colonial history. In 
colonial Brazil, travel abroad served the purpose of maintaining social hierarchy. The 
official position of the Portuguese crown, as recorded in royal documents, was to force 
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colonial dependency on Portuguese subjects by limiting the availability of services in 
Brazil and requiring colonialists to travel abroad (Russell-Wood 2001). From the 
beginning, then, travel regulated the autonomy of colonial elite by redirecting them to 
the crown and preserving the integral role of the motherland. Many institutions, 
including those of higher education, were virtually non-existent in Brazil during 
colonial rule (Skidmore 2004). Colonial subjects who wished to participate formally in 
arenas of education, governance, and high society were required to do so through 
institutions outside the colony: in Spanish Latin America or, more commonly, in 
Europe. 
In more recent history—in the centuries following independence—travel 
remained linked to affluence. While it is not my intention to cover all of the social and 
economic events that altered meanings of travel, I want to mention a few of the 
elements most commonly cited by participants in this project when asked to explain, in 
historical terms, why travel holds such value for Brazilians. First, travel provided access 
to stability in unreliable economic times. Maintaining homes abroad and foreign bank 
accounts were common among the politically elite and functioned to preserve social 
differentiation, provide access to resources when domestic assets were threatened, and 
invest in the household economy. Transnationalism offered a safe haven for those 
seeking to escape political turmoil. While this link is clear in the case of Brazilians 
going abroad during the military dictatorship, for instance, it is also apparent in the 
influx of transnationals to Brazil, in the case of German and Japanese citizens during 
the Second World War. Thus, historically, travel has represented access to stability for 
affluent families. 
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Secondly, travel reflected one’s prowess as a consumer. In the twentieth century, 
economies based on consumerism and cultural exports developed, attracting both those 
Brazilians wanting to purchase goods unavailable domestically and those wishing to 
purchase “cultural” experiences. The United States, for example, became an 
increasingly desirable destination for elite families. Trips to Disney World were 
essential to the entrance of young debutantes to Brazilian high society, making travel 
even more desirable for families looking to display status and wealth (O’Dougherty 
2002). Transnationalism provided additional arenas for consumption, and the number of 
Brazilians traveling by air nearly tripled between 2001 and 2011 (Reid 2014:170). 
Thirdly, transnationalism signaled historical ties (intellectual, familial, or 
otherwise) to foreign ancestry. For many Brazilians, Europe remained the cultural 
capital of the world and vacations abroad substantiated claims to cultural sophistication.  
Recalling a vacation to Europe as a child, Fatima summarized, “We visited eight 
countries in ten days. We saw only the most important sites: the Eiffel Tower, the 
Coliseum, Buckingham Palace, the Louvre. There was not time to see everything, you 
know? I learned about the birthplace of our culture. It was beautiful. Everything was so 
refined.” While it could be argued that many tourists, regardless of their nationality, 
sought similar experiences abroad, I want to highlight in particular the association made 
between Europe and refinement and cultural heritage. The colonial legacy that initially 
limited access to education and high society later facilitated the participation of elite 
families in these institutions through transnationalism. Consider the following excerpt 
from Ricardo. Note the links he makes between class, transnationalism, and intellectual 
sophistication. 
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Ricardo:  Brazilians. That reminds me of the history of our country. It is funny, 
but in the history of our country, we are Portuguese colonies. And 
every prefix, suffix—prefix or suffix?—every suffix –eiro signifies 
worker. In Portugal, in Portuguese. Iron worker (ferreiro). Works 
with iron. Baker (padeiro). Works with bread. And we are Brazilians 
(brasileiros). Why “Brazilians”? Because we worked, the slaves that 
came from Africa to Brazil, they came to work with Brazil. They 
worked extracting lumber from Brazil. So they were called 
Brazilians. So Brazilians, workers in nature, strong advocates for 
nature, but sometimes mentally weak. Because sometimes they want 
to get to know the world, but they do not even know their own 
country. They do not know their own identity. They do not even 
know their own history. And they want to have a history. Every day I 
see, with much pain and heartbreak, the Brazilian people crawling 
toward a cultural explosion. Not culture. But cultural identity. It 
would be so much more beautiful if we could start introducing 
people to our origins. Grafting our culture. It would be so beautiful if 
you Americans or other foreigners, if you arrived here and were 
welcomed with our Brazilian identity. If you go to Peru, you are met 
with a lot of Peruvian identity. 
L:   That’s true. 
Ricardo:   If you go to Chile, you are met with a lot of Chilean identity. You go 
to Brazil, and you are met with a lot of cultural identities from other 
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places. We give so much more value to things from abroad than 
things that are from here. 
L:   To Europe, to the United States? 
Ricardo:   Unfortunately this is our reality. Brazil: the country of everyone else. 
[laughter] 
In Ricardo’s telling, the frenzy for transnationalism is unique to the Brazilian 
context. It is historically grounded in colonialism and it is inherently tied to class. Those 
of more humble professions—miners, bakers, loggers—desire transnational experiences 
precisely because they have no intellectual sophistication (fraco de mente). Their failure 
to recognize the merit of their own national identity is reflected in their preference for 
all things foreign (coisas de lá) over that which is “native” to Brazil. Whether or not 
this is really the case is of less interest to me than the overall argument about 
transnationalism and Brazilian identity. Ricardo’s characterization of Brazil as “the 
country of everyone else” (O país de todos) is meant to be a critical commentary about 
society’s expropriation of cultural heritage. The notion that Brazilians crave “the Other” 
above their own identity reflects larger perceptions about national identity in Brazilian 
society: that Brazil is unable to export any single cultural identity of its own and that it 
remains a sterile ground for the transplanting of foreign cultures rather than a fertile 
environment for cultural “grafting” (enxertar). Thus, the desire for travel is seen by 
many Brazilians as a long standing feature of Brazilian society. 
Finally, travel was seen as a form of education and pathway of upward mobility. 
When federal institutions of higher education were finally established in the twentieth 
century, students of affluent families who did not place high enough in standardized test 
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to secure entrance into public universities often were sent abroad for higher education. 
In fact, the link between travel and education is so deeply rooted in Brazil that it 
remains an underlying principal of many projects of the modern Brazilian state 
addressing inequality. During my fieldwork, for example, the Lula administration 
initiated a program to broaden the educational experiences of socio-economically 
disadvantaged high school students by sending them abroad for a year of study in a 
foreign country. The aim, essentially, was to improve their socio-economic condition 
via travel. One such student actually ended up placed with an acquaintance of a relative 
of mine in a small, rural Oklahoman town. The irony, I quickly discovered after 
speaking with her host family, was their own marginalized identity as underemployed 
residents of a housing project in an economically depressed region of the state. It was 
unclear how exactly these circumstances were intended to improve the exchange 
student’s socio-economic status. Regardless, historically based associations between 
status, travel, and education remained a premise on which the Brazilian state governed 
aspirations of upward mobility and transnationalism among its subjects. 
In recent decades, large-scale social and economic movements extended the 
qualification of being “well-traveled” beyond elite groups and increased the number of 
transnational experiences among Brazil’s citizenry. For the first time in Brazil’s history, 
travel is no longer the exclusive domain of the elite. The broad availability of domestic 
credit and the emergence of Brazil on the global scene have made travel both more 
affordable—through monthly payment schedules advertised for any “renda de casa” 
(budget)—and more attractive—as a form of meaningful participation in the 
international dealings of the nation state. Shifts from inwardly-focused development 
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policies to externally-focused initiatives in an era of “globalization” shaped the modern 
Brazilian subject as one externally present and interacting on the global scale. 
Moreover, the decades following the initiation of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and 
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), as well as the global financial crisis of 2008, 
created a climate of new possibilities for emerging powerhouses—those countries 
previously dubbed “developing” by the “developed” world. Brazil’s resulting 
diplomatic efforts broke from traditional alliances with countries such as the United 
States and the United Kingdom and focused on nontraditional partnerships with 
governments of China, Russia, and Venezuela, achieving “the global status Brazil 
craved” (Reid 2014:261). For many Brazilians, the country’s rising tide of influence in 
international politics signaled a coming of age: “a nation on the cusp of super-
powerdom” (Naidoo 2010). 
Inasmuch as the nation state now demands recognition as a global power, 
Brazilians themselves demand recognition in the global arena as players in their own 
right. The Brazilians I surveyed were quick to point out this change. Ricardo once told 
me, “You Americans need us. We go to your country to spend money.” Of course, the 
Brazilian real was trading at R$1.50 to the dollar at the time of this statement and 
Brazilians were traveling in droves to the United States. Most mornings during my 
fieldwork, I passed by the American Consulate on my way downtown and observed 
lines stretching around the block for travel visas. So, the assertion that the modern 
Brazilian subject has something to offer the international community, or rather, that the 
international community “needs” (precisa) the transnational Brazilian highlights 
sentiments of empowerment and agency enacted through travel. On more than one 
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occasion, I was reminded by Brazilians that ex-pats were returning (notably from the 
United States) for employment in an economy with greater job prospects than its North 
American neighbors and vying for a greater slice of the international labor market. Of 
course, my fieldwork was conducted during a period of economic optimism in which 
the real was trading strong, averaging R$1.30 to the USD, and preparations for the 2014 
World Cup favorably seasoned public opinion about the ascendancy of the host nation 
in international politics. 
While transnationalism has been used by many scholars to examine concepts of 
diaspora, migration, and post colonialism, for the purposes of this chapter, I want to 
focus on the ways in which it fuels the desire for public employment via aspirations of 
being a modern Brazilian subject for many participants in this project. As noted in 
earlier chapters, the crusade for citizenship is a hallmark of the Partido de 
Trabalhadores and defines the political sympathies of those in the public sector. 
Brazilians themselves explain the appeal of transnationalism using conventional 
discourses ascribing status, education, and cosmopolitanism to the experience of travel. 
The following sections explore two discourses in particular—flexible citizenship and 
conspicuous consumption—and offer insights into the experiential (rather than material) 
value of travel. While these discourses are often invoked at the national level—
prevalent in contemporary media sources—they are also historically grounded in the 
social and economic change Brazil has undergone in the past two decades. 
Flexible Citizenship 
The concept of transnationalism surfaced often during my fieldwork, reflected in 
the imaginings of participants and expressed in their desire for “flexible citizenship.” I 
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use the term “citizenship” because citizenship is a critical component of social, political 
and ethical subjectivity. Ong (1999) defines “flexible citizenship” as the process of 
using geographic and social positionality in changing economic and political 
environments with the goal of taking advantage of capitalist accumulation. For most of 
the participants in my project, flexible citizenship was not a reality to the extent Ong 
applies it to the Chinese business elite. However, there were many similarities between 
the strategies employed by the huagiao in Ong’s ethnography and the Brazilian families 
I surveyed. Many expressed the goal of securing flexibility in what has historically been 
a volatile economic and political environment. For example, several participants had 
access to banking in alternate currencies, most often the USD, and many made regular 
deposits in foreign institutions. While this practice is certainly not new to elite 
Brazilians, I was surprised at how much more accessible it had become to “regular” 
Brazilians in this project. Brazilians with connections abroad ranged from a student 
whose father was a high-ranking officer in the Brazilian military, to one whose parent 
was an American, to one who studied in Europe during college and maintained his 
foreign bank account, to one who simply “bought” USD bills on the informal market 
(from art vendors in upscale tourist hotspots around the city) and stored them in her 
closet for upcoming travel. In all of these cases, socially adept Brazilians used their 
positions within their social network to take advantage of capitalist accumulation 
through transnationalism. Moreover, I would suggest that a long history of economic 
and political volatility actually increased the value of travel for many of the participants 
in this project. Juliane’s father, for example, allocated a significant portion of his 
disposable income to buying dollars held in a foreign bank account overseas. His 
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regular trips to the US allowed him to save for a recession he anticipated would soon 
strike Brazil (which did soon happen). 
Key to travel is capital mobility—the ability of capital to cross geographical 
borders. Often, modern technology—the internet, online banking, ATMs—facilitates 
transnational practices. But more traditional practices of exchange networks were also 
present. For example, I once needed a large sum of cash to purchase a tablecloth from a 
street vendor. Rather than make several ATM withdrawals incurring foreign transaction 
fees, one of the parents of a student participant offered to “cash” a check of mine. I 
made out the check to his name and he took it to a mechanic shop where a friend of his 
worked. He returned with local currency in a more favorable exchange rate than I could 
have gotten through formal channels. When the check cleared my bank account in the 
United States approximately two months later, it had been physically routed 
(presumably mailed) to a business in Texas and deposited in their account. I later asked 
him about this process. He admitted not knowing exactly how the check made it to 
Texas, but he assumed it went through the owner of the mechanic shop—a 
“businessman” who lived in a luxury residence atop a neighboring favela and had 
“connections” stateside. Thus, while he did not maintain his own flexible citizenship in 
the same sense as Ong’s huagiao, he participated in an extension of that status through 
the “citizenship” of the mechanic shop owner. His familiarity working with existing 
social networks and through informal channels illustrates a more “traditional” way of 
accessing capital in a transnational context. 
In addition to capital accumulation, more and more Brazilians I surveyed 
exercised their flexible citizenship to maintain and construct transnational networks. In 
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July of 2015, I hosted Fernando and his family for a week during their trip to the United 
States. Fernando was employed as a minister at a local Christian church congregation 
and his wife was concursada as medical assistant in a public hospital. By OECD 
standards, their household income classified them as solidly middle class: a Classe C 
family. It was their first time abroad, and I was curious to know why they had chosen to 
travel rather than allocate their resources to other projects. During my earlier fieldwork 
visits, for example, they had discussed plans to construct several residential units on the 
land behind their house to generate additional income. 
L:  What happened to the deal with the rental properties behind your 
house?  
Fernando: We are still working toward that goal. We have already purchased 
some construction materials. But it remains a long way off. Now is 
the time to travel. Normally, we stay close to home during winter 
break, but several years ago we received an invitation from an 
American friend to stay at his house if we traveled to the United 
States. So we knew we would not have to pay for accommodation. 
So it was affordable. We tried to get visas in years past, but they 
were denied. This time, when we got word that they had been 
approved, we bought the tickets. 
L: Why do you think your visa applications were approved this time? 
Fernando: Look, we have a friend who travels to the United States once every 
three years. He helped us fill out the application. He advised us on 
what to say during the interviews. On the day of the interview, he 
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called to say he was praying for us. And he called afterward to see 
how the interview went. He was very helpful. 
His wife added: 
Michele: My family does not understand how we were able to do this. They 
think we won the lottery. They seriously think we won the lottery! 
[laughter] My sisters think we have become rich and that is how we 
paid for this vacation. They do not understand how we could have 
saved little by little from our jobs and paid for the flights. Even my 
co-workers are so impressed that we are going. 
L: Have you paid cash for everything on this trip? 
Fernando: No. We have a credit card. 
Fernando and his wife had been considering international travel for several 
years, and indeed, saving for it. But transnational networks with both Americans and 
Brazilian acquaintances who had been abroad facilitated the realization of their travel 
goals. Fifteen years ago, neither the visa applications nor the financing for the flights 
would have been successful. Public sector work was a critical component of their visa 
and credit card applications. As an employee in charge of processing visa applications 
at the American Consulate in Recife once explained to me: 
The Americans want to make sure you have money to spend before you go. And 
steady money coming into your bank accounts. And the credit card companies 
want to make sure you have money to spend on the monthly payments. So 
public sector work satisfies both. 
 
Conspicuous Consumption 
Travel is linked to capital accumulation, upward mobility, and success for the 
modern Brazilian subject. This is due, in part, to opportunities for “conspicuous 
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consumption” (Veblen 2006). Multiple authors have approached aspirations to travel 
through this lens or similar frameworks grounded in Bourdieusian notions of 
“distinction” (Goldstein 2003, Owensby 1999, Peshkin 2000, Rutz and Balkan 2009). 
O’Dougherty (2002) provides an excellent examination of consumption in Brazil in the 
1990s, framing travel as an arena of competition in “tournaments of value” (after 
Appadurai 1986) for middle-class actors seeking social distinction. She aptly concludes 
that the “quest for foreign goods and travel unifies the Brazilian middle class” (126). 
Many of her observations about the function of these “symbolic pursuits abroad” (94) 
are applicable to the participants in this project. Like O’Dougherty, I also encountered 
during my fieldwork tales of “great deals” on items purchased abroad and noticed that 
many who had traveled to the United States were quick to point out their favorite 
pastime: shopping. 
Public sector work provides the means to make purchases with clear 
associations to traveling abroad. For example, upon learning they were expecting a 
baby, an acquaintance of mine declared, “I’m going to the Unites States for my baby 
shower.” She planned a shopping trip to the United States to buy baby items. When I 
asked why she could not purchase the items in Brazil, she explained that the selection 
was much greater and that she could save (economizar) on goods purchased abroad. 
While it was unclear to me if costs were indeed less once flight, room, and board 
expenses were considered, it was clear that the shopping trip provided cultural capital 
that was not necessarily quantifiable. She insisted that travel to the United States came 
with the added benefit that people would notice the items had been purchased abroad 
(conheça as marcas americanas). 
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During my fieldwork, there was always word of someone selling Victoria’s 
Secret body sprays, designer purses, or name brand cosmetics upon returning from 
travel to the United States. More than providing an additional income in the informal 
economy, practices like this bestowed upon the seller an international quality—as a 
well-traveled, well-connected, global Brazilian subject. But travel for reasons relating to 
conspicuous consumption went beyond purchasing particular brands of items. The 
accumulation of capital, both economic and cultural, drove agendas for overseas travel. 
In 2013, for example, Sandra visited for a few days while on vacation to the United 
States and asked that I take her “shopping.” She had very specific knowledge about the 
items she wished to buy—those with the most “bang for the buck” representing a 
vacation abroad and easily read by those in her social circle as markers of status. She 
was uninterested in my recommendations about “better” brands. In particular, she asked 
to shop at the local Ross Dress-for-Less. We arranged the trip and on our way to the 
store, she told me about all of the great deals she had heard about from friends and 
acquaintances that had been abroad. Once we arrived, I was amused when, much to her 
disappointment, she was not able to find a single item with the Ross logo. “Is there not a 
single thing that says ‘Ross’?!” she demanded. She wanted to return to Brazil with a 
tangible item (preferably a purse) substantiating her trip to Ross. 
The following year, I noticed photos posted on social media by another 
participant in front of the local Marshall’s department store during a recent trip to 
Miami. Her caption read, “Finally! Shopping!” (Finalmente! Shopping!). I was struck 
by the draw to discount shopping at retailers such as Ross and Marshall’s. Frugality as a 
text can be read in multiple ways. O’Dougherty (2002) interprets “international bargain 
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shopping” as a class project: it is practiced by the middle class in an effort to extend the 
possibilities of conspicuous consumption. In this view, frugality is practiced because it 
affords middle class families the ability to compete with more affluent families by 
purchasing discounted goods and thus stretching economic capital. The tangible goods 
obtained through discount shopping are highly prized and Brazilian families take care to 
preserve their signaling power. Like O’Dougherty, for example, I found that the 
practice persists of storing items purchased abroad in their original boxes, complete 
with packing materials and owner’s manuals. In fact, many of the participants I visited 
maintained multiple shelving units in their laundry rooms or bedrooms dedicated to 
housing electronics, small appliances, shoes, and other accessories purchased abroad in 
the original packaging. However, while upward mobility via conspicuous consumption 
may provide the motivation for some Brazilian families shopping at discount retailers 
abroad, I find this explanation lacking for the participants in this project for two 
reasons. First, what is striking about the above mentioned examples is that frugality is 
esteemed because of its experiential value rather than its material result. In other words, 
both participants sought to display proof of an experience emblematic of their shopping 
skills rather than display the signalers themselves (particular brands). Secondly, framing 
frugality in terms of competitive relations ignores other motivations for discount 
shopping that may be rooted in valuing experiences above material goods. O’Dougherty 
notes “the Brazilian state remained well in view as a player—or better, as an adversary 
in conflicts over the acquisition of these goods” (2002:114). This suggests that, for 
some families at least, discount shopping is a form of insubordination against the state. 
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Experiential Value 
At the time of this dissertation, much of the existing scholarship on the meaning 
of travel to Brazilians was concerned with discount retail shopping as a field of 
competitive relations (Rutz and Balkan 2009). O’Dougherty (2002), for example, 
tracked a group of “upper middle sector” consumers in the southern part of Brazil 
seeking to be upwardly mobile in the 1990s. She focused on the tangible goods acquired 
through travel and the status ascribed to them. While she conceded that “the verbal 
display of international experience and knowledge is perhaps as operative as goods for 
claims to social distinction” (124), she did not investigate the meanings of these 
experiences nor their exchange in the knowledge economy. She also failed to consider 
the value of travel for purposes other than status. Thus, it is not clear why the 
experience of travel (for motives other than consumption) may be so desirable nor why 
it might be linked to public sector work and imaginings of success. 
It is at once helpful to utilize ethnographic data from previous projects for 
comparative purposes whilst also critically evaluating claims about the consumption of 
travel and class identity. Data collected during O’Dougherty’s fieldwork reflect a period 
of immense economic instability and political turmoil in Brazil—a wildly different 
historical context than that of my own fieldwork. Moreover, much of the ethnography 
presently available is concentrated on the southern region of Brazil—an area with a rich 
history of modernity and cosmopolitanism—in direct opposition to the perceived 
“backwardness” of the northeast. So, in the following section, I would like to offer an 
explanation of travel that focuses on the value of experiences rather than the 
competitive nature of purchases or the material goods obtained abroad. 
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Experiential purchases are transactions primarily concerned with obtaining an 
experience (music concerts, vacation cruises, fine dining) rather than a material good 
(cars, clothes, appliances). I use the term experiential purchases after Van Boven and 
Gilovich’s (2003) work in social psychology examining the “enduring satisfaction” of 
experiences over material possessions. Their research suggests that experiences actually 
hold greater value for many participants, even though they are intangible, because, 
“they are more open to positive reinterpretations, are a more meaningful part of one's 
identity, and contribute more to successful social relationships” (2003:1193). 
In one particular study, satisfaction was tied to income: for those earning less 
than US$30,000 per year, experiential and material purchases afforded similar levels of 
satisfaction. Similarly, subsequent research suggests that participants who have an 
abundance of experiential purchases may gain less satisfaction (Quoidbach et. al 2015). 
Cultural context and meanings of “satisfaction” aside, it is relevant to this project to 
consider the relationship between value and self and note that with fewer possessions 
the relative value gap between goods and experience may be lessened. 
While a number of researchers have confirmed these findings in various cultural 
contexts (Carter and Gilovich 2010; Nicolao et. al 2009, Rosenzweig and Gilovich 
2012), I want to extend the framework to investigate meanings of travel in the Brazilian 
case. Of particular interest to me is the desire of participants in this project to display 
evidence of discount retail shopping and recall in narrative form their similar 
experiences abroad. Rather than framing travel as an attempt to accumulate goods, I 
suggest it can function as a form of participation in frugality—an experience valued by 
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many participants in this project—and consequently as a gatekeeper to particular kinds 
of subjectivity, legitimizing claims to modernity and religious identity. 
These assertions are based on several points related to experiential purchases. 
First, individuals perceive shared experiences as more enjoyable than individual ones 
(Caprariello and Reis 2013). Secondly, posting on social media is a form of making 
travel experiences shared experiences. Bhattacharjee and Mogilner (2014) suggest that 
social norms accessed by sharing “extraordinary experiences”—events not experienced 
in ordinary, day-to-day life—on sites such as Facebook, regulate the sense of self. 
Third, experiential purchases offer a viable expenditure of disposable income that 
avoids the stigmatization of materialism (Van Boven et. al 2010:551). Travel allows 
northeasterners to participate, joining broader discourses about experiences 
stereotypically available to those in the southern regions of Brazil. Finally, experiences 
are integral to the construction of self. In contrast to material possessions, experiences 
“tend to be more closely associated with self” (Carter and Gilovich 2012:1304). 
Experiences, rather than possessions, are more commonly invoked in narrative and 
more favorably remembered as time goes on. 
The Brazilians I surveyed were more likely to talk about experiences than 
material goods when asked to discuss their family history or aspirations for future 
employment and education. Among those I surveyed over the course of several years, 
many were also more likely to recall a specific travel experience more favorably in each 
subsequent retelling. In 2013, for example, Sandra vacationed to the United States and I 
accompanied her to New York City. We visited all the standard “tourist” stops: the 
Empire State Building, the Statue of Liberty, Ground Zero, Central Park, and so on. But 
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it was not until walking through Times Square and posing for a picture with the “Naked 
Cowboy,” that she let out a long sigh and exclaimed, “We can go home now. I have 
seen everything there is to see in New York.” I laughed because the highlight of her trip 
was not a tangible item brought back from New York City, but the experience of posing 
with an icon emblematic of travel abroad (Figure 8). While she had initially complained 
about the tip required for posing with the cowboy (USD$20), in subsequent tellings of 
the story, there was no mention of the monetary cost. In fact, on the last observed 
occasion of her retelling in 2014, her narrative was quite exaggerated and exuberant: 
recalling more flirting and more audacious behavior than had actually been the case. 
Her audience giggled and teased, with some interjecting their own stories of 
experiences with the Naked Cowboy. 
 
Figure 8. Posing with the Naked Cowboy at Times Square (author 2013) 
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The value of experiences in narrative and subjectivity has been thoroughly 
discussed in anthropology. In The Social Life of Stories, Cruikshank (1998) examines 
meaning in narrative, arguing that oral and written texts do not inherently have 
meaning. Instead, she points to the everyday contexts in which stories are invoked, 
created, told, or referenced for social and cultural purposes. She notes, “Meaning does 
not inhere in events but involves weaving those events into stories that are meaningful 
at the time. Events, after all, are stories known directly only to those who experience 
them and interpret them to others, who in turn make their own interpretations of what 
they hear” (1998:2). Like cultural objects, Cruikshank determines that narrative forms 
require shared knowledge between the storyteller and the audience—a kind of “cultural 
scaffolding”—to imbue meaning among members of the community. In the same way, 
retelling stories of discount shopping trips (or displaying evidence of the experience) 
creates success narratives. Frugality is esteemed because it is both built into the 
“cultural scaffolding” of many participants in this project and it is useful via narrative 
for reinterpretation and new constructions of self (Cruikshank 1998). Whether this be 
the result of religious identity—displaying good stewardship (as Daniel said, “Deus 
quer que eu administre bem.”)—or class identity—maximizing the use of disposable 
income—it is important to point out that frugality can be at once structural and 
embodied. 
Finally, recalling the discussions on governing technologies in previous 
chapters, it is easy to see how narratives about travel experiences provide coherence in 
changing, often chaotic, political, economic, and class status environments. The telling 
and retelling of travel experiences functions as an attempt to organize anxieties created 
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through state-crafting projects, such as neoliberalism. Narrative forms serve to locate 
one’s place in the world, and consequently, public work has become emblematic of an 
orderly subjectivity. 
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Chapter 7: Home Ownership 
The previous chapter examined the experience of travel as a consumptive 
practice enabled by public sector work. This chapter offers another case study—home 
ownership—as a lens through which to view the desire for public sector work and the 
technologies of power and self discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. For many of the families 
in this project, participation in the public sector not only makes home ownership a 
possibility, it guarantees access to the credit apparatus reifying that possibility. This is 
an important distinction since home ownership accounts for perhaps the single greatest 
change in the household economy in the last decade. By the time of my fieldwork, for 
example, mortgage payments as percentage of monthly disposable income had grown to 
15 percent of the household budget, more than unsecured credit, education, or leisure 
expenditures (Biller and Schmidt 2013). This figure is even more remarkable 
considering that in 2010, mortgage payments accounted for less than eight percent of 
disposable income spending. In other words, indebtedness from home ownership 
doubled for the average Brazilian family in just three short years.  
Consumer lending has put within grasp of the aspiring middle class particular 
kinds of homes, desirable neighborhoods, and “lifestyle” features like fitness, parking, 
and security that were previously inaccessible to owner occupants. Concursos act as 
gatekeepers of sorts to an exclusive, upwardly mobile community of homeowners; and 
home ownership holds a number of meanings for Brazilian families. This chapter 
examines why home ownership is integral to notions of stability for Brazilian families 
and how it acts as a powerful signifier for class belonging. 
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Mortgage Lending 
Home ownership is not new to Brazil. The rate of home ownership in Brazil 
actually has hovered around 70 percent for the past two decades (Euromonitor 
International 2015). In some ways, this statistic is misleading: first, the owner 
occupancy rate includes ownership of “informal” housing. That is, it includes 
ownership of housing units that do not meet legal codes or public health and safety 
standards (such as housing in impoverished rural communities or urban favelas). 
Second, the steady rate of home ownership does not reflect the feverish amount of 
turnover experienced within the housing market in the past two decades. That is to say, 
while rates of home ownership may have increased gradually only four to five percent, 
the actual numbers of transactions in the housing market have increased exponentially. 
In the ten years preceding my fieldwork (between 2002 and 2012), for example, the 
Financial System of Low Cost Housing (SFH) reported that the number of units 
purchased through mortgages increased 1,075 percent—a more than tenfold increase 
(SFH 2015)! Moreover, during the course of my fieldwork (between 2011 and 2015), 
the monetary value of outstanding mortgage balances tripled (SFH 2015).  
The trend continues, despite indications that the housing market may be cooling. 
The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) reports that consumer lending as a 
percentage of GDP remains low in Brazil (especially when compared to fellow BRICS 
countries—Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), indicating an 
underdeveloped mortgage market and significant potential for future growth in the 
banking industry (Martins et. al 2011). Even though private banking institutions are 
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taking interest in Brazil’s housing market, state-owned banks continue to finance the 
greatest number of securities and assume the most risk (Figure 9).  
 
Figure 9. Total housing credit, R$ billions June 2001 (author 2016) 
The steep growth trajectory of outstanding mortgage balances appears unlikely 
to change. As housing shortages persist, the state continues to subsidize the construction 
of new units made available to the public through state-owned mortgage lenders. 
Moreover, increasing indebtedness among Brazilians means that many are facing virtual 
debt “prisons,” increasing demand for products like home equity loans and second 
mortgages. So, while rates of home ownership over the past two decades may not 
appear particularly impressive at first glance, what is remarkable is the ballooning of 
mortgage securities to achieve home ownership, especially among particular kinds of 
consumers. In other words, home ownership via consumer lending has become a critical 
component of consumptive behavior among many Brazilian families in this project.  
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Only recently have mortgages become a real possibility for many Brazilians. 
Along with the availability of domestic credit for unsecured debt, the accessibility of 
financing for home loans expanded under President Lula and experienced significant 
growth with the continuation of his policies under President Rouseff (Reid 2014). Prior 
to this time, mortgages were only accessible to affluent families due to high interest 
rates and large principle down payment requirements. But the expansion of housing and 
an increased access to mortgage credit have been hallmarks of the Partido de 
Trabalhadores government over the past 15 years. In 2003, the state created the 
Ministry of Cities to address urbanization, housing, and sanitation (Magalhães 2014). In 
2009, the program My House, My Life (Minha Casa, Minha Vida, nicknamed My 
House, My Debt)—launched by the national bank Caixa Ecônomica—provided funding 
for home ownership for low to middle income families and embarked on construction 
projects for over 3.3 million new units (Caixa 2014). Even though the program was 
intended to target low income families, middle class families appear to have benefited 
from it as well, especially in the northeast. Families with household incomes ranging 
between R$1,700 and R$5,000 qualified for low interest rates, low monthly payments, 
and mortgages requiring little to no money down. Recall that this range of income 
essentially represents Classe C families—many of the families in this project. The 
possibility of home ownership, or rather, the possibility of owning homes previously 
inaccessible to middle class families, resulted in a significant shift in the horizontal 
strata as home ownership became an increasingly powerful component of stability and 
signaler of middle class identity.  
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“Homelessness” and Stability 
During my fieldwork, apartments in the newest high rises offered through Minha 
Casa, Minha Vida were advertised for 360 payments of R$980—at that time, 
approximately one and a half times the minimum wage. Advertisement brochures touted 
the proximity of residential communities to shopping centers and main thoroughfares, 
stressing “paved roads” and “elevated” locations, safe from the flooding that annually 
engulfed the metropolis. Amenities like pools, soccer fields, clubhouses, and 
professional landscaping offered the “best place for you to live” with “all of the 
comforts for your family” (Figure 10). Financing through Minha Casa, Minha Vida 
served as a credentialing technology for new construction, and residential communities 
marketed this stamp of approval to potential homeowners: “financing made super easy 
through Minha Casa, Minha Vida.” 
 
Figure 10. Advertisement brochure for high rise community (author 2014) 
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Maria, a 45-year-old public school teacher, participated in one such program to 
purchase a unit in a high rise in an up-and-coming suburb south of the city. Instead of 
occupying the unit, she rented it to an acquaintance and continued living in the home 
she shared with her mother and unmarried sister. Her monthly mortgage payment was 
R$800 and she charged R$1,200 a month for rent in 2010. But in just a few years, by 
the time of our interview, the going price of rent for units in her building was closer to 
R$2,000. She explained that it made more sense to rent the unit rather than occupy it 
herself, since she doubled her income by continuing to live at home. Both she and her 
sister held positions in the public sector, and with their government paychecks, both 
qualified for mortgages from public lenders through the Minha Casa, Minha Vida 
program.  
For Maria, home ownership was both emblematic of stability and contributive to 
it. Her investment in real estate not only served as a tangible manifestation of her 
consumptive power, but it also, like public sector work, provided a guarantee of 
income. “As long as I maintain employment as a public servant,” she explained, “the 
condo is mine. They cannot take it from me. I am concursada.” Maria linked stability 
conferred by public sector work to home ownership with good reason. Civil servants 
had preferential access to loans and real estate during my fieldwork. Many lenders 
offered a “fast track” to approved financing for public employees based on their pay 
stubs alone. The ease with which home ownership was achieved by public servants 
contributed to a concentration of wealth among those employed in the public sector. 
Civil servants in state-owned properties enjoy below-market-value rent payments and 
had first choice purchasing those properties when they come up for sale when the 
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government sells assets. Rather than selling at current market value, these were 
properties whereby “the prices, defined by an evaluation done by the Caixa Econômica 
Federal (a bank controlled by the Federal Government), and payment conditions were 
quite favorable to the civil servants” (Mendes 2014:198). Recall from Chapter 4 that 
state-crafting projects in Brazil aim to locate financial accumulation in the realm of the 
state rather than the private sector. As expenditures in the field of home ownership have 
become more easily accessible (through equity and increased liquidity), the desire for 
public sector work facilitating those expenditures has also intensified. Home ownership 
reinforces the desire for public sector work and is itself an extension of the stability 
afforded by public sector work. Nearly every person I surveyed about desire for public 
sector work included home ownership in his or her list of guaranteed outcomes of 
passing concursos.  
If home ownership is indicative of stability for many Brazilian families, the lack 
of home ownership is similarly reflective of instability. One evening, over a cup of 
coffee, Daniel was discussing the upcoming wedding of a young couple from his 
church. Even though the groom occupied a position of high status within the church 
community, he did not have a “well-paying” job nor did his parents own their own 
home. Daniel commented that the bride was in for a surprise, as the groom was not as 
well off (estável) as she expected. I asked how this could be, since the groom’s parents 
appeared to be solidly middle class—having lived in a gated high-rise community in 
one of the nicer neighborhoods in the city and sent two children abroad for college. His 
response highlighted the centrality of home ownership to his own notions of stability 
and class belonging: 
178 
Daniel:  Their situation is very sad. Truly very sad. 
L: What do you mean? 
Daniel: They do not have a house, Lauren. They are homeless! 
L:  How are they homeless? They have a house. They have lived in that 
same apartment for years! 
Daniel: Yes, but it is rented. It is not their apartment. 
Daniel’s assertion that the family was homeless (sem casa) caught me off guard. 
Longevity in their place of residence did not necessarily equate stability. In fact, the 
very act of renting made them unstable and created reservations about marrying into the 
family. Since rent had to be renegotiated every few years, Daniel reasoned, how could 
the family be certain their income would be enough to meet expenses two years down 
the road?  
I later confirmed these details with the mother of the groom. She added that the 
trend of rising housing prices had created a great deal of anxiety for her family; at the 
current rate, she did not know how much longer they would be able to stay in their 
apartment. From Daniel’s point of view, lack of home ownership meant that the family 
might as well be “homeless.” Sandra agreed with her father when I asked her about the 
groom’s financial condition: 
Sandra: He does not make much, Lauren. And she does not even have a job. 
L: So? 
Sandra: So they are going to live in his parents’ apartment! 
L: And she cannot work? 
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Sandra: She can. Maybe as a teacher’s aide, if someone, I do not know, 
secures a job for her, or something like that. Even so, how will they 
ever improve their financial condition without stable jobs? 
The tone of her discussion was disapproving. Marriage into the family was 
unattractive in two respects: first, the couple would have to live with their parents (who 
were already “homeless”), and second, neither the bride nor the groom had “stable” 
employment to improve their financial prospects at any point in the near future. While it 
is not unusual for Brazilian children to reside with their parents long into their 
adulthood (for example, into their 30s), it is increasingly less common for married 
couples to live with their families. Structural changes such as access to consumer credit, 
prolific mortgage lending, and increased wages are altering social norms for middle 
class families and making home ownership an integral component of stability. That is 
not to say families do not organize resources informally or arrange the household 
economy to provide for young couples. Three of the families in this project owned 
second story units constructed above a parent’s home, four others were owner 
occupants, and one lived with her mother, renting the apartment she owned for 
additional income. Sandra went on to explain that the bride had little to no training or 
schooling for “stable” work. With the groom, it was less about how much he earned and 
more about the sector of the labor market in which he participated. Again, public sector 
work was perceived as facilitating stability—in this case, home ownership—both for the 
present time and for the future of the young couple.  
It has not always been the case in Brazil that home ownership was integral to 
notions of stability. In a country where there was a gross deficit of housing units for 
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families and almost three-quarters of all arable landholdings were held by just three 
percent of the population at the turn of the millennium (Wolford 2003), property 
ownership has been structurally impossible for many Brazilian citizens since 
independence. In fact, recall that for most of O’Dougherty’s (2002) participants, home 
ownership was not a defining feature of middle class identity. In the decade preceding 
my fieldwork, however, profound changes occurred facilitating the growth of home 
ownership among ordinary Brazilians. Some of these changes stemmed from policies 
discussed in Chapter 4. The commodification of personal information, for example, 
facilitated the expansion of the credit apparatus and mortgage securities. Social 
insecurity brought about by the reformation of the state facilitated the privatization and 
marketization of public entitlements such as security and safety. Foreign investment 
contributed to speculation and real estate booms. And finally, consumer lending fueled 
dramatic growth in consumptive patterns, especially among upwardly mobile families 
looking to secure long term stability. 
Conspicuous Consumption 
Recall from Chapter 6 that travel and material goods purchased abroad 
functioned as a form of conspicuous consumption. For families in this project, home 
ownership also functioned as a site for conspicuous consumption. Goldstein (2003) in 
an observation about domestic workers in Brazilian households, called middle class 
identity in the home a “game of symbols.” For much of the period since the military 
dictatorship, the “rules” to this game have remained somewhat constant despite 
economic instability. In her examination of consumption among the middle class in the 
1990s, for example, O’Dougherty (2002) argued that consumption was increasingly 
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inflexible during periods of economic instability. That is, the “symbols” of middle class 
identity remained constant. Travel, material goods purchased abroad, and social events 
comprised the primary fields of conspicuous consumption. O’Dougherty did not find 
home ownership to be as compelling of a marker of middle class identity. She takes as 
her point of departure “middle class” families from São Paulo, but her designation of 
middle class is complicated by the up-scale neighborhoods from which her informants 
come, as well as their participation in affluent class practices such as debutante balls 
and Disney vacations. Reid follows similar suit, defining middle class families in Recife 
as those living in the “smart beachfront residential suburb of high-rise towers” in Boa 
Viagem, with a car, apartment, and monthly income of R$3,000 (2014:172).  
Not one of the families in my study hailed from such a neighborhood or 
participated in debutante balls, though all but one identified as middle class. Without 
denying the findings of O’Dougherty and Reid, I suggest a broader definition of middle 
class in this project, one that instead focuses on consumptive patterns, occupation, and 
education. In this chapter, I explore how emerging consumptive patterns of home 
ownership via consumer lending have become a central pursuit of the middle class and 
why home ownership is emblematic of class belonging. That is to say, more than any 
other consumptive practice, home ownership has become representative of middle class 
identity.  
Much of the growth in the housing market can be traced to the growth of the 
middle class and to lending practices established by the state. Since the 1990s, the 
number of Brazilians belonging to the middle class doubled and household incomes 
increased significantly (Birdsall 2012). In the northeast, especially, household income 
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rose by 72.8 percent in the first decade of the 2000s (Reid 2014).  Moreover, purchasing 
power for Brazilian families increased five percent per year for three decades. Thus, 
robust disposable incomes allowed for a variety of consumptive patterns by the time of 
my fieldwork. Consumer lending also underwent dramatic changes. For example, the 
number of consumer loans doubled in the first decade of the millennium, rising from six 
percent to 13 percent (Reid 2014). During this time, the number of bank accounts in 
Brazil nearly doubled (Reid 2014). This is significant because the Brazilian state has 
tied public banks to the housing market through savings accounts owned by the general 
public. Banks must allocate R$0.65 of every real deposited in a savings account to 
financing housing (Martins et. al 2011). So, notwithstanding large volumes of savings 
withdrawals in the near future, the capacity for mortgage lending will remain robust and 
home ownership will remain a site for conspicuous consumption. 
By the time of my fieldwork, recent changes in legal frameworks and policies in 
the past decade—such as those affecting domestic workers and higher education—were 
increasingly constraining consumption among many upwardly mobile families (even 
though consumer lending was at an all time high). Measures implemented by the state 
to shape subjectivity and conform to the market made it difficult for middle class 
families to sustain the same traditional markers of class identity afforded by their 
parents’ generation. In her study of downward mobility among the middle class in the 
US, Newman contends, “Class is clearly a critical factor…but it is not the only one. 
Generation is at least as powerful a source of conflict” (1999:110). I have already 
discussed some of the ways in which the expansion of higher education and the quota 
system made entrance into public universities more competitive and tenuous for middle 
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class families and I will return to the topic of domestic work at a later point in this 
chapter, but with respect to conspicuous consumption, it is important to note that the 
broad availability of mortgages enabled many ordinary Brazilians to rework markers of 
class by turning to home ownership as yet another field of accumulation and 
consumption. Families with more material capital increased their stake in the market 
through home ownership. 
Recall from Chapter 4 that neoliberalism in particular had the effect of 
expanding consumer credit and commodifying mortgage securities in Brazil, both of 
which increased accessibility to home ownership and altered symbolic provisioning for 
the future associated with middle class identity. In some ways, home ownership 
functioned as a means of production in the neoliberal project. That is, it allowed for the 
accumulation of economic capital via equity, increased liquidity, and credit worthiness.  
In the same way that public sector work in Brazil can be seen as redistributive (Alesina 
et. al 2000), home ownership can be seen as redistributive in that the “means of 
production” are financed by the state, seized by the middle class, and expropriated for 
private use. It remains an object of consumption, but also a site of production 
increasingly utilized as other markers in the domestic sphere are challenged and 
constrained. 
Domestic Work 
Like many parts of Latin America, high rates of participation in the informal 
economy in Brazil make the labor market dynamic different from that in the US. During 
my own childhood in Brazil, most middle class families I knew maintained at least one 
female domestic worker in their home. This had the effect of creating a dominating 
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technology between women who employed domestic help and women who were 
domestic help. Goldstein (2003) suggests that employing domestic help in the home 
was the defining characteristic of middle class identity in Brazil, embodying culturally 
specific markers constructed through particular histories of colonialism, enslavement, 
hyperinflation, and economic depression. For example, she points out that affluent 
children in Brazil are not allowed in the kitchen and learn nothing of cooking or 
cleaning, making “helplessness” a marker of prestige.  
In the decade leading up to my fieldwork, however, gendered work in the 
domestic sphere changed dramatically. In 2007, the IBGE reported some 1,723,000 
domestic workers employed in Brazilian households; by the conclusion of my 
fieldwork, the number had dropped to 1,325,000—a loss of almost 400,000 jobs in just 
seven years (IBGE 2014b). The reasons for this shift are varied. First, and perhaps most 
obvious, the number of formal jobs in Brazil increased significantly in the first decade 
of the millennium with economic growth. This had the effect of driving fewer 
Brazilians to seek primary employment in the informal economy. Secondly, the 
emergence of the new middle class put pressure on traditional middle class, in public 
and private spaces. Reid notes, “they had to pay more for maids, while social spaces, 
from shopping centers to roads, became more crowded” (2014:157). Third, a series of 
legislative measures aimed at formalizing domestic work brought domestic workers 
under the protections of the state. Of particular importance to participants in this project 
was a law that required employers to provide formal benefits to domestic workers 
employed in the home more than two days a week (a signed labor contract, paid 
maternity leave, the end-of-year disbursement, and a handful of other standard 
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employment benefits). The labor courts were strengthened and expanded to handle the 
caseload of charges brought against employers who did not comply, and whether or not 
it was actually the case that employers were taken to court, the consensus among 
Brazilians I surveyed was a fear of engaging with the penal system.  
Eventually, the legislative houses passed measures granting social security, 
holiday pay, and overtime to domestic workers, requiring even more capital for the 
maintenance of domestic work. Shifts in legal frameworks governing the domestic 
sphere had the direct effect of constraining the use of domestic work as a marker of 
middle class identity. In fact, by the time of my fieldwork in 2012, all but one family 
had released their live-in maid due to the strain it placed on the household economy. Or 
at least, that was the common explanation. “It’s simply too expensive,” Daniel told me. 
He employed a woman two days a week for housecleaning and meal preparation, and 
his wife had taken up cooking on the days their domestic help was not present. She was 
proud of her culinary skills, especially when they featured international cuisines. One 
evening, for example, she asked for my help making doughnuts. We downloaded a 
recipe (in English, she insisted), heated a pot of oil, and fried the dough. After cooling 
and decorating the sweets, we gathered around the table and recounted our favorite 
doughnut shop memories from travels abroad. It seemed to me that changes in the 
domestic sphere had reworked the “game of symbols” referenced by Goldstein and 
replaced the symbolic value of “helplessness” with sentiments like pride, self-reliance, 
and cosmopolitan citizenship. Rather than display in their home a boxed specialty 
blender acquired abroad, Daniel’s family exhibited a privileged knowledge (about 
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doughnuts) acquired from international travel. This knowledge was reproduced in the 
domestic sphere, a practice that shapes notions of domesticity. 
To say that legal frameworks completely eliminated the symbolic capital of 
maintaining domestic work in middle class families would be inaccurate. On the 
contrary, many families adjusted their patterns of consumptive behavior, employing 
domestic service just 2 days a week to avoid the costs associated with full time work or 
simply allocating more of the budget to eating out. I remember being struck by the 
strategies Juliane’s family employed to maintain their middle class identity in the face 
of these changes: every morning, her father visited the upscale paderia in their 
neighborhood and purchased breakfast for the family. If anyone was home for lunch, 
the family went out to eat at a local restaurant. And since dinner in Brazil is very light, 
the family usually snacked on cold foods from the refrigerator or leftovers from 
breakfast. I remarked one morning after spending a few days in their home that it must 
get expensive paying for every meal out. “Not as expensive as a maid,” Juliane’s mom 
quipped. Juliane’s mother was able to maintain her practice of not cooking and the 
housekeeping was concentrated to two days a week. So, while legal frameworks altered 
symbols of middle class identity, families were creative in reinterpreting, reworking, 
and reproducing traditional markers in the domestic sphere. 
Leisure and the Home 
During my fieldwork, Daniel’s family lived in a second-story residence they had 
constructed over the first floor of a property they purchased 15 years ago. Through a 
series of small personal loans from relatives and friends and a diligent savings habit, 
they had stockpiled construction materials and saved over the years to expand the 
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original two-room property to include four small retail spaces on the first floor and a 
modest three bedroom, two bath home on the second floor (Figure 11). 
 
Figure 11. A second-story home with retail shops below (author 2012) 
Daniel rented the storefronts to small businesses—a movie rental store, a hair 
salon, a second-hand thrift shop, and a realty office. But the availability of mortgages 
through public lending made moving a regular topic of conversation in the family. 
Daniel’s wife, for example, complained about the noise from the street in front of the 
house—the property was located on the main thoroughfare (avenida principal) of the 
neighborhood. On Friday nights, food and alcohol vendors parked in the plaza in front 
of the home and served snacks and drinks into the early hours of the morning. Daniel 
was especially bothered by these gatherings, as they “drew the youth out of the 
neighboring favelas” to party and engage in illegal activities. Almost daily, Sandra 
visited a friend who lived in a gated condominium community to use the fitness facility. 
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During the time of my fieldwork, the family regularly entertained the topic of moving to 
a better, more “tranquil” home. 
When I returned to Recife for a follow-up visit in 2014, the family had 
“upgraded”: they had rented out their home and had moved into a three bedroom, two 
bath gated high-rise condominium with pools, fitness centers, and secure parking. They 
had a new stainless-steel refrigerator and new kitchen cabinets, hot water heaters on the 
showerheads, and air-conditioned rooms. In the same way automobiles and computers 
act as class indicators in discussions about higher education, hot water heaters can 
provide a baseline for measuring standards of living in northeastern Brazil. Hot showers 
have been relatively rare in households in this region. The tropical climate affords year-
round warm temperatures, and water is often collected in roof tanks and warmed by the 
afternoon sun. “Cold” showers are a regular, and welcome, part of the daily routine to 
escape the heat and humidity for many northeasterners. On particularly chilly nights, 
families may heat water on the stove and take a “bucket bath.” Lack of hot water often 
comes as a surprise to foreigners, and even to native Brazilians from the southern part 
of the country, but it should not be taken as an indication of poverty in these 
households. Rather, it represents a material culture specific to the northeast coastal 
region. During my fieldwork in 2012, only 4 of 19 participants had hot water heaters 
installed on the showerheads in their bathrooms. By the time of my follow-up visit in 
2014, this number had increased to seven, with several more participants reporting 
electrical outlets in their shower stalls wired for water heater installation, even if they 
had not purchased the actual heater. Consider the contrast between the material culture 
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of the 1990s: only one of the families in this project had hot water in their showers prior 
to the 2000s. 
In addition to markers of leisure in the primary residence, vacation homes have 
been made increasingly available to middle class families through mortgages. During 
my fieldwork in 2012, vacation homes and private gated communities dotted the 
landscape along highways to resort towns on the beach or in the mountains. Billboards 
announced the newest subdivision and its luxury amenities: golf courses, pools, fitness 
courses, and manicured lawns. I spent several weekends with Juliane’s family at one 
such vacation home in a gated community complete with horses and stables, hiking 
trails, and other amenities of country living. What struck me as particularly interesting 
was that her family maintained the vacation cottage as well as a modest vacation home 
in a nearby beach community, even though they did not employ full time domestic work 
in their primary residence. Her dad confirmed that both vacation properties had been 
purchased with mortgages within the past six years. Thus, the desire for home 
ownership extended beyond primary residences to include provisioning of vacation 
homes as sites of leisure. To many of the families in this project, home ownership via 
consumer lending had become more integral to class identity than maintaining domestic 
help. This represents a significant shift in the household economy. Recall that both of 
Juliane’s parents had passed concursos—in fact, her dad had occupied two positions in 
the public sector and was drawing retirement from one while maintaining work in the 
other. Concursos facilitated entrance into an exclusive, upwardly mobile community of 
homeowners with time for leisure (also afforded by public sector work). For Juliane’s 
family, and indeed for Daniel’s family, mortgages opened the market for particular 
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kinds of homes—leisure homes and primary residences in more desirable 
neighborhoods, with “lifestyle” features like fitness, parking, and security that were 
previously inaccessible.  
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
In this dissertation, I have attempted to investigate the desire for public sector 
work in Brazil. My conclusions were based on fieldwork, ethnographic data collection, 
and literature review during a four year period, between 2011 and 2014. I spent the 
greater part of 2012 living in Recife, conducting participant observation and building 
relationships with the families in this project, and I am forever indebted to their 
kindness and willingness to share their lives, aspirations, and struggles for the purposes 
of this dissertation project. Though I have circulated excerpts of my writings to 
participants and received feedback from many in this project, my conclusions are my 
own. 
Chapter 1 began with an introduction to the field site. I emphasized the 
competitive and highly selective nature of concursos and examined two explanations 
traditionally offered for the preference of employment in the public sector. I argued that 
wage premiums were unsatisfactory in explaining desire since many of the public 
positions desired by participants in this project actually paid less than their private 
sector counterparts. I also argued that class identity did not, in itself, adequately explain 
the desire for particular occupations since participants were determined to obtain a 
public sector position at any cost, regardless of earnings level or identity utility. I 
offered an outline of my own theoretical framework, locating the desire for public 
sector work in subjectivation: as part of a larger learned subject position cultivated in 
citizens by technologies of power and technologies of self in an effort to relieve 
anxieties of interpretation and orientation. I closed the chapter with an overview of my 
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methodology and the broader context to which I hoped to contribute through this 
project. 
Chapters 2 and 3 provided histories of the labor market and higher education in 
Brazil. Chapter 2 considered the historical context shaping the labor market conditions 
at the time of my fieldwork. Longstanding economic instability, unemployment, and 
shifting models of corporate management plagued the labor market in the years leading 
up to my dissertation project and heightened the desire for employment in both the 
formal economy and in the public sector. I briefly outlined the legal frameworks 
affording benefits to public sector employees, with special attention paid to the near 
absolute protection from termination. I attempted to unpackage the meanings of 
“stability” for many of the participants in this project. Focusing on job security in 
particular, I linked the desire for public sector work to the capacity to consume and 
accumulate, especially in the fields of education, travel, and home ownership. I 
employed the classification scheme used by the OECD to sort participant families by 
income levels and then identified work as a function of collective aspirations of the so-
called emerging or new middle class. Finally, I framed occupational status as a familial 
project and suggested that the operationalization of job selection ties the individual to 
the family in the same ways that public sector ties the individual to the state. Thus, I 
argued the desire for public sector work represented an alignment of interests—among 
Brazilians aspiring to be responsável and the state aspiring to produce (govern) 
responsável citizens. 
Chapter 3 provided an overview of higher education in Brazil. I opened with a 
history of postsecondary education in the Portuguese colonies and traced the 
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development of the institutional apparatus unto the time of my fieldwork. I argued that 
the colonial legacy in higher education was important for two reasons: first, it explained 
why higher education in its current form is a relatively new structural phenomenon, 
since universities were not present in Brazil until the 1930s; and secondly, it explained 
why meanings of higher education associated with class identity and mobility, 
intergenerational transmissions of wealth, and travel are easily transferred to public 
sector work. Namely, I argued that the desire for public sector work overlaid on 
previously established foundations of governmentality and politics of exclusion in 
higher education. I argued that institutions of higher education both shape students 
through exclusion, conferring prestige, and reproducing racial or socioeconomic 
disadvantage and are shaped by students through consumerism, commodification of 
higher education, and political organizing. Finally, I attempted to illustrate the 
complicated relationship between postsecondary education and public sector work 
through two ethnographic examples. I concluded that higher education is at once 
complementary and in competition with public sector work. 
Chapters 4 and 5 bridged the “historical” chapters on the labor market and 
higher education with the “case study” chapters on travel and home ownership. Chapter 
4 considered technologies of power dominating conduct and objectivizing the subject 
during the time of my fieldwork. I argued that structural changes in the political 
economy and horizontal strata created an environment of economic and social 
insecurity, leading to anxieties of interpretation and orientation for many of the 
participants in this project. In particular, I focused on the implications of neoliberalism 
for subjectivity via commodification, individuality, and the reformation of the state 
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through the expansion of the penal wing and the reduction of the welfare wing. I 
attempted to demonstrate through census and employment data how the expansion of 
the public sector in the last decade was concentrated in systems of penality and reflected 
the internally contradicting aims of neoliberal state-craft. I also offered an overview of 
Marxist and Weberian frameworks of class identity to investigate how structural 
changes in income classes have affected consumption patterns, success narratives, and 
symbols of class identity, ultimately accounting for the emergence of the 
union/government/corporation bloc that has altered anxieties, class consciousness, 
work, and the ability to organize politically. I concluded that the desire for public sector 
work is at once a proactive alignment with the neoliberal project of the state and a 
reaction to shrinking public entitlements and instability in the labor market, arising from 
an environment in which social insecurity threatened to pull down anyone perched 
precariously on the boundaries of middle class. 
Chapter 5 investigated technologies of self, implemented by participants in this 
project to construct themselves as ethical subjects. I focused on evangélicos as a 
category of practice and examined subjectivation through moral discourses drawing 
from Weberian frameworks of the protestant ethic, divine callings advanced by 
Calvinism, and efforts to align oneself with God’s will. I offered three examples of how 
technologies of self are constructed socially through discourse in the face of anxiety: a 
peaceful self, fulfillment in life, and ease of life. I noted that since conversions from 
Catholicism comprised a large percentage of evangelical growth in Brazil, comparative 
perspectives of new subjectivities being fashioned from traditional moral systems 
helped explain the contradictions surrounding the morality of public sector work. I 
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concluded that technologies of self, operationalized in the construction of the 
evangélico subject, accounted for significant cultural changes underway in many areas 
of Brazil, including the public sector. Thus, ethical subjectivation at once constrained 
aspirations for employment by limiting employment opportunities in which the 
connection to the supernatural was unclear or not established and by introducing 
opportunities in which employment functioned as a location for embodied practice with 
eternal significance. 
Chapters 6 and 7 offered case studies in which the major themes of the 
preceding chapters could be examined as interrelated, complementary, and 
contradictory forces shaping the desire for public sector work. I selected the case studies 
because they exemplified the goals most often referenced among the Brazilians I 
surveyed when discussing the practical outcomes of public sector work. Chapter 6 
examined travel and the historically rooted meanings of transnationalism to participants 
in this project. In particular, I focused on discourses of contrast categories linking 
public sector work to aspirations of travel, paid time off, and a lifestyle of leisure. I 
offered flexible citizenship as an explanation for the geographic and social positionality 
Brazilians display in changing economic and political environments to take advantage 
of capitalist accumulation and conspicuous consumption abroad. Finally, I argued that 
for many Brazilians, satisfaction from experiential purchases far outweighed that gained 
from material purchases. That is, experiential value increased as time passed and 
narrative forms imbued experiences with new meanings and reworked new forms of 
symbolic and social capital. I concluded that for many Brazilians, travel had less to do 
with an actual quantifiable amount of money and more to do with public employment 
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facilitating travel. Thus, transnational experiences defined the kind of person 
participants envisioned themselves becoming with public sector work. 
Chapter 7 offered home ownership as a case study. I offered a brief history of 
the housing market and the mortgage securities facilitating its expansion, with particular 
attention on government subsidized programs. I considered the meanings of stability 
extended from public sector work to home ownership through access to preferential 
consumer lending, and I argued that owner occupancy (rather than renting) mitigated 
the precarious position faced by many middle class families in maintaining class 
belonging. I suggested that traditional markers of middle class identity, such as 
employing domestic help and displaying gender roles, have been supplanted by home 
ownership in the new millennium due to legal initiatives affording greater protection to 
domestic workers and requiring families to choose between domestic help or consumer 
debt. Ultimately, I argued that the markers signaled by consumer lending solidified 
class belonging. Finally, I considered home ownership as a site of production for 
leisure, extending to vacation homes and weekend villas now accessible through second 
mortgages and home equity loans. 
Race and Religion 
The ethnographic project is, by nature, an incomplete snapshot of a particular 
people at a particular time and place, interpreted for the reader through the eyes of the 
ethnographer. The so-called “crisis in representation” challenged anthropologists to 
incorporate reflexivity into the ethnographic project, and it is with that in mind that the 
following paragraphs acknowledge a few of the shortcomings of this dissertation.  
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First, a critique I received from reviewers was that my fieldwork did not 
adequately address the topic of race among participants in this project. I agree. Part of 
this was due to limitations in my initial research design: I did not include in my original 
proposal a protocol to investigate racial identity, so I had not thought through the “how” 
of studying race prior to moving to Brazil. At the outset of my fieldwork, my formal 
interview scripts did not contain questions about race and I was not intentional about 
asking about it when I surveyed Brazilians about public sector work. That is not to say 
the topic of race did not come up during fieldwork. Unlike in the US, where class is the 
“only American identity term that is organized primarily around an economic axis” 
(Ortner 2006:72), class identity in Brazil is very closely tied to racial identity. So the 
topic of race frequently surfaced in discussions about class or economic security, albeit 
in veiled and often obscure ways.  
For example, while watching an NBA game in the home of Lucinete one 
evening, she turned to me and asked, “Is basketball the national game over there?” I 
replied without giving it much thought, “No. Most would say baseball is the national 
past time. Or football.” Frowning, she asked again, “Is basketball not the common 
man’s game? It seems like only the poor play basketball over there.” After a long pause, 
I realized what she was saying. I asked, “What is the national game here?” She 
immediately replied, “Soccer. Soccer is the national game. It’s the poor man’s game in 
Brazil.” Then she explained matter-of-factly, “Only the rich can afford to send their 
kids to play basketball. Look at all the Brazilian basketball players. They are all white. 
Yours are all black.”  
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I share this excerpt to illustrate the complexity of race and class in Brazil and the 
ease with which categories of race and class were used interchangeably in conversation. 
There is a vast and excellent literature on the subject of race in Brazil, much of which 
offers far better examples than the one outlined above. But in this dissertation project, I 
was not prepared to engage this body of literature in my fieldwork. It was not until I 
began the phase of conducting formal interviews that I started asking participants about 
their racial identity and the effect they thought it had on higher education, income, and 
public sector work. Responses were often dismissive and usually led to a critique of the 
quota system. In fact, only one student—Ana Paula, who had herself been granted 
entrance to a university through a quota program—identified racial discrimination as a 
problem in higher education and a barrier to equal income earnings.  
At the opening of each formal interview, I asked participants to state their race, 
along with other demographic markers of identity (including age, sex, class, religion, 
residential neighborhood, and household income). Usually, students and family 
members self-identified using terms I would have used to describe their racial identity. 
However, on a few occasions, participants self-identified using a term reflecting a 
darker position on the “skin-tone continuum” (Wacquant 2008) than I would have used. 
Rebeca was one such student whose racial status I would have identified as mixed 
(parda) but who self-identified as black (negra). She also self-identified as lower-
middle class (classe media baixa), even though her monthly household income was 
among the highest of families in this project (R$11,800, or Classe A, in 2012). It is 
possible her self-identification was comparative, that is, shaped by the interview setting 
and my own racial identity (I am white, branca). On the other hand, it is also quite 
199 
possible that she was aware of her own Afro-Brazilian ancestry and intentionally 
emphasized her negra identity in discussions about race. While she did not support 
racial quotas in higher education or public sector work, she was active as a member of 
the Afro-Brazilian women’s group on campus. Her self-identification, then, might have 
reflected a political or social agenda. In any case, her example illustrates how my 
fieldwork failed to adequately investigate issues of race among participants in this 
project. 
The new middle class is itself a demographic marked by racial tensions. Arnold 
and Jalles (2014) note that Brazilians of color made up one of the largest segments of 
newcomers to the middle class between the years of 2002 to 2012, second only to those 
from rural areas (Figure 12). It is unclear how exactly members from “traditional” 
middle class families viewed these newcomers, but I suspect there were anxieties 
surrounding the changing face of the middle class. 
 
Source: Arnold and Jalles 2014. 
Figure 12. Characteristics of the new middle class 
The mass protests of 2013 amplified some of these concerns to an international 
audience and displayed the consequences of downward mobility in public discourse. 
Brazilian scholars and public officials alike tried to classify demonstrators into well-
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defined groups of occupational, racial, or religious belonging. One commentator 
emphasized race, arguing, “black and brown newcomers to the middle class do not want 
to risk falling back into the working class, so they protest the loss of consumptive 
power” (Singer 2013). To me, the lines were not so clearly drawn. Even though 
Brazilians on the whole reject the concept of race (Hasenbalg 1991), inequalities in 
income distribution remain tied to racial categories. Racism continues to be veiled as 
socioeconomic disadvantage, and rather than support efforts to reduce inequality by 
targeting racial and socioeconomic barriers, many Brazilians I surveyed do not consider 
legitimate the distinction of the two. However, the inequity was obvious and persisted 
in higher education as well as the labor market, where quotas existed to diversify the 
student body and the public sector work force.   
The second shortcoming of this dissertation project concerns religious identity. 
During my fieldwork, I taught English classes at a local center situated on one of the 
busiest avenues in the city. The avenue was a main thoroughfare for the bus lines 
servicing the metropolitan area, and, on any given week night, bus stops were packed 
with students returning from classes or test prep courses. The center maintained a 
religious affiliation, and in addition to offering instructional courses in English and 
Spanish, it also offered courses on various biblical topics. This was not particularly 
unusual in Recife, nor was it unique to the local center at which I worked. The demand 
for English instruction and the desirability of the English language was such that 
courses were commonly offered by Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), 
religiously affiliated institutions, and private test prep centers alike. In fact, at the time 
of my fieldwork, there were a dozen or so centers within a three block radius of the one 
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at which I worked, for-profit and non-profit, secular and religiously affiliated (Figure 
13).  
 
Figure 13. Advertisement brochure for English classes (author 2012) 
In any case, my observations about religious identity and public sector work first 
came about as a result of observing casual conversations among students in these 
classes. That is to say, like race, I did not anticipate confronting religious identity so 
overtly in discussions about public sector work. But the weight of the evangelical 
aspiration and moral discourses surrounding public sector were so pervasive, I could not 
ignore them. Unfortunately, like race, I had not prepared prior to starting my fieldwork 
to engage the body of literature concerning evangelicalism in Brazil. I also did not 
202 
know if the anecdotal evidence I was observing in my classes could be extended to 
evangélicos in particular or Brazilians in general. It was unclear to me if the religious 
affiliation of the center “self-selected” a sample of students with religious identities, or 
if I would have encountered these identities and discourses regardless of where I taught. 
Moreover, at the time of my fieldwork, religious identity appeared to closely follow 
other markers, especially class identity and residential neighborhood, so it was also 
unclear if the moral discourses I observed in these classes were indeed due to religious 
identity or something else, like class. Regardless, the end result was that I began 
investigating the morality of public sector work in conversations with participants in 
this project, the transcripts of which made up a large part of Chapter 5. Thus, my 
analysis would have benefited from a research design addressing religious identity. 
Looking Forward 
As of the writing of this final section, Brazil was heading into the deepest 
recession in more than three decades. The Rouseff administration was facing threats of 
impeachment and the giant, state-owned oil company, Petrobras, was collapsing from 
low oil prices and widespread internal corruption. It remained to be seen if public sector 
work would indeed buffer the ill effects of an economic slow-down, insecurity, and 
declining wages for many of the participants in this project. By 2016, the possibility of 
public sector work was increasingly untenable for many Classe C families, as the 
annual number of open concursos was in decline and reserve lists were growing longer 
and longer. The odds of securing employment for Brazilians who actually managed to 
pass the tests were increasingly exponential and improbable.  
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It should be of no surprise that the concurso apparatus remained intact even with 
an eroding façade of credibility. Tests for public sector work continued to provide 
significant profit to the state and thus continued to be promoted by the state. Moreover, 
the markets created by the demand for test preparation and administration of concursos 
formed a lucrative industry, unlikely to go anywhere in the coming decades. The desire 
for public sector work also remained, as decades of economic and social insecurity 
continued to weigh on the public psyche and frame a bloated public sector as both the 
problem and the solution.  
Though it would require a longer time commitment than allotted for the 
dissertation project, it would be worthwhile investigating the test prep industry that has 
arisen in response to the demand for concursos. In an interview with the director of a 
prestigious private test prep center, I was surprised to learn that the center did not keep 
records on the percentage of students who successfully passed concursos after 
completing their courses. Of course, the director claimed the rate of success was “very 
high” but the extremely competitive selection rates of public sector work is 
contradictory. In 2012, courses ranged from R$100 to R$700 and students often 
enrolled in a dozen courses to prepare for one concurso. Concursos themselves were 
relatively inexpensive to take (R$50), but, as with all things in Brazil, the government 
received a cut of the profit taken in by test administrators and prep centers. Exactly how 
much and in what form was less clear. Thus, an extended study would offer great 
insight into the structural mechanisms at work in the markets supporting the industries 
of test prep and concurso administration. 
204 
This dissertation project offers a “snapshot” of the concurso fever that had swept 
Brazil during the first decade of the millennium. I believe my fieldwork took place at 
the height of the desire for public sector work and captured some of the final successful 
attempts of upwardly mobile families to gain entrance into the middle class and grasp 
stability for their households.  
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